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Expert Knowledge in First Amendment Theory and Doctrine 
Claudia E. Haupt 
In this dissertation, through three separately published articles, I interrogate the role of expert 
knowledge in First Amendment theory and doctrine. I argue that expert knowledge ought to play 
a prominent role in answering doctrinally relevant empirical questions, as in the case of 
incorporating a scientifically grounded understanding of visual perception into Establishment 
Clause inquiries concerning religious symbols. Moreover, the generation and dissemination of 
expert knowledge itself is worthy of First Amendment protection, for example in protecting 
professional speech. And expert knowledge should determine the scope of First Amendment 
protection for professional advice. There is, in other words, a close but often 
underappreciatedconnection between expert knowledge and the First Amendment. 
In Active Symbols, I challenge the assumption sometimes articulated in Establishment Clause 
case law involving religious symbols that visual representations of religious symbols are merely 
“passive” as compared to textual (spoken or written) religious references. Drawing on one 
relevant body of expert knowledge—cognitive neuroscience—I argue that images are at least as 
“active” as text. The lack of judicial expertise on the empirical question of how visual images, as 
opposed to spoken or written words, communicate has led to a distortion in the development of 
Establishment Clause doctrine. This distortion can be remedied by taking relevant expert 
knowledge into consideration where such knowledge can answer germane empirical questions 
that are doctrinally relevant but tend to be outside the realm of judicial expertise. 
Professional Speech argues that the First Amendment protects the communication of expert 
knowledge by a professional to a client-within a professional-client relationship for the purpose 
 
 
of giving professional advice. The First Amendment thus provides a shield against state 
interference that seeks to prescribe or alter the content of professional speech. The key to 
understanding professional speech, I suggest, lies in the concept of the learned professions as 
knowledge communities. First Amendment protection for professional speech can be justified on 
all traditional grounds: autonomy interests of the speaker and listener, marketplace interests, and 
democratic self-government.  
Unprofessional Advice provides a theory to identify the range of valid professional advice for 
First Amendment purposes. Building on the concept of the professions as knowledge 
communities, this article explores the range of professional advice that may be given consistent 
with the professional knowledge community’s common ways of knowing and reasoning and the 
respective profession’s agreed upon methodology. Because knowledge communities are not 
monolithic, there is a range of knowledge that is accepted as good professional advice. Advice 
falling within this range should receive robust First Amendment protection. Advice not within 
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The role of expertise and facts in First Amendment theory and doctrine remains 
underexplored.1 Robert Post, for example, has suggested that because expert knowledge is 
generated in venues other than the paradigmatic marketplace of ideas, it is seemingly 
disconnected from contemporary First Amendment theory.2 In this dissertation, through three 
separately published articles, I interrogate the role of expert knowledge in First Amendment 
theory and doctrine. I argue that expert knowledge ought to play a prominent role in tailoring 
doctrine to adequately address relevant empirical questions, such as by incorporating a 
scientifically grounded understanding of visual perception into Establishment Clause analyses of 
religious symbols. Moreover, the generation and dissemination of expert knowledge itself is 
worthy of First Amendment protection, as I argue in the context of professional speech. The 
scope of protection for professional advice, finally, can be properly delineated by reference to 
knowledge communities generating the underlying expertise. There is, in other words, a close but 
often underappreciated connection between expert knowledge and the First Amendment. 
Each of the three articles of this dissertation offers a distinctive account of how expert 
knowledge interacts with and informs First Amendment theory and doctrine. Taking an internal 
view of First Amendment doctrine, Active Symbols and Unprofessional Advice each chart 
pathways to introduce more empirical accuracy into existing or developing doctrinal frameworks 
by drawing upon bodies of relevant expert knowledge. Taking an external view, Professional 
Speech argues for First Amendment protection for professional speech to avoid distortions of 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897 (2010) (“What has received 
considerably less theoretical and doctrinal attention is the relationship of the First Amendment to questions of hard 
fact, and the extent to which, if at all, the standard First Amendment theories, slogans, and doctrines are applicable 
to questions of demonstrable truth, and , conversely, demonstrable falsity.”). 
2 See ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 




professional knowledge caused by outside interference. First Amendment protection of 
professional advice-giving thus ensures the reliable communication of expertise from the 
professional to the client within the professional-client relationship. Building on this basis, 
Unprofessional Advice offers a theory to delineate the scope of professional advice deserving of 
First Amendment protection. So doing, it draws a comparison with the treatment of expert 
knowledge in tort law and evidence. The range of accurate, reliable, and therefore—from the 
client’s perspective—useful professional advice is to be determined by the knowledge 
community through its shared methodology. 
The Role of Expert Knowledge in Existing First Amendment Doctrine 
The first article offers a new perspective on the role of expert knowledge within existing 
Establishment Clause doctrine. In Active Symbols, I challenge the assumption sometimes 
articulated in Establishment Clause case law involving religious symbols that visual 
representations of religious symbols are merely “passive” as compared to textual (spoken or 
written) religious references. Scientific research shows that in so designating visual 
representations of religious symbols, the courts have it exactly backwards. Visual images, in fact, 
are more “active” in their communication than words. Quite notably, this seemingly reflexive 
misconception is in marked contrast to the Free Speech Clause, where judges have begun more 
seriously to grapple with the difference between the textual and the visual.3 A more accurate 
understanding of how visual images communicate, based on scientific insights generated by an 
expert community, should likewise inform Establishment Clause doctrine. 
                                                          
3 See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 819-21 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(discussing the difference between written materials and violent video games); id. at 851-53 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 




The role of visual communication has received increasing attention in the literature, and the 
scholarly analysis of courts’ treatment of images across different legal areas likewise applies to 
Establishment Clause theory and doctrine. Take Rebecca Tushnet’s exploration of images in 
copyright law as an example.4 She detects a “baseline expectation that text will be the unit of 
analysis.”5 But, she notes, “[i]mages are more vivid and engaging than mere words,” “we process 
images so quickly,” and images “are perceived more as gestalt, while texts appear to the reader 
in a set sequence, most of all of which needs to be processed for the whole to be understood.”6 
These empirical observations concerning visual communication also resonate in the 
Establishment Clause context.  
In Establishment Clause doctrine, the treatment of the high school graduation prayer in Lee v. 
Weisman7 on the one hand and the Seventh Circuit’s apparent difficulty in deciding a case 
involving a high school graduation held in a church where religious various symbols—including 
a very large Latin cross—were present8 on the other illustrates the problem. The lack of judicial 
expertise on the empirical question of how visual images, as opposed to spoken or written words, 
communicate has led to a distortion in the development of Establishment Clause doctrine. Thus, I 
suggest “that characterizing religious symbols as passive is descriptively inaccurate, doctrinally 
incoherent, and analytically unsound. Nevertheless, this remains a common approach in the 
courts. As an empirical matter, judges erroneously ascribe a passive quality to visual displays; 
this is largely based on incorrect assumptions about how visual images communicate.”9 Within 
                                                          
4 Rebecca Tushnet, Worth A Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683 (2012). 
5 Id. at 688. 
6 Id. at 690-91. 
7 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
8 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist. (Elmbrook I), 658 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 2011), rev’d en banc, 687 F.3d 840 
(7th Cir. 2012). 




the current doctrinal Establishment Clause framework, judges can correct these assumptions by 
taking relevant expert knowledge into consideration.  
To demonstrate how expert knowledge can usefully inform judicial decision-making in order 
to answer the important empirical question of how images communicate (as distinct from what 
the symbolic religious message means), I draw on one such body of expert knowledge, the 
neuroscience of visual perception. Cognitive neuroscience teaches that images are at least as 
“active” as text.  How does this expert knowledge enter into the existing doctrinal framework? I 
suggest that a focus on communicative impact, as already exists in the Free Speech realm, 
provides a ready mechanism to introduce an empirically sound approach to Establishment Clause 
analysis. Justice Breyer’s dissent in the violent video games case has already demonstrated that 
courts are institutionally able to appreciate these scientific insights.10 Assessing messages in a 
medium-neutral manner can reverse the doctrinal distortions caused by erroneously treating 
religious visual symbols as “passive.”  
The implications are potentially much broader than domestic Establishment Clause doctrine. 
The European Court of Human Rights was faced with a similar question concerning the visual 
impact of religious symbols in the Italian classroom crucifix case.11 Thus, the insights gained 
from expert knowledge regarding the way in which visual religious symbols communicate can 
inform discussions of the legal treatment of visual religious symbols more generally.12 And, to 
                                                          
10 Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. at 852 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explicitly referencing neuroscience research). 
11 See, e.g., Claudia E. Haupt, Transnational Nonestablishment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 991, 1024-31 (2012) 
(discussing Lautsi v. Italy). 
12 See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks & Pasquale Annicchino, Cross, Crucifix, Culture: An Approach to the 
Constitutional Meaning of Confessional Symbols, 13 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 71 (2014) (“Based on a review of U.S. 
Establishment Clause decisions, Claudia Haupt has cogently argued that government display of visual religious 
symbols is no less problematic than its use of religious texts, and that finding a religious symbol constitutionally 
acceptable because it is “merely passive” overlooks that the government’s display of such symbols often violates the 
Establishment Clause by coercing viewers to violate their personal beliefs or by communicating strong government 




make the potential area of application even broader, the cultural shift from textual to visual 
communication is not confined to religious symbols.13  
Beyond the First Amendment, an emergent body of literature has turned to investigating the 
role of images in traditionally text-based legal argument and federal rulemaking.14 As Elizabeth 
Porter notes, “[w]e are on the cusp of an analytic shift toward a more vibrant, yet potentially 
troubling, visual legal discourse.”15 She suggests that judges and lawyers “don’t take images 
seriously,” and, as a consequence, “we currently lack tools to deal with . . . risks” associated with 
their increasing use.16 “The biggest risk of failing to take images seriously,” Porter contends, “is 
that . . . law lacks tools and traditions for mitigating the risks of image-driven communication.”17 
As a result, “we have no grammar, no syntax, no canons of interpretation for the visual. We lack 
the ingrained institutionalized skepticism that we bring to text.”18 Therefore, she diagnoses a 
tendency of lawyers and courts to “fall prey to naïve realism—the tendency to believe that 
images are transparent conveyors of a single truth—and implicit biases.”19 This naïve realism, 
according to Porter, manifests itself in a range of areas and distorts legal analysis.20  
Ultimately, an internal view of Establishment Clause doctrine concerning visual religious 
symbols must account for the empirical question of how images communicate. The answer can 
                                                          
13 See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money: Santa Fe, Mitchell v. Helms, and the Arc 
of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 787 (2001) (noting the “rapid transmission of pictures 
and symbols around the globe” and its “sweeping consequences for mass societies, far beyond its effects on law in 
general, or upon the small corner of Religion Clause law in particular.”). 
14 See, e.g., Elizabeth G. Porter, Taking Images Seriously, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1687 (2014); Elizabeth G. Porter & 
Kathryn A. Watts, Visual Rulemaking, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1183 (2016). 
15 Porter, Taking Images Seriously, supra note 14, at 1693. 
16 Id. at 1694. 
17 Id. at 1756. 
18 Id. 
19 Id.  
20 Id. at 1758 (“Rebecca Tushnet has convincingly shown that naïve realism infects copyright cases, because 
‘excessive judicial self-confidence’ results in decisions that assess artistic works according to unacknowledged and 
unsophisticated aesthetic judgments. Claudia Haupt has argued that the same lack of visual skepticism has damaged 




be provided by expert knowledge. This type of interaction between doctrine and expertise is a 
point I return to in Unprofessional Advice. 
A First Amendment Theory to Protect Professional Advice as Expert Knowledge 
Professional Speech provides a theory of First Amendment protection for professional 
speech. The conceptual core of this theory is an understanding of the professions as knowledge 
communities whose main reason for existence is the generation and dissemination of knowledge. 
While the concept of “the professions” remains contested, I argue that “knowledge” is the 
defining character of the learned professions. The professional’s advice is valuable to the client 
because the client gains access to a body of knowledge that she would not otherwise have. 
Therefore, I argue, the learned professions are best understood as knowledge communities. 
Members of these knowledge communities share common ways of knowing and reasoning, that 
is, a shared methodology, as a result of training and practice. By drawing on a shared body of 
knowledge, they solve similar problems in their professional practice. 
Taking professional knowledge communities as a conceptual starting point, I argue that the 
First Amendment protects the communication of expert knowledge by a professional to a client, 
thus providing a shield against state interference that seeks to prescribe or alter the content of 
professional speech.  
The article makes the case for understanding the values underlying professional speech as 
distinct from those underlying other forms of speech.21 It rejects the analogy made with 
                                                          
21 See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, Professional Speech and the First Amendment, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 67, 75 (2016) 
(“The impulse to treat professional speech as a distinct category is further buttressed by impressive theoretical 
arguments regarding the distinctive nature of professional speech, particularly when one focuses on the learned 
professions, a distinctiveness largely marked by the unique training and expertise of such professionals. One of the 
strongest and most imposing efforts along these lines is Claudia Haupt’s argument that the professional speech 
doctrine is justified because of professionals' inherent character as ‘knowledge communities’ or ‘communities 




commercial speech, arguing that the underlying interests are fundamentally different.22 Instead, it 
suggests that the normative basis of professional speech is best considered on its own terms. 
Without taking a position regarding the best justification for First Amendment protection of 
speech generally,23 I suggest that professional speech protection can be justified under all 
standard theories. In this approach, this article differs from a leading account of the interaction 
between expert knowledge and the First Amendment, provided by Post, which emphasizes the 
role of “democratic legitimation” and “democratic competence.” 24 This mirrors Post’s general 
First Amendment theory that ascribes a “lexical priority” to participatory democracy theory.25 
This article, by contrast, places equal emphasis on autonomy interests of the speaker and listener. 
So doing, it builds on the importance of the fiduciary duty between professional and client.26 In 
short, listener autonomy can only be served if the professional communicates knowledge that is 
comprehensive, accurate, and personally tailored to the specific situation of the client. 
Importantly in professional settings, the ultimate decision rests with the client. Speaker 
autonomy in this context is not the autonomy to speak one’s own mind, as is the case in public 
discourse, but to communicate professional insights in accordance with the knowledge 
community. This is also the fundamental assumption of the tort regime where the benchmark for 
malpractice liability is exercise of the profession according to skill of a reasonably well-qualified 
professional. 
                                                          
22 See, e.g., Timothy Zick, Professional Rights Speech, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1289, 1349 (2015) (noting that “Halberstam 
and Post both suggest that professional speech merits protection roughly analogous to that provided for commercial 
speech. Haupt would peg protection for professional speech to the state of the art in the relevant ‘knowledge 
community.’ Under her approach, any professional speech that does not follow the discipline’s standard of care, as 
determined by the expert community, would not be entitled to free speech protection.”). 
23 Cf. Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 119-20 (1986) (suggesting that there is 
not one exclusive approach to justifying First Amendment protection). 
24 Post, supra note 2, at xii-xiii. 
25 See Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 
2373 (2000). 
26 Cf. Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.  1183, 1218 n.147 (2016) (discussing First 




The article contributes to the larger debate over whether professional speech is a distinctive 
form of speech,27 a question that has gained doctrinal significance as the federal appellate courts 
are in marked disagreement regarding its treatment.28 For example, a panel of the Eleventh 
Circuit issued three consecutive conflicting opinions in the same case, highlighting the profound 
difficulties courts face in analyzing the underlying theoretical and doctrinal questions.29 
Tailoring First Amendment Doctrine Based on Expert Knowledge  
Unprofessional Advice provides a theory to identify the range of valid professional advice for 
First Amendment purposes. Building on the concept of the professions as knowledge 
communities, this article explores the range of professional advice that may be given consistent 
with the professional knowledge community’s common ways of knowing and reasoning and the 
agreed upon methodology. A central question here is where First Amendment protection for 
professional speech ends and malpractice liability begins. Because knowledge communities are 
not monolithic, there is a range of knowledge that is accepted as good professional advice. 
Advice falling within this range should receive robust First Amendment protection. Advice 
                                                          
27 Compare id. at 68 (“The purpose of this Article is to arrest the momentum of the professional speech doctrine, and 
urge its rejection.”) with Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status 
of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 843 (1999); Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First 
Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 947 (conceptualizing “professional 
speech” as speech “uttered in the course of professional practice” distinct from “speech . . . uttered by a 
professional.”). I adopt Halberstam’s and Post’s approach, see Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE 
L.J. 1238, 1240 n.1 (2016). 
28 Compare Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding California conversion therapy law as a 
permissible regulation of conduct) with King v. Christie, 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014) (upholding New Jersey 
conversion therapy law as permissible regulation of speech).  
29 See Wollschlaeger v. Florida, 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014) (upholding Florida law prohibiting doctors from 
inquiring about gun ownership as “a legitimate regulation of professional conduct.”) vacated and superseded on 
reh’g Wollschlaeger v. Florida, 797 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2015) (upholding the Florida law as “a permissible 
restriction on physician speech.” The court reached its decision applying “a lesser level of scrutiny” commonly 
applied in commercial speech cases) vacated and superseded on reh’g Wollschlaeger v. Florida, 2015 WL 8639875 
(11th Cir. Dec 14, 2015) (upholding the Florida law as “a permissible restriction on physician speech.” This time, 
however, the court applied strict scrutiny.) The Eleventh Circuit then decided the case en banc, striking down three 
of the four provisions of the Florida law, affording professional speech “heightened scrutiny.” See Wollschlaeger v. 




outside of this range, however, is subject to malpractice liability, and the First Amendment 
provides no defense. 
In a move akin to that in Active Symbols, this article suggests incorporating expert knowledge 
into existing doctrine. So doing, it draws on insights from tort law and evidence to provide a 
theoretical basis for distinguishing good and bad professional advice. Conceptualizing the 
professions as knowledge communities introduces the idea of a shared methodology.  
Knowledge communities, to reiterate, are not monolithic, but their shared notions of validity 
limit the range of acceptable opinions found within them. With respect to the emphasis on 
methodology, the article is in conversation with a larger body of literature concerning the role of 
science in law and policy.30 Extending protection to good professional advice and imposing 
malpractice liability on bad advice requires a normative and doctrinal defense for excluding 
outliers from First Amendment protection when their professional advice diverges too much 
from the profession’s consensus. The question of consensus in turn ties in to this larger 
discussion of uses of science in law.31 The profession’s “consensus,” notwithstanding some 
epistemic relativism, means that “[i]f most or all members of the relevant thought collective are 
in agreement, then that collective judgment surely demands a high degree of respect from society 
in general and the law more particularly.”32 
On this basis, I suggest that the justification for professional advice must be grounded in 
shared methodology. Those who do not base their advice on the profession’s shared 
methodology place themselves outside of the knowledge community; they are thus external 
                                                          
30 See, e.g., Symposium: Science Challenges for Law and Policy, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1631 (2015). 
31 As a leading scholar of Science and Technology Studies notes, “the argument is not that science has been able to 
access unvarnished truth, but rather that scientific communities have been able to set aside all theoretical and 
methodological disagreements to come together on a shared position.” Sheila Jasanoff, Serviceable Truths: Science 
for Action in Law and Policy, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1723, 1741 (2015). 




outliers. Those who base their professional advice upon the profession’s shared methodology, 
but are outside of the profession’s consensus are internal outliers. In accordance with the 
existing tort regime, whether their advice clears the malpractice bar is for the profession itself to 
decide. 
Ultimately, “grounding First Amendment protection of professional speech in the protection 
of knowledge communities . . . provides a powerful basis for resisting”33 intrusive state 
regulation that seeks to alter the content of professional advice. The implications resonate in a 
number of ways across different professions.34 
* * * 
Through the lens of these three separate but complementary inquiries, I examine the role of 
expert knowledge in various First Amendment contexts. A tension seems to exist between expert 
knowledge and the values underlying the First Amendment; Post, in identifying this tension, 
suggested that “[e]xpert knowledge requires exactly what normal First Amendment doctrine 
prohibits.”35 Indeed, the treatment of expert knowledge in First Amendment theory exposes 
important differences to public discourse. Two aspects stand out: listener interests and speaker 
                                                          
33 Carl Coleman, Reconciling the First Amendment with the Regulation of Professional-Client Communications, 
JOTWELL (January 27, 2017) (reviewing Claudia E. Haupt, Unprofessional Advice, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. (forthcoming 2017)) http://health.jotwell.com/reconciling-the-first-amendment-with-the-regulation-of-
professional-client-communications/ (“By grounding First Amendment protection of professional speech in the 
protection of knowledge communities, Haupt provides a powerful basis for resisting efforts to prevent physicians 
from asking the kind of questions that their professional standards require. At the same time, it leaves ample room 
for regulating professional communications that fall outside professional norms.”). 
34 See, e.g., Claudia E. Haupt, Religious Outliers: Professional Knowledge Communities, Individual Conscience 
Claims, and the Availability of Professional Services to the Public, in LAW, RELIGION, AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED 
STATES (Holly F. Lynch, I. Glenn Cohen & Elizabeth Sepper eds., Cambridge University Press forthcoming 2017) 
(applying analytical framework to health professions); Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Ethics, Personal Conscience, 
and Public Expectations, 27 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 233 (2016) (commenting on American Medical Association policy 
statement on physician exercise of conscience); Claudia E. Haupt, Antidiscrimination in the Legal Profession and 
the First Amendment: A Partial Defense of Model Rule 8.4(g), 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. ONLINE __ (forthcoming 2017) 
(analyzing American Bar Association Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g)). 
35 Post, supra note 2, at 9 (noting that “[i]f content and viewpoint neutrality is ‘the cornerstone of the Supreme 




inequality. Both remain generally underexplored in First Amendment theory though they are of 
foundational importance in the context of professional speech. 
The predominant perspective in First Amendment doctrine tends to focus primarily on 
speaker interests. But in the professional context, this focus is misplaced. Likewise, First 
Amendment jurisprudence traditionally has been firmly committed to speaker equality in public 
discourse. The underlying justification is based in democratic theory: a fundamental belief in 
equality of speakers in public discourse is necessary for equal participation, which in turn forms 
the basis of democracy. This strong notion of equality of speakers and opinions pervades the 
First Amendment. 
The justifications underlying professional speech protection, however, run opposite to these 
assumptions. The very purpose of professional speech is to provide useful advice to the client. A 
focus solely on the speaker is misplaced because within the professional-client relationship, the 
perspective of the listener—who receives access to knowledge from the speaker—is essential. 
Moreover, the professional deploying her expert knowledge within the professional-client 
relationship affirmatively is not equal to other, non-professional speakers. The existence of a 
professional-client relationship is key: in public discourse, expert knowledge is just another 
opinion. 36  But professional advice is not just another opinion. 
Taken together, these three independent yet related articles illustrate the importance of expert 
knowledge and its potential for interacting with and informing First Amendment theory and 
doctrine.  
                                                          
36 See Post, supra note 2, at 44 (“Within public discourse, traditional First Amendment doctrine systematically 





CLAUDIA E. HAUPT 
Abstract: Visual representations of religious symbols continue to puzzle judges. 
Lacking empirical data on how images communicate, courts routinely dismiss 
visual religious symbols as “passive.” This Article challenges the notion that 
symbols are passive, introducing insights from cognitive neuroscience research 
to Establishment Clause theory and doctrine. It argues that visual symbolic mes-
sages can be at least as active as textual messages. Therefore, religious messages 
should be assessed in a medium-neutral manner in terms of their communicative 
impact, that is, irrespective of their textual or visual form. Providing a new con-
ceptual framework for assessing religious symbolic messages, this Article recon-
ceptualizes coercion and endorsement—the dominant competing approaches to 
symbolic messages in Establishment Clause theory—as matters of degree on a 
spectrum of communicative impact. This focus on communicative impact recon-
ciles the approaches to symbolic speech in the Free Speech and Establishment 
Clause contexts and allows Establishment Clause theory to more accurately ac-
count for underlying normative concerns. 
INTRODUCTION 
It’s no help to the cause of constitutional interpretation that religion is an 
emotional subject and that there is no systematic evidence of the social, po-
litical, psychological, cultural, ethical, or indeed religious consequences of 
the display of religious symbols in today’s United States. Here as elsewhere 
evidence-based law remains a dream. 
—Judge Richard Posner1 
Consider two public school graduation ceremonies. During the first cere-
mony, held at the school, an invited member of the clergy steps onto the stage 
                                                                                                                           
 © 2014, Claudia E. Haupt. All rights reserved. 
  Associate-in-Law, Columbia Law School. Many thanks to Richard Albert, Caroline Corbin, MJ 
Durkee, Jim Fleming, David Fontana, Kent Greenawalt, Philip Hamburger, Joel Harrison, Walter 
Haupt, Michael Heller, Jessie Hill, Chip Lupu, Gillian Metzger, Henry Monaghan, James Nelson, 
David Noll, Fred Schauer, and participants in workshops at Boston College Law School, Columbia 
Law School, George Washington University Law School, the University of Houston Law Center, 
Western New England University School of Law, and the 2013 Religious Legal Theory Conference 
for insightful comments and discussions. 
 1 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist. (Elmbrook II), 687 F.3d 840, 873 (7th Cir. 2012) (en 
banc) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
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and offers an invocation and benediction—both are nonsectarian.2 The second 
graduation ceremony is held not in the school building but rather “in the main 
sanctuary of . . . a local Christian evangelical and non-denominational” church 
where “[a]n enormous Latin cross, fixed to the wall, hangs over the dais and 
dominates the proceedings.”3 But none of the participants engage in prayer or 
make any reference to the cross, other religious symbols present in the church, 
or religion generally. 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the first scenario was unconstitutional 
as a violation of the Establishment Clause in Lee v. Weisman.4 The second sce-
nario, conversely, was initially upheld by a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit—the first federal appellate court to rule on 
the constitutionality of the practice of holding public school graduation cere-
monies in houses of worship—against an Establishment Clause challenge.5 
The Seventh Circuit later reversed en banc, but over strong dissents from judg-
es Ripple, Easterbrook, and Posner.6 
Do religious symbols communicate messages differently than religious 
words in prayer or scripture? Courts have repeatedly dismissed visual repre-
sentations of religious symbols as merely “passive,” crafting a distinction be-
tween the visual and the textual that significantly underestimates the commu-
nicative power of the former. This suggests that courts deem visual religious 
displays less powerful, and therefore, less constitutionally suspect than textual 
religious messages. Are religious visual symbols more benign than prayer be-
cause they are merely “passive”? This question—fundamentally important 
both for Establishment Clause theory and doctrine—remains underexplored in 
the literature. 
This Article argues that characterizing religious symbols as passive is de-
scriptively inaccurate, doctrinally incoherent, and analytically unsound. Never-
theless, this remains a common approach in the courts. As an empirical matter, 
judges erroneously ascribe a passive quality to visual displays; this is largely 
based on incorrect assumptions about how visual images communicate.7 Courts 
                                                                                                                           
 2 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 581–84 (1992). 
 3 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist. (Elmbrook I), 658 F.3d 710, 712–13, 715 (7th Cir. 
2011), rev’d en banc, 687 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 4 Lee, 505 U.S. at 586. 
 5 See Elmbrook I, 658 F.3d at 712. 
 6 Elmbrook II, 687 F.3d at 843; id. at 861 (Ripple, J., dissenting); id. at 869 (Easterbrook, C.J., 
dissenting); id. at 872 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 7 See infra notes 138–238 and accompanying text. Assessing the difference between the textual 
and the visual is not just an Establishment Clause concern. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Com-
pelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 2), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2258742, archived at http://perma.cc/7DD7-TAE9 (discussing “the new trend of com-
pelled visual speech” and its First Amendment implications). Beyond the First Amendment, the role 
of the visual recently has received attention in areas such as evidence, copyright, and trademark law. 
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tend to assume a lower intensity of communicative impact when religious sym-
bols are at issue than when spoken or written religious words are at issue, mani-
festing a hierarchical binary: text is presumed active and privileged over images 
which are merely passive.8 In doing so, this Article argues, the courts have it ex-
actly backwards. 
In contrast to the Establishment Clause context, courts have made incipi-
ent efforts in the speech context to evaluate the distinctions between the textual 
and the visual.9 The notion that certain visual expressions are “passive” is chal-
lenged in the speech cases, putting into stark contrast the recognized power of 
images in these cases with the “passive” designation in cases involving visual 
religious symbols. To moderate that disconnect, this Article makes the case for 
more symmetry within the First Amendment as it concerns empirical claims 
regarding the perception of visual symbols. 
The novelty of the approach to visual symbols presented in this Article lies 
in the insight that by neglecting the difference between the textual and the visual, 
Establishment Clause theory and doctrine overlook a distinction that is important 
for assessing the communicative impact of the message. Unlike other approaches 
that prefer to textualize the symbols or do not explicitly distinguish between the 
visual and the textual,10 this Article argues that the inquiry best starts with the 
visual image. First, as an empirical matter, how do images—and, by extension, 
visual representations of religious symbols—communicate? Second, as a matter 
                                                                                                                           
See, e.g., NEAL FEIGENSON & CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW ON DISPLAY: THE DIGITAL TRANSFOR-
MATION OF LEGAL PERSUASION AND JUDGMENT 104 (2009) (discussing the role of visuals in evi-
dence law); Laura A. Heymann, The Law of Reputation and the Interest of the Audience, 52 B.C. L. 
REV. 1341, 1385–86 (2011) (discussing the purposes of visual symbols in the context of trademark 
law); Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of 
Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 841 (2009) (discussing the effects of “competing 
factual perceptions” in evidence law); Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of 
Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 687 (2012) (discussing images in the context of copyright law). 
 8 See generally JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, trans., 
The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, rev. ed. 1998) (1967) (discussing the historical hierarchical binaries 
that dominate Western thought, including that between the active and the passive). Scholars have 
observed this phenomenon in other speech contexts as well. See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 7, at 24–25 
(discussing compelled speech and the reason/emotion binary). 
 9 See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2750–51 (2011) (Alito, J., concur-
ring in the judgment) (discussing the difference between written materials and violent video games); 
id. at 2768–69 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (distinguishing video games from more passive forms of me-
dia); see also R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1211–13 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (discuss-
ing textual and visual warning statements on cigarette packages). 
 10 See, e.g., B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic Critique of the 
Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491, 493 (2005) (textualizing visual images); Frank S. Ravitch, 
Religious Objects as Legal Subjects, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1011, 1016 (2005) (initially focusing 
on the religious objects and symbols); Mark Strasser, Passive Observers, Passive Displays, and the 
Establishment Clause, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1123, 1130–34 (2010) (not explicitly distinguish-
ing between the visual and the textual). 
14
824 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:821 
of cultural interpretation, what do symbols mean? This second step of the analy-
sis draws from the existing literature on the interpretation of religious symbols.11 
Although some have observed that courts fail to appreciate the power of sym-
bols, placing them at “the bottom of the speech hierarchy,”12 the visual nature of 
religious symbols remains underexamined. Scholars have occasionally criticized 
the characterization of religious symbols as “passive.”13 But what is noticeably 
absent from the literature critical of the “passive” characterization is an empirical 
assessment of whether it is descriptively accurate; this Article concludes that it is 
not. 
That religious symbolic images are powerful is not a new insight; the bouts 
of iconoclasm during the Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century, for 
instance, suggest as much. But engaging the power of images and the power of 
words equally in what this Article calls a “medium-neutral approach” is neces-
sary to strike the correct normative balance in Establishment Clause theory. 
This Article proceeds from the normative premise that the State may not 
adopt a religious identity; it may neither determine its own religious preference 
nor communicate such a preference to its citizens.14 The underlying concern is 
to avoid harm resulting from excluding groups of citizens from fully engaging 
in democratic participation, an interest grounded in political theory considera-
tions. All citizens, regardless of religious affiliation or lack thereof, will rely on 
the state’s responsiveness to their concerns. In the free speech context, Robert 
Post articulated the value of participatory democracy as allowing citizens to 
“experience the value of self-government.”15 Similar considerations obtain 
with respect to nonestablishment: “[e]very group must be able to compete for 
political influence and participate in determining a society’s identity and goals 
and the means to achieve them.”16 This is particularly important in a democrat-
ic society with increasing religious pluralism, both among religious groups and 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See infra notes 239–299 and accompanying text. 
 12 Timothy Zick, Cross Burning, Cockfighting, and Symbolic Meaning: Toward a First Amend-
ment Ethnography, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2261, 2394 (2004). 
 13 See, e.g., Ravitch, supra note 10, at 1016 (asserting that “there is no such thing as a ‘passive’ 
religious object or symbol”); Strasser, supra note 10, at 1124 (criticizing the lack of clarity in judicial 
uses of the term). 
 14 See Charles Taylor, The Meaning of Secularism, HEDGEHOG REV., Fall 2010, at 23, 23 (stating 
that “no religious outlook or (religious or areligious) Weltanschauung can enjoy a privileged status, let 
alone be adopted as the official view of the state”). 
 15 Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 483 (2011). The 
objective of participation under this theory is “making government responsive to their views.” Id. at 
484. Each citizen must equally have the opportunity to participate; indeed, this equal opportunity is 
deemed “vital to the legitimacy of the entire legal system.” James Weinstein, Participatory Democra-
cy as the Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 498 (2011). 
 16 Claudia E. Haupt, Transnational Nonestablishment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 991, 1061 (2012). 
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between religion and nonreligion. When the State assumes its own religious 
identity, it jeopardizes this fundamental value. 
This Article proceeds in a descriptive, an empirical-analytic, and a pre-
scriptive part. Part I explicates the two dominant approaches to Establishment 
Clause questions involving symbolic communicative acts—coercion and en-
dorsement.17 The prevailing current theory conceives of coercion and en-
dorsement as different in kind. This Part then explains how the notion of “pas-
sive” symbols maps onto these two central theories. It demonstrates that the 
passive quality courts ascribe to religious symbols operates in a constitutional-
ly relevant manner. But the notion that visual religious symbols are passive—
in contrast to textual religious messages—is based on a misconception about 
the communicative power of images. Judicial assessments of visual religious 
symbols are missing important empirical information about how visual images 
communicate. Yet, empirical evidence is readily available. 
Part II imports cognitive neuroscience literature18—both as primary 
source material and as applied to other areas of the law (in what is sometimes 
described as the emerging field of “neurolaw”19)—into Establishment Clause 
theory.20 As this Part explains, empirical evidence from the field of cognitive 
neuroscience teaches us that the human brain processes words and images dif-
ferently. Images are processed at higher rates than textual components and they 
are more directly linked to emotion than text.21 Visual symbolic messages 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See infra notes 24–137 and accompanying text. 
 18 Cognitive neuroscience emerged in the 1990s as a result of combining psychology with the 
functional analysis of the brain made possible by technological advances in brain imaging. See Oliver 
R. Goodenough & Micaela Tucker, Law and Cognitive Neuroscience, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 61, 
63–65 (2010). 
 19 Neurolaw is the combined study of law and neuroscience. Id. at 63–65 (providing a brief over-
view of the development of neurolaw). Insights from neuroscience are increasingly playing a role in 
the legal field, both in case law and legal academic literature. See, e.g., Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. 
Ct. at 2768 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing neuroscience data); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 
(2010) (discussing “brain science”); Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: 
Functional Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental States, 62 STAN. L. 
REV. 1119, 1134–35 (2010); Nita A. Farahany, Incriminating Thoughts, 64 STAN. L. REV. 351, 366–
68 (2012); Amanda C. Pustilnik, Pain as Fact and Heuristic: How Pain Neuroimaging Illuminates 
Moral Dimensions of Law, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 801, 815–16 (2012); Erez Reuveni, Copyright, Neu-
roscience, and Creativity, 64 ALA. L. REV. 735, 738 (2013); Frederick Schauer, Can Bad Science Be 
Good Evidence? Neuroscience, Lie Detection, and Beyond, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1191, 1203–04 
(2010); Lois A. Weithorn, Developmental Neuroscience, Children’s Relationships with Primary 
Caregivers, and Child Protection Policy Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1487, 1537–41 (2012); 
Dominique J. Church, Note, Neuroscience in the Courtroom: An International Concern, 53 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1825, 1831–40 (2012). See generally NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, 
AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE (Brent Garland ed., 2004) (providing a report and commissioned papers 
discussing the relationship between neuroscience and the law); Kevin Davis, Brain Trials, A.B.A. J., 
Nov. 2012, at 37, 42 (providing a perspective on neuroscience in the courtroom). 
 20 See infra notes 151–187 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 151–187 and accompanying text. 
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therefore can be at least as active as textual symbolic messages. Further, this 
Part analyzes how these characteristics of visual images implicate constitution-
al analysis in the speech context. There, several Supreme Court opinions dis-
play a—largely intuitive—assessment of the visual and textual that indicates a 
higher sensitivity to the communicative power of images than in the Estab-
lishment Clause context. Finally, this Part distinguishes the empirical claim—
how images communicate—from the cultural interpretation of what symbols 
mean. 
Part III explains what these insights mean as a prescriptive matter for Es-
tablishment Clause theory and, more broadly, First Amendment approaches to 
visual symbols.22 It makes three discrete contributions to First Amendment 
theory, both in the Free Speech and the Establishment Clause context. First, the 
theoretical and doctrinal approach to religious symbols ought to be reassessed 
in light of the empirical evidence on how images communicate. The character-
ization of religious symbols as “passive” is inaccurate, so at a minimum, the 
prescriptive lesson is to abandon it and treat visual representations of religious 
symbols the same as spoken or written religious texts. Second, contributing to 
greater symmetry within the First Amendment, this Part moves to reconcile the 
treatment of visual symbolic messages in Free Speech and Establishment 
Clause theory by shifting the focus to communicative impact. Third, having 
abandoned the active/passive distinction, the evaluation of religious symbolic 
messages—like that of textual messages—ought to be conceptualized accord-
ing to their communicative impact, irrespective of the medium by which they 
are conveyed. This Part provides a novel conceptual framework for doing so. 
Within the communicative impact framework, in which endorsement and coer-
cion are reconceptualized as matters of degree rather than kind, the medium-
neutral focus on communicative impact allows us to more accurately account 
for the underlying theoretical concerns of the Establishment Clause. The foun-
dational normative concern is that the State may not take on its own religious 
identity, and therefore may also not communicate its own religious preference. 
For such a communicative act expressing the state’s religious identity or pref-
erence, the medium used to convey the message is secondary to its communi-
cative impact. 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See infra notes 300–364 and accompanying text. 
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I. FROM WORDS TO IMAGES 
Although law traditionally has been mostly concerned with texts,23 the 
cultural—and therefore also legal—significance of visuals has increased quite 
dramatically.24 This increased significance of visuals is reflected in the Estab-
lishment Clause context. The two graduation scenarios used in the introductory 
example illustrate a shift in Establishment Clause litigation over time: from a 
focus on words to images; from a focus on the textual to the visual.25 
In the Supreme Court, the first Establishment Clause cases were about 
money,26 then spoken prayers and devotional Bible readings.27 Over time, dis-
putes increasingly involved public displays of religious messages. Among 
these were textual displays, such as the Ten Commandments, and nontextual 
displays.28 The first two iconic Supreme Court cases involving nontextual reli-
gious imagery in Christmas displays, decided in the 1980s, were Lynch v. Don-
nelly and County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter.29 More 
recently, the Supreme Court confronted the display of a Latin cross directly in 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See Christina Spiesel, Reflections on Reading: Words and Pictures and Law, in LAW, MIND 
AND BRAIN 391, 391 (Michael Freeman & Oliver R. Goodenough eds., 2009) (“[Law] has thought of 
itself as pre-eminently about the use of words and their linear logics.”). 
 24 FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 7, at 10 (asserting that “our culture, and increasingly now 
the law as well—has gone visual”); Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money: 
Santa Fe, Mitchell v. Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 
787 (2001) (discussing the “rapid transmission of pictures and symbols around the globe” and its 
“sweeping consequences for mass societies, far beyond its effect on law in general, or upon the small 
corner of Religion Clause law in particular”). 
 25 Cf. Lupu, supra note 24, at 788 (“In a fast-moving political culture in which visual images 
dominate public focus, public controversy over matters of government speech about religion can be 
expected to take precedence over issues of government money in support of religion.”). 
 26 See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 292–93 (1899) (holding that congressional funding for 
a Roman Catholic hospital in Washington, D.C. was permissible). 
 27 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 61 (1985) (holding that state law authorizing a one-
minute period of silence for prayer or meditation at the beginning of the school day violated the Estab-
lishment Clause); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963) (holding that a state 
action requiring Bible passages be read at the opening of the school day violated the Establishment 
Clause); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422–24 (1962) (holding that public school prayer violated 
Establishment Clause). 
 28 McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 858 (2005) (holding unconstitutional a Ten 
Commandments display in a courthouse); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005) (plurality 
opinion) (holding constitutional a Ten Commandments display on the grounds of the Texas Capitol); 
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40 (1980) (per curiam) (holding unconstitutional a Ten Command-
ments display in school classrooms); see also Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464 
(2009) (holding that no First Amendment claim to forum access existed for a religious display in a 
park that contained Ten Commandments). 
 29 Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 579 (1989) (holding 
unconstitutional a Christmas display featuring crèche in a courthouse, while holding constitutional a 
Christmas display featuring a Christmas tree and menorah on public property); Lynch v. Donnelly, 
465 U.S. 668, 672 (1984) (holding constitutional a Christmas display featuring a crèche on public 
property). 
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a case involving a veterans’ memorial in the Mojave Desert.30 The Court has 
since denied certiorari in two other cases involving the Latin cross.31 
As the role of religious symbols became more controversial, such cases be-
came more salient.32 But the approach to visual symbols remains under-
theorized and subject to criticism.33 The Supreme Court most recently revisited 
the Establishment Clause in a textual speech case, upholding the practice of leg-
islative prayer at town board meetings.34 The resulting doctrinal parameters must 
take account of symbolic messages in future cases. Indeed, a challenge in the 
Elmbrook graduation-at-church case is already before the Court.35 Disputes over 
symbols will continue to arise, forcing courts to engage the power of visuals. 
A. Coercion and Endorsement as Distinct in Kind 
The key divide in theoretical and doctrinal approaches to the Establish-
ment Clause remains that between coercion and endorsement.36 The doctrinal 
fundamentals with respect to religious symbols are relatively simple, but in-
creasingly contested. The primary doctrinal basis remains the three-part test 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman.37 Justice Sandra Day 
                                                                                                                           
 30 Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 706 (2010); see also Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. 
v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995) (holding that a First Amendment claim to forum access existed 
for a cross display). 
 31 See Mount Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk (Trunk IV), 132 S. Ct. 2535, 2535 (2012) (denying 
certiorari on a case where the Ninth Circuit held that the Mount Soledad war memorial violated the 
Establishment Clause); Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 12 (2011) 
(denying certiorari where the Tenth Circuit held that memorial crosses next to highways were uncon-
stitutional). 
 32 Cf. 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIR-
NESS 74 (2008) (suggesting as the underlying reason that cases involving religious texts and symbols 
in public places did not reach the Supreme Court until 1980 “that various long-standing practices 
reflecting a Christian point of view have grown to seem more problematic than they had to earlier 
generations”). 
 33 See, e.g., Utah Highway, 132 S. Ct. at 22 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (noting 
in the context of Establishment Clause cases involving religious symbols, that “it is difficult to imag-
ine an area of the law more in need of clarity”). 
 34 See Town of Greece v. Galloway, No. 12-696, slip op. at 1 (U.S. May 5, 2014). 
 35 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, Elmbrook II, 687 F.3d 840 (No. 12-755), 2012 WL 
6693652, at *1. One of the questions presented in the Elmbrook petition to the Supreme Court is: 
“[w]hether the government ‘coerces’ religious activity . . . where there is no pressure to engage in a 
religious practice or activity, but merely exposure to religious symbols.” Id. at *i. 
 36 There are other tests and standards used in Establishment Clause adjudication. See 2 
GREENAWALT, supra note 32, at 157–93. This Article focuses on coercion and endorsement because 
they are the predominant approaches to communicative acts. The active/passive distinction is most 
salient for the two categories—coercive action and symbolic endorsement—created by these inquiries. 
For a discussion of the tests and standards used, see 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 32, at 157–93. 
 37 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). The classic formula of this three-prong test states: “First, the 
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government 
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O’Connor subsequently conceived the endorsement test as a clarification of the 
Lemon test in cases involving visual religious displays, such as a nativity scene 
and a Latin cross.38 But the coercion and endorsement approaches also consti-
tute larger, competing theories underlying the Establishment Clause. Thus far, 
Establishment Clause theory typically treats coercion and endorsement as dif-
ferent in kind.39 
The endorsement test inquires whether—from the perspective of a rea-
sonable observer—the State endorses (or condemns) a religious practice.40 Its 
normative basis is grounded in political theory: the harm against which the 
Establishment Clause is designed to protect is “send[ing] a message to non-
adherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, 
and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored 
members of the political community.”41 
The other major approach is the coercion inquiry. Justice Antonin Scalia 
in McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky and Justice Anthony Kennedy in 
County of Allegheny expressed a preference for applying a coercion theory in 
cases involving religious symbols.42 But the coercion inquiry has taken differ-
ent forms depending on the interpretive scope of coercion. Michael McConnell 
has described “religious coercion as the fundamental evil against which the 
[Establishment] [C]lause is directed.”43 The coercion inquiry will find a prac-
tice with “coercive impact”44 unconstitutional, and for some, only a coercive 
practice will violate the Establishment Clause.45 Christmas displays, for exam-
                                                                                                                           
entanglement with religion.” Id. at 612–13 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Though much maligned, the Court never explicitly overruled the Lemon test; it did, however, choose 
not employ the test in several cases involving religious displays. See, e.g., Utah Highway, 132 S. Ct. 
at 21 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of  cert.) (asserting that “five sitting Justices have questioned 
or decried the Lemon/endorsement test’s continued use”); McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 861 (declining 
to abandon the Lemon test); Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686–87 (plurality opinion) (noting that the Lemon 
test is “not useful in dealing with the . . . passive monument”). 
 38 See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 772 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (discussing the endorsement test in a 
case concerning a Latin cross); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688–89 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (discussing the 
endorsement test in a case concerning a nativity scene). Although the endorsement test as originally 
proposed combines the first two prongs of the Lemon test, it has since arguably developed into a com-
peting theory. See 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 32, at 46. 
 39 See infra notes 40–59 and accompanying text. 
 40 See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 780–81 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 
620. 
 41Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 42 McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 908–09 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 
662 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 43 Michael McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
933, 939 (1986). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 937 (“If Madison’s explanations to the First Congress are any guide, compulsion is not 
just an element, it is the essence of an establishment.”). 
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ple, though “manifestations of religion in public life,” are constitutional under 
this theory because they “entail no use of the taxing power and have no coer-
cive effect.”46 The coercion theory arguably is on the rise in the Supreme 
Court.47 The problem, of course, is to determine the meaning of “coercion.”48 
Contrasting Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion and Justice Scalia’s dis-
sent in Lee, the school prayer case used in the introductory example, illustrates 
the possible scope of coercion. Starting from the premise that the Establish-
ment Clause prohibits coercion into participation or support of “religion or its 
exercise,”49 Justice Kennedy’s interpretation of coercion encompasses “public 
pressure” and “peer pressure” on students attending a graduation ceremony to 
stand silently during prayer.50 By contrast, Justice Scalia’s dissent rejects the 
idea of “psychological coercion.”51 He suggests that the historical understand-
ing of the Establishment Clause prohibited “coercion of religious orthodoxy 
and of financial support by force of law and threat of penalty.”52 In addition, 
Justice Scalia deems impermissible state endorsement of divisive sectarian 
positions; nondenominational prayers, however, are permissible.53 Importantly, 
he points out that in Lee “no one [was] legally coerced to recite [prayers]” —
thus making compelled activity of the audience a key element of his under-
standing of coercion.54 For a majority of the Supreme Court Justices and 
scholars, however, a lack of coercion does not necessarily result in a finding of 
constitutionality.55 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Id. at 939. 
 47 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Government-Sponsored Religious Displays: Transparent Rational-
izations and Expedient Post-Modernism, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1211, 1252 (2011) (“The Court’s 
new majority may be edging towards a holding that government is free to promote Christianity as long 
as it does so noncoercively.”); cf. Greece, No. 12-696, slip op. at 21–22 (relying primarily on the 
coercion theory). The decision in Town of Greece v. Galloway displayed a difference in the definition 
of coercion between the opinion for the Court authored by Justice Kennedy—joined in relevant Part 
II-B by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito—and the concurrence authored by Jus-
tice Clarence Thomas and joined, in relevant Part II, by Justice Scalia. Compare id. at 22 (noting that 
coercion does not arise when the prayers at question “neither chastised dissenters nor attempted 
lengthy disquisition on religious dogma”), with id. at 7 (Thomas, J., concurring) (defining coercion in 
the Establishment Clause context as “actual legal coercion . . . not the ‘subtle coercive pressures’ 
allegedly felt by respondents in this case”). This reflects Justice Kennedy’s and Justice Scalia’s di-
verging understandings of coercion. See infra notes 49–59 and accompanying text. 
 48 Cf. McConnell, supra note 43, at 941 (declining to offer a definition). 
 49 Lee, 505 U.S. at 587. 
 50 Id. at 593 (“This pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion.”). 
 51 Id. at 636–39 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 52 Id. at 640. 
 53 Id. at 641. 
 54 Id. at 641–42. 
 55 See id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“The Court has repeatedly recognized that a viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause is not predicated on coercion.”); 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 32, at 
157. 
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Coercion as envisioned by Justice Scalia is a different category of in-
fringement than endorsement. Justice Scalia’s version arguably makes the Es-
tablishment Clause redundant because the types of infringement he discuss-
es—compelled church attendance, disadvantages for dissenters, and the 
like56—are impermissible as a matter of free exercise.57 This is a categorically 
different harm than that caused by state endorsement of religion that does not 
violate an individual’s right to free exercise. As the contrast between Justice 
Kennedy’s and Justice Scalia’s interpretations of coercion in Lee shows, coer-
cion can indicate a wider or narrower category of state actions prohibited un-
der the Establishment Clause. Although Justice Kennedy expressed a prefer-
ence for an underlying theory of coercion,58 it is difficult to uphold a categori-
cal distinction between coercion and endorsement in light of his interpretation. 
Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s interpretation of coercion approximates endorse-
ment, whereas Justice Scalia maintains that there is “no warrant for expanding 
the concept of coercion beyond acts backed by threat of penalty.”59 These vari-
ations are only necessary if one follows the theory that Establishment Clause 
violations are only possible as a matter of coercion and that coercion and en-
dorsement are different in kind. But even if this line can be drawn with some 
clarity, the resulting categories do not pay sufficient respect to the subtle shifts 
in communicative impact that religious messages can have. 
B. Visual Communication and Passivity 
What do courts mean when they characterize a visual religious symbol as 
“passive”? Is “passive” always synonymous with “noncoercive”? Courts, as a 
doctrinal matter, typically use the endorsement test for evaluating religious 
symbolic displays.60 But a close reading of the relevant cases reveals that judg-
es are most likely to use the “passive” label in opinions upholding the displays 
in question, signaling in their reasoning that they are adopting a type of coer-
cion inquiry that may or may not be made explicit.61 This paradox—explicit 
use of the endorsement test and implicit assertion of noncoerciveness by apply-
ing the “passive” label—has significant traction in cases involving “passive 
symbols” and perhaps explains some of the confusion and unpredictability of 
outcomes in this area of the law. The distinction in kind between endorsement 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 640–41 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 57 See id. at 621 (Souter, J., concurring) (arguing that this approach “would render the Establish-
ment Clause a virtual nullity”). 
 58 See id. at 587 (majority opinion); Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 59 Lee, 505 U.S. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 60 See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620 (employing the endorsement test). 
 61 See infra notes 62–137 and accompanying text. 
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and coercion invites discarding visual images as passive, and the relevant case 
law indicates that courts are often amenable to this invitation. 
Following an underlying coercion theory, judges will likely make a dis-
tinction between active and passive, where passive denotes “noncoercive.” 
Following an endorsement theory, however, such a distinction would be largely 
irrelevant. Thus, to the extent that “passive” merely is synonymous with 
“noncoercive,” it signals that the judge’s underlying Establishment Clause the-
ory is in doctrinal opposition to the endorsement approach. But as one scholar 
notes, “[t]he psychological pressure to remain respectfully silent in the face of 
a symbol one finds objectionable” may in fact also have a “subtle coercive ef-
fect” on the observer.62 This also suggests that the label “passive” is unlikely to 
describe the audience in a constitutionally relevant manner, because the audi-
ence is always free to remain silent (passive), as seen in Lee.63 The basic idea 
of coercion is that individuals cannot be compelled to act; thus, it is unlikely 
that “passive” means passivity of the observer. It is more likely that it refers to 
the manner in which the symbol communicates its message. 
It is difficult to discern how much analytical weight courts actually place 
on the designation of visuals as “passive.” A skeptic might contend that the 
term has no independent, constitutionally relevant meaning. If “passive” in-
deed served no purpose beyond embellishment, courts ought to immediately 
abandon it. A related line of criticism might suggest that the term “passive” 
does not neatly align with “visual.” As will be shown, more often than not, it 
does. And in any event, the underlying problem—the disparate treatment of 
textual and visual communication where courts assume a hierarchy that privi-
leges the former—remains. 
The following discussion proceeds from the premise that “passive” has 
independent meaning. The sheer frequency of its use and its pervasiveness in 
cases involving religious symbols—not only domestically but also abroad64—
                                                                                                                           
 62 Mark L. Movsesian, Crosses and Culture: State-Sponsored Religious Displays in the US and 
Europe, 1 OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION 1, 5 (2012). 
 63 Lee, 505 U.S. at 593; cf. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding 
unconstitutional a compulsory flag salute). 
 64 See Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, at *1, *29 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Grand Chamber Mar. 18, 
2011), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-104040, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Q4D3-ZMLZ. Though this Article focuses solely on domestic developments, it is 
worth noting that foreign courts have also used the language of “passive symbols,” most prominently 
perhaps the European Court of Human Rights in 2011, in Lautsi v. Italy, where the court allowed 
classroom crucifixes in Italian public schools. See id. at *31–32. 
 The Italian government argued that “[w]hatever the evocative power of an ‘image’ might be . . . it 
was a ‘passive symbol,’ whose impact on individuals was not comparable with the impact of ‘active 
conduct.’” Id. at *16. Referencing an earlier decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court, the 
applicants conversely argued “[a]s to the assertion that it was merely a ‘passive symbol,’ this ignored 
the fact that like all symbols—and more than all others—it gave material form to a cognitive, intuitive 
and emotional reality which went beyond the immediately perceptible.” Id. at *18. The Grand Cham-
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suggest that it does. Indeed, “passive” is used to discard the communicative 
power of visuals. This hierarchical understanding of words and images, this 
Article argues, is ill-conceived. 
The following Subsections explore how courts analyze visual religious 
iconography in comparison to textual religious messages in three contexts: re-
ligious imagery in public displays, the use of religious buildings for govern-
ment-sponsored secular purposes, and the use of religious imagery in expres-
sions of government identity.65 The discussion reveals that the “passive” desig-
nation can plausibly function in two ways—alternatively or cumulatively—in 
order to justify disparate treatment of visuals and text. First, “passive” can de-
note an empirical claim regarding the manner in which visual images com-
municate. Passivity in this sense suggests less ability to communicate effec-
tively than textual speech. Second, “passive” can denote a bundle of factors, 
including brief exposure to the symbol, a vague notion of minimal offensive-
ness, or other characteristics of the symbol that result in its presumed noncoer-
civeness. But these notions, unlike the empirical claim, go to the context and 
cultural meaning of the symbol. The empirical claim is false;66 the cultural 
claim is complex and the “passive” designation is at best an ambiguous and 
misleading label.67 
1. Religious Imagery in Public Displays 
In Lynch—the progenitor case of visual symbolic religious displays—the 
Supreme Court upheld a holiday display on public property that featured a 
                                                                                                                           
ber explicitly addressed the active/passive distinction, stating that a crucifix on a wall is an “essential-
ly passive symbol and this point is of importance in the Court’s view, particularly having regard to the 
principle of neutrality. It cannot be deemed to have an influence on pupils comparable to that of di-
dactic speech or participation in religious activities.” Id. at *29. 
 Several concurring opinions also addressed the designation of the crucifix as a “passive” symbol. 
See id. at *34–37 (Rozakis, J., concurring); id. at *38–43 (Bonello, J., concurring); id. at *44–46 
(Power, J., concurring). The concurring opinion of Judge Ann Power agreed with the majority’s as-
sessment of the crucifix as a passive symbol “insofar as the symbol’s passivity is not in any way coer-
cive,” but her assessment was more nuanced. See id. at *45 (Power, J., concurring). She “concede[d] 
that, in principle, symbols (whether religious, cultural or otherwise) are carriers of meaning. They may 
be silent but they may, nevertheless, speak volumes without, however, doing so in a coercive or in an 
indoctrinating manner.” See id. As she framed it, the question thus is not whether symbols can com-
municate like textual language—she asserts they can—but whether the message communicated is one 
that violates the negative religious freedom of the observer under the Convention. See id.; see also 
Haupt, supra note 16, at 1024–32 (discussing Lautsi). 
 65 See infra notes 68–102 and accompanying text (religious imagery in public displays); infra 
notes 103–123 and accompanying text (religious buildings for government-sponsored secular purpos-
es); infra notes 124–137 and accompanying text (religious imagery in expressions of government 
identity). 
 66 See infra notes 151–187 and accompanying text. 
 67 See infra notes 239–299 and accompanying text. 
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crèche among various other (nonreligious) elements.68 Chief Justice Warren 
Burger stated “[t]he crèche, like a painting, is passive; admittedly it is a re-
minder of the origins of Christmas.”69 Further, he stated: 
To forbid the use of this one passive symbol—the crèche—at the very 
time people are taking note of the season with Christmas hymns and 
carols in public schools and other public places, and while Congress 
and Legislatures open sessions with prayers by paid chaplains, would 
be a stilted overreaction contrary to our history and to our holdings.70 
In short, if spoken and sung textual messages are allowed, a “passive” visual 
message ought to be permissible as well. But comparing the crèche to a paint-
ing suggests that its visual nature plays some role. Although it might refer to 
the aesthetic interest the town might have in displaying the crèche— similar to 
the interest in displaying a painting71—it would be rather nonobvious to de-
scribe this aesthetic interest as “passive.” 
In County of Allegheny, another Christmas display case, Justice Kennedy 
stated that “where the government’s act of recognition or accommodation is 
passive and symbolic . . . any intangible benefit to religion is unlikely to pre-
sent a realistic risk of establishment. Absent coercion, the risk of infringement 
on religious liberty by passive or symbolic accommodation is minimal.”72 In 
this context, “passive” describes the government’s posture towards the sym-
bols; it does not describe the way the symbols communicate or the effect they 
have on observers.73 But in the same case, Justice Kennedy uses “passive” to 
describe the display itself; this is more closely related to the visual character of 
the symbol.74 Further, Justice Kennedy noted that “[p]assersby who disagree 
with the message conveyed by these displays are free to ignore them, or even 
to turn their backs, just as they are free to do when they disagree with any oth-
er form of government speech.”75 In this instance, the passive nature seems to 
indicate that the display itself does not “speak” and that the observer can easily 
avert exposure to its message. 
                                                                                                                           
 68 645 U.S. at 685. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 686. 
 71 Cf. 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 32, at 76 (offering this interpretation but finding it likewise 
unconvincing). 
 72 492 U.S. at 662 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 73 See id. at 662–63 (“Noncoercive government action within the realm of flexible accommoda-
tion or passive acknowledgement of existing symbols does not violate the Establishment Clause un-
less it benefits religion in a way more direct and more substantial than practices that are accepted in 
our national heritage.”). 
 74 Id. at 664 (“The crèche and the menorah are purely passive symbols of religious holidays.”). 
 75 Id. 
25
2014] Active Symbols 835 
Thus, there are at least two (somewhat related) ways in which the “passive” 
designation operates: (1) to describe the relationship between the government 
and the symbol, indicating the manner in which the government recognizes reli-
gion (here, acknowledgment of religious practice); and (2) to describe the rela-
tionship between the symbol and its viewer (presumably, “not speaking”). The 
two are related to the extent that one assumes mere acknowledgment—rather 
than coercion or at least proselytizing—occurs when there is no textual message. 
In other words, visual messages, under this view, do not result in coercion. This 
designation, then, likely contains an empirical claim regarding the communica-
tive power of images. Moreover, it is also possible to conceive different levels of 
“activity” of the visual symbolic message. And while it may be possible to avoid 
the message of a holiday display,76 this is less easily accomplished in other set-
tings.77 This distinction hints at the different degrees of communicative impact 
that a symbolic message may have.78 
The “passive” designation also appeared in the Supreme Court’s Ten 
Commandments cases. In Stone v. Graham, the Court found insignificant “that 
the Bible verses involved in this case are merely posted on the wall, rather than 
read aloud.”79 Without overstating the significance of the distinction, it is in-
teresting to note that text “read aloud” and text “posted on the wall” —the lat-
ter a more visual display80—are contrasted. This reference might allude to a 
difference in quality that the Court detects between spoken and silent (that is, 
“merely posted”) texts.81 More importantly, then-Justice William Rehnquist 
referred in dissent to an earlier Decalogue case in which the Tenth Circuit 
characterized the monument as “passive,” which the court described as “in-
volving no compulsion.”82 
Almost twenty five years later, in Van Orden, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
picked up the “passive” characterization in upholding “[t]he placement of the 
Ten Commandments on the Texas State Capitol grounds,” which he described 
as “a far more passive use of those texts than was the case in Stone, where the 
                                                                                                                           
 76 See id. Though some would dispute that this is possible at all. See infra notes 185–186 and 
accompanying text. 
 77 See, Stone, 449 U.S. at 42 (holding unconstitutional a Kentucky statute requiring the posting of 
the Ten Commandments in public school rooms). 
 78 See infra notes 328–339 and accompanying text. 
 79 Stone, 449 U.S. at 42. 
 80 Cf. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 559 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(discussing printed text as graphic), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1996 (2013). 
 81 See Stone, 449 U.S. at 42. 
 82 See id. at 46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“‘It does not seem reasonable to require removal of a 
passive monument, involving no compulsion, because its accepted precepts, as a foundation for law, 
reflect the religious nature of an ancient era.’” (quoting Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 
29, 34 (10th Cir. 1973))). 
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text confronted elementary school students every day.”83 The use of “passive” 
in this context seems to take on a temporal dimension, in contrast to exposure 
“every day.”84 This, however, is a rather nonobvious meaning of the term.85 
Conceivably, the intent to influence the students in Stone is much more direct 
than is the intent to influence the (occasional or frequent) passerby in Van Or-
den; yet, the monument remained in place whether observers walked past it or 
not. This difference might make sense in distinguishing a permanent display 
from a temporary display. But it is not immediately apparent what role charac-
terizing the monument as “more passive” plays in distinguishing two perma-
nent displays featuring identical textual messages.86 The Chief Justice also dis-
tinguished the Ten Commandments monument in Van Orden from Bible read-
ing and prayer in schools;87 this aligns with an interpretation of text as active 
and visual images as passive. Moreover, he compared the monument to a wide 
variety of visual representations, all presumably as “passive” as the monu-
ment.88 Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III criticized the Chief Justice’s reliance on 
the characterization of the monuments as “passive,” stating that “Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s adoption of ‘passivity’ as the plurality’s test for upholding public 
religious messages is no model of clarity.”89 
In his dissent in McCreary County, Justice Scalia asserted that “[t]he pas-
sive display of the Ten Commandments, even standing alone, does not begin to 
[proselytize or advance any one faith or belief or apply some level of coer-
cion].”90 “Passive” here means “noncoercive.” He cited Justice Kennedy in 
County of Allegheny to illustrate the role of “passive” symbols.91 But Justice 
Kennedy’s analysis in County of Allegheny made the connection between “pas-
                                                                                                                           
 83 545 U.S. at 691 (plurality opinion). 
 84 See id. 
 85 Cf. Strasser, supra note 10, at 1157 (criticizing the temporal dimension). 
 86 See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 712 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his Van Orden dissent, Justice John 
Paul Stevens likewise asserted that “[t]he monolith displayed on Texas Capitol grounds cannot be 
discounted as a passive acknowledgement of religion.” See id. Additionally, in addressing the Chief 
Justice’s comparison with Stone, Justice David Souter stated that “[p]lacing a monument on the 
ground is not more ‘passive’ than hanging a sheet of paper on a wall when both contain the same text 
to be read by anyone who looks at it.” Id. at 745 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 87 Id. at 691 (plurality opinion). 
 88 See id. at 688–89 (comparing the monument in Van Orden to varied depictions of the Ten 
Commandments at numerous locations throughout Washington, D.C., including at the Supreme 
Court). 
 89 J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Rehnquist Court at Twilight: The Lures and Perils of Split-the-
Difference Jurisprudence, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1969, 1989 (2006); see also Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme 
Court 2010 Term, Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Con-
stitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 68–69 (2011) (focusing on the passive designation in distin-
guishing outcomes in Van Orden and McCreary County). 
 90 McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 909 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 91 Id. at 909 (citing Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 664 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part)). 
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sive” and “noncoercive” less forcefully than did Justice Scalia. This, again, 
reflects Justice Kennedy’s wider understanding of coercion as seen in Lee.92 
In the lower courts, the qualitative distinction between textual and visual 
messages—frequently dismissing the latter as passive—has likewise taken 
root.93 Though some courts are suspicious of the “passive” designation, they 
find it empirically unclear how religious symbolic communication works and 
in which instances it constitutes a constitutional violation.94 The long-running 
litigation involving the Mt. Soledad Cross in San Diego provides an illustra-
tion.95 In its most recent iteration, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the memorial’s current arrangement—which has a large Latin 
cross as its centerpiece—violated the Establishment Clause.96 But it was the 
district court’s usage of the “passive” designation that is particularly illuminat-
ing.97 After concluding that the Mt. Soledad Cross satisfied the Lemon test, the 
court conducted an inquiry into what it identified as one relevant factor: 
“whether [the monument] is passive or proselytizing in its effect.”98 The “pas-
sive” designation was used in various other ways throughout the decision, in-
cluding to describe the City of San Diego as an “absent and passive recipient” 
of the monument donated by a private group.99 Yet, it is irrelevant to the mes-
sage of the monument whether the municipality was “active” or “passive” in 
receiving the monument, except for the question of attribution of the mes-
sage.100 That determination does nothing to make the religious symbol itself 
                                                                                                                           
 92 See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. 
 93 See, e.g., Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095, 1110 (10th Cir. 2010) (Gorusch, J., 
dissenting) (dissenting from  denial of hearing en banc and characterizing the highway crosses at issue 
as “passive public displays”); Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1176 (D.R.I. 1981) (characteriz-
ing the nativity scene at issue as “passive”), aff'd, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd, 465 U.S. 668 
(1984). 
 94 See, e.g., Smith v. Lindstrom, 699 F. Supp. 549, 567 (W.D. Va. 1988) (acknowledging that 
“the effect of well-crafted symbolic speech is anything but passive, quiet, or ineffective”). 
 95 See Trunk v. City of San Diego (Trunk I), 568 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1203 (S.D. Ca. 2008), rev’d, 
Trunk v. City of San Diego (Trunk II), 629 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, Trunk v. 
City of San Diego (Trunk III), 660 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nom., Mount Soledad 
Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk (Trunk IV), 132 S. Ct. 2535 (2012). 
 96 Trunk II, 629 F.3d at 1129. 
 97 See Trunk I, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 1218. The district court interpreted Ninth Circuit precedent—in 
particular the 2009 decision Card v. City of Everett—to extend the Van Orden holding beyond the Ten 
Commandments context to other passive displays. See id. at 1204, 1206 (citing Card v. City of Ever-
ett, 520 F.3d 1009, 1204 (9th Cir. 2008)). However, the district court’s reliance on Card is confound-
ing; there is no clear indication that the Card opinion purports to extend Van Orden beyond its imme-
diate context. See Card, 520 F.3d at 1018 (discussing the scope of Van Orden). 
 98 Trunk I, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 1218. 
 99 Id. at 1223. 
 100 See Claudia E. Haupt, Mixed Public-Private Speech and the Establishment Clause, 85 TUL. L. 
REV. 571, 601–06 (2011) (discussing attribution of speech in cases of donation of religious monu-
ments to municipalities). 
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passive. Turning finally to the assessment of “passive or proselytizing effect,” 
the district court distinguished the “passive” monuments in Van Orden from 
“other more confrontational displays which were meant to indoctrinate.”101 The 
court noted that “[t]he gist of this observation is that passive monuments are 
less likely to violate the Establishment Clause.”102 The court’s former observa-
tion suggests a noncoercive effect; the latter is circular, simply equating “pas-
sive” with “likely to pass constitutional muster.” Thus, what becomes clear is 
that the “passive” designation used by courts obfuscates rather than clarifies 
the manner in which visual religious symbols communicate. 
2. Religious Buildings Used for Secular Purposes 
Sometimes, secular functions are brought to sites dominated by religious 
symbols.103 In several district court cases, school districts were barred from 
holding graduation ceremonies in churches.104 The issue of high school gradua-
tions in church buildings has just now percolated through the federal courts. 
The Seventh Circuit decisions in Elmbrook, used in the introductory example, 
were the first time a federal appeals court addressed the issue.105 A three-judge 
panel initially upheld the district court’s decision holding that the practice was 
constitutional under the Establishment Clause, but the Seventh Circuit reversed 
after rehearing en banc.106 The initial panel decision suggested that if individu-
als proselytize (verbal) or distribute literature (textual), the outcome would 
                                                                                                                           
 101 Trunk I, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 1224. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Churches have been used as venues for a variety of secular purposes. Examples include the 
use of church property as public school classrooms, see, e.g., Porta v. Klagholz, 19 F. Supp. 2d 290, 
292–93 (D.N.J. 1998); Spacco v. Bridgewater Sch. Dept., 722 F. Supp. 834, 834 (D. Mass. 1989); 
Thomas v. Schmidt, 397 F. Supp. 203, 205 (D.R.I. 1975); State of Neb. ex rel. Sch. Dist. of Harting-
ton v. Neb. State Bd. of Educ., 195 N.W.2d 161, 162 (Neb. 1972); or other school events, see, e.g., 
ACLU-TN v. Sumner Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 03-11-0408, 2011 WL 1675008, at *1–2 (M.D. Tenn. 
May 3, 2011); the use of churches as polling places, see, e.g., Otero v. State Election Bd. of Okla., 975 
F.2d 738, 739 (10th Cir. 1992); Berman v. Bd. of Elections, 420 F.2d 684, 684 (2d Cir. 1969) (per 
curiam); and the use of a church as a post office, see Cooper v. U.S. Postal Serv., 577 F.3d 479, 484 
(2d Cir. 2009). 
 104 See Does v. Enfield Pub. Sch., 716 F. Supp. 2d 172, 175 (D. Conn. 2010) (finding a public 
school graduation at a Christian church to be impermissible); Lemke v. Black, 376 F. Supp. 87, 88 
(E.D. Wis. 1974) (finding a public school graduation at a Roman Catholic church to be impermissi-
ble). But see Musgrove v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard Cnty., 608 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1305–06 (M.D. Fla. 
2005) (finding a likelihood of success on the merits with respect to Establishment Clause challenge to 
graduation at a church “display[ing] a giant cross” but ultimately denying a preliminary injunction 
based on public interest considerations). 
 105 See Elmbrook II, 687 F.3d at 842; Elmbrook I, 658 F.3d at 712–13. 
 106 Elmbrook II, 687 F.3d at 843. 
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likely be different than if they were exposed to imagery.107 And, indeed, this 
was exactly what the en banc majority focused on.108 
The panel stated that “graduates are not forced—even subtly—to partici-
pate in any religious exercise ‘or other sign of religious devotion,’ or in any 
other way to subscribe to a particular religion or even to religion in general.”109 
It thus applied a theory of coercion to evaluate the religious imagery’s effect. 
Further, the panel stated that graduation attendees 
are not forced to take religious pamphlets, to sit through attempts at 
proselytization directed by the state or to affirm or appear to affirm 
their belief in any of the principles adhered to by the Church or its 
members. Instead, the encounter with religion here is purely passive 
and incidental to attendance at an entirely secular ceremony.110  
Characterizing the encounter as passive results from the absence of coer-
cion to participate in religious activity; “passive” denotes noncoercion. But in 
Lee, the graduation prayer case used in the introductory example, the Supreme 
Court found coercion where no active participation in the prayer was re-
quired.111 Thus, the only distinction plausibly left for the Seventh Circuit en 
banc review was the textual (prayer) in Lee as opposed to the visual (Latin 
cross) in Elmbrook. 
In reviewing the Elmbrook case en banc, the Seventh Circuit concluded 
that having the graduation ceremony in a church violated the Establishment 
Clause.112 Unlike the panel, the en banc majority applied a standard that did 
not focus solely on coerced activity, but rather combined coercion and en-
dorsement.113 In doing so, the majority focused on the textual elements—the 
religious literature and banners with religious messages—present in the 
church.114 Though the majority did discuss the cross “[l]iterally and figurative-
ly towering over the graduation proceedings,” it pointed out that “Elmbrook 
Church’s sizeable cross was not the only vehicle for conveying religious mes-
                                                                                                                           
 107 Elmbrook I, 658 F.3d at 733 & n.21. 
 108 Elmbrook II, 687 F.3d at 843–44. 
 109 Elmbrook I, 658 F.3d at 727. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Lee, 505 U.S. at 592–93. 
 112 Elmbrook II, 687 F.3d at 843. 
 113 Id. at 855 (“Although Lee and Santa Fe focus on the problem of coerced religious activity, it is 
a mistake to view the coercion at issue in those cases as divorced from the problem of government 
endorsement of religion in the classroom generally.”). 
 114 Id. at 850 (holding that a public school graduation ceremony in a church violated the Estab-
lishment Clause because the church “among other things featured staffed information booths laden 
with religious literature and banners with appeals for children to join ‘school ministries’” (emphasis 
added)). 
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sages to graduation attendees.”115 Returning to the textual, the court stressed 
the presence of religious pamphlets, literature, and banners in the church.116 
Pointing to “the sheer religiosity of the space,” the majority invoked both “the 
presence of religious iconography and literature.”117 But the court’s emphasis 
seemed to be heavily on the textual elements. 
While the majority did not use the active/passive distinction to describe 
either the display or the observers, Judge Ripple—in a dissent joined by then-
Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judge Posner—used it to describe both.118 Judge 
Ripple’s dissent discussed the majority’s application of Lee as well as the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe—
which held unconstitutional the practice of student-led prayer at football 
games.119 The dissent argued that the prayers in Lee and Santa Fe “amounted 
to state sponsorship of religious activity and coerced the attending students to 
participate, at least passively, in that religious prayer activity. There, the state 
had affirmatively sponsored, endorsed and coerced participation in a specific 
religious activity.”120 
The dissent distinguished the “religious activity” of prayer from “the 
mere presence of religious iconography and similar furnishings.”121 The ac-
tive/passive distinction in this instance is applied both to the prayer (“activity”) 
and symbols (“mere presence”) as well as the audience (“participate, at least 
passively”).122 This obscures which active/passive distinctions matter and how 
they matter. The dissent argued that “it certainly cannot be maintained that, 
like in Lee and in Santa Fe, they were coerced into participating, actively or 
passively, in any religious ceremony or activity.”123 But despite this finding of 
noncoercion, the role of the “passive” label here, too, is inconsistent at best. 
3. Religious Imagery in Official Expressions of Identity 
Religious text,124 religious symbols,125 or a combination of both126 are 
frequently used in expressions of federal, state, or municipal identity. For in-
                                                                                                                           
 115 Id. at 852. 
 116 Id. at 852–53. 
 117 Id. at 853. 
 118 Id. at 861 (Ripple, J., dissenting). 
 119 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000); Elmbrook II, 687 F.3d at 863 
(Ripple, J., dissenting). 
 120 Elmbrook II, 687 F.3d at 862 (Ripple, J., dissenting). 
 121 Id. at 863. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. at 864. 
 124 See, e.g., Saladin v. City of Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687, 689 (11th Cir. 1987) (word “Christi-
anity” in city seal). 
 125 See, e.g., King v. Richmond Cnty., Ga., 331 F.3d 1271, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003) (outline of stone 
tablets representing Ten Commandments in superior court clerk’s seal); Robinson v. City of Edmond, 
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stance, the national motto “In God We Trust,” the Court’s opening call includ-
ing the phrase “God save the United States and this Honorable Court,” and the 
reference to God in the Pledge of Allegiance are textual; so is the practice of 
legislative prayer. Yet none of these textual expressions have been considered 
to violate the Establishment Clause.127 While the religious content of the textu-
al expressions has not been called into question—and they are not “passive” —
they are thought not to violate the Establishment Clause mostly on the theory 
that these statements no longer have “force as an endorsement of belief in 
God.”128 The practice of legislative prayer is constitutional under the Estab-
lishment Clause on account of its historical permissibility since the first Con-
gress.129 Visual symbolic representations in expressions of identity might be 
thought of in a similar way—either lacking religious valence or embodying 
historical representations—though in some of these cases, too, the textu-
al/visual distinction suggests that courts tend to ascribe a stronger communica-
tive force to text. 
To illustrate, consider King v. Richmond County, Georgia, where the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held constitutional a superior court 
clerk’s use of a seal featuring an outline of the Ten Commandments.130 The 
image was “a depiction of a hilt and tip of a sword, the center of which is over-
laid by two rectangular tablets with rounded tops.”131 Rather than portraying 
the text of the Ten Commandments, “Roman numerals I through V are listed 
vertically on the left tablet; the right lists numerals VI to X.”132 The district 
court found no Establishment Clause violation, instead finding “that a depic-
tion without the text would not lead a reasonable observer to conclude that re-
                                                                                                                           
68 F.3d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir. 1995) (Latin cross in city seal); Murray v. City of Austin, Tex., 947 
F.2d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 1991) (cross in city seal); Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401, 1403–04 (7th 
Cir. 1991) (Latin cross as well as Latin cross, shield, sword, scepter, dove and crown, respectively, in 
city seals); Weinbaum v. Las Cruces Pub. Sch., 465 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1185 (D.N.M. 2006) (three 
crosses in seal on school district’s maintenance vehicles); Webb v. City of Republic, 55 F. Supp. 2d 
994, 995 (W.D. Mo. 1999) (fish symbol in city seal); ACLU of Ohio v. City of Stow, 29 F. Supp. 2d 
845, 847 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (cross in city seal). 
 126 See, e.g., Johnson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bernalillo Cnty., 528 F. Supp. 919, 920 
(D.N.M. 1981) (cross and motto), rev’d sub nom. Friedman v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bernalillo 
Cnty., 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1985). 
 127 See generally B. Jessie Hill, Of Christmas Trees and Corpus Christi: Ceremonial Deism and 
Change in Meaning Over Time, 59 DUKE L.J. 705 (2010) (detailing the constitutional challenges to 
each). 
 128 See id. at 710. 
 129 Greece, No. 12-696, slip op. at 1 (upholding prayer in town board meetings); Marsh v. Cham-
bers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983) (upholding prayer in state legislature); see also supra note 34 and 
accompanying text; infra notes 357–364 and accompanying text (discussing legislative prayer). 
 130 King, 331 F.3d at 1273. 
 131 Id. at 1274 (“Appellees conceded that the pictograph in the center of the Seal resembles depic-
tions of the Ten Commandments.”). 
 132 Id. 
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ligion was endorsed.”133 Although the court did not use the active/passive dis-
tinction, it did find the distinction between a textual and a nontextual represen-
tation relevant. The Eleventh Circuit likewise placed great weight on the ab-
sence of the text from the symbolic representation.134 In particular, the court 
concluded that “[b]ecause the words ‘Lord thy God’ and the purely religious 
mandates (commandments one through four) do not appear on the Seal, a rea-
sonable observer is less likely to focus on the religious aspects of the Ten 
Commandments.”135 This suggests that the text, rather than the visual symbolic 
representation, communicates the Decalogue’s religious message. 
Courts in similar cases dealing with religious iconography in municipal 
seals have referenced the passivity of symbols.136 One district court concluded 
that “it would be palatably unreasonable to require the removal of the passive 
and benign symbols of the cross and the motto [‘con esta vencemos’] from the 
seal.”137 While the absence of the text from the Ten Commandments illustra-
tion presumably can be understood as the absence of a religious message, it is 
more difficult to see the cross as devoid of religious content. Thus, “passive 
and benign” cannot indicate the absence of a religious message. It more likely 
means that the visual of the cross, like the visual of the Decalogue without 
text, is comparatively less capable of conveying a religious message than reli-
gious text. The communicative impact of visuals without the text, therefore, is 
deemed less powerful. 
* * * 
Courts tend to use the “passive” designation in Establishment Clause cas-
es involving visual religious symbols in two ways—either simultaneously or 
alternatively. To the extent the “passive” label functions as an empirical asser-
tion, it is based on an erroneous understanding of how visual images com-
municate. This misconception is perpetuated in Establishment Clause doctrine. 
It allows conceiving religious visual messages as constitutionally less trouble-
some and provides an avenue to discard them without fully engaging with the 
images’ communicative power. And when the passive label is used as short-
hand for a bundle of factors that go to the cultural interpretation and context of 
the symbol, the designation is misleading and therefore not particularly useful. 
                                                                                                                           
 133 Id. at 1275 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 134 Id. at 1285–86 (noting the absence of text material). 
 135 Id. at 1285. 
 136 See, e.g., Johnson, 528 F. Supp. at 925; see also Murray, 947 F.2d at 154–55 (discussing the 
noncoercive passivity of a cross in the city seal, which served primarily to identify city activity and 
property and to promote Austin’s “unique role and history”); Id. at 169 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) 
(“The cross is not a ‘passive’ symbol . . . .”). 
 137 Johnson, 528 F. Supp. at 925. 
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II. HOW IMAGES COMMUNICATE 
To rectify misconceptions and remedy the misguided approach to visual 
religious symbols illustrated in Part I, Establishment Clause theory must better 
account for the way in which visual images communicate.138 By failing to care-
fully consider the way in which visual images communicate, we are missing 
important empirical information that is relevant for assessing the communica-
tive impact of symbolic messages. Section A of this Part will therefore intro-
duce empirical evidence to refute the text/image hierarchy based on visual per-
ception.139 Cognitive neuroscience research shows that images are by no means 
less able to communicate messages than text. Indeed, visual representations in 
some instances may have a greater impact on the audience than spoken or writ-
ten words. Visual representations of religious symbols can be just as active 
as—if not, in fact, sometimes more active than—written or spoken textual reli-
gious messages. They are, eponymously, “active symbols.” 
Courts, as demonstrated, make little effort to account for the visual nature 
of religious symbols or, worse yet, dismiss such symbols as merely “pas-
sive.”140 The focus on the textual has prevented the full appreciation of the vis-
ual nature of religious symbols as images. Giving short shrift to the visual 
happens in other contexts as well; copyright law is but one example.141 Tracing 
the courts’ aversion to images, one commentator even detected “in the history 
of the development of English law a conscious wall built against images, es-
                                                                                                                           
 138 This Article uses the term “image” to describe a two- or three-dimensional visual representa-
tion that exists as a physical thing in the real world (i.e., not merely cognitive, mental images that 
exist only in our heads). Cf. FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 7, at 5 (“In common usage, a ‘visual 
image’ can refer to an artifact, such as the snapshot you hold in your hand and look at; to your mental 
image of that photo; or to your visual memories drawn from your experience of looking at the photo 
or the thing that the photo depicts.”); Christina Spiesel, More Than a Thousand Words in Response to 
Rebecca Tushnet, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 40, 40 n.2 (2012), http://harvardlawreview.org/2012/02/
more-than-a-thousand-words-in-response-to-rebecca-tushnet/, archived at http://perma.cc/5UFV-
FAS8 (expressing preference for the term “picture” over “image”). Of course, these designations are 
arbitrary; others use different definitions. See, e.g., FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 7, at 5 (noting 
that “we will use ‘pictures’ to mean visually perceived artifacts, external visual representations, re-
serving ‘image’ for mental imagery (that is, internal, immaterial visual representations)”). Another 
scholar categorizes pictures as “all representations, including written or printed words.” Id. (referring 
to Richard Benson, former dean of the Yale School of Art). In the First Amendment context, Timothy 
Zick distinguishes between “oral symbols (words) and nonverbal symbolic gestures.” Zick, supra note 
12, at 2390. Frederick Schauer distinguishes linguistic and nonlinguistic communicative acts. Freder-
ick Schauer, Intentions, Conventions, and the First Amendment: The Case of Cross-Burning, 2003 
SUP. CT. REV. 197, 200. In the context of religious symbols, Kent Greenawalt distinguishes “signs 
with religious words” and “religious symbols.” 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 32, at 69. Likewise, my 
primary distinction is between textual and nontextual. 
 139 See infra notes 151–187 and accompanying text. 
 140 See supra notes 60–137 and accompanying text. 
 141 See Tushnet, supra note 7, at 688. 
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sentially shutting itself off from pictures.”142 Perhaps indicative of this lack of 
appreciation of the symbolic is Justice Robert Jackson’s observation that 
“[s]ymbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas.”143 By 
contrast, verbal expression is considered less primitive.144 In other words, texts 
enjoy privileged status in the law.145 One scholar observes that “[t]he prefer-
ence for text over image” in the First Amendment context “is often assumed 
and rarely explained.”146 The courts are not alone; “there is a strong cultural 
bias that thinking is accomplished only with words because language is the 
medium of thought.”147 Yet, in other First Amendment contexts, as Section B 
of this Part illustrates, “[v]isual images are frequently perceived as more pow-
erful and less controllable than verbal speech.”148 This characterization is 
clearly at odds with the notion of “passive” religious symbols. 
Moreover, as Section C of this Part argues in further detail, we must dis-
tinguish between visual perception of the message and the meaning of the 
symbolic content of the message irrespective of the medium.149 How images 
communicate is an objective empirical question. The answer can be provided 
by cognitive neuroscience. The way communication via images is processed is 
the same for all human brains. By contrast, the question of what images—and 
in particular, religious symbols—mean is context-dependent and subjective. 
The empirical data on visual perception thus is of only limited use in construct-
ing a more responsive conceptual framework.150 
                                                                                                                           
 142 Spiesel, supra note 23, at 403; see also Zick, supra note 12, at 2398 (asserting that judges 
display “a general disrespect for symbolism”). 
 143 W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943). 
 144 See Zick, supra note 12, at 2273. 
 145 See FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 7, at 4 (contending that law identifies rationality and 
virtue with texts rather than pictures); Spiesel, supra note 23, at 404 (discussing how law has depend-
ed on written texts for its development); Zick, supra note 12, at 2300 n.205 (arguing that the First 
Amendment protects verbal speech more than nonverbal gestures). 
 146 Amy Adler, The Thirty-Ninth Annual Edward G. Donley Memorial Lectures: The Art of Cen-
sorship, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 205, 210 (2000). 
 147 See Spiesel, supra note 23, at 392. 
 148 See Adler, supra note 146, at 217; infra notes 188–238 and accompanying text. Concerns 
about the power of images pervade other areas of the law as well. See, e.g., Carol Sanger, Seeing and 
Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 403–04 
(2008) (discussing the admissibility of fetal images in tort and criminal law); see also CHRISTOPHER 
B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE: PRACTICE UNDER THE RULES 186 (4th ed. 2012) 
(discussing the court’s “authority under Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 611(a) to minimize the 
emotional impact” of photographic evidence); Neal Feigenson, Visual Evidence, 17 PSYCHONOMIC 
BULL. & REV. 149, 149–53 (2010) (providing an overview of studies of visual evidence on legal deci-
sion making). 
 149 See infra notes 239–299 and accompanying text. 
 150 See infra 300–364 and accompanying text (providing a new conceptual framework for Estab-
lishment Clause inquiries). 
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A. The Neuroscience of Visual Perception 
The human brain, as a generalizable matter, processes images and words 
each in a particular way. Empirical evidence of brain functioning comes from 
two different kinds of studies. First, on the input side, functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (“fMRI”) can measure the difference in blood oxygen level de-
pendent (“BOLD”) signals at resting and stimulus conditions.151 Second, on the 
output side, responses to stimuli offered in several modes can be measured using 
a variety of ways that do not necessitate fMRI examination. For example, in tra-
ditional psychological research, the likelihood of remembering negative versus 
neutral textual information can be tested using questionnaires,152 and the pro-
cessing of picture-word stimuli can be examined in a similar manner.153 
At this point, three preliminary observations are in order. First, an im-
portant caveat: law and science differ considerably in their methodology and 
interpretation of materials.154 Legal scholars must therefore exercise particular 
caution when using neuroscience literature. Likewise, the translation of prima-
ry sources into the legal literature must be viewed with caution as the second-
ary literature (including the “neurolaw” literature) is likely to make more gen-
eralized statements than can be derived from experimental data as reported in 
scientific primary literature. This also explains in part why this Article uses 
neuroscience data to refute the empirical claim courts make with respect to 
visual perception of images, but not to fashion a new approach. Second, a 
word about what is not at issue in this discussion: the veracity of the visual 
representation. Much of the literature on neuroscience and the law concerns 
the descriptive value and “truth” of images, in particular photographs or vid-
eo.155 The descriptive aspect of images—whether the picture is an accurate 
representation of reality, as may be important in the law of evidence—is not 
                                                                                                                           
 151 RICHARD B. BUXTON, INTRODUCTION TO FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING: 
PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES 7 (2d ed. 2009); Arno Villringer, Physiological Changes During Brain 
Activation, in FUNCTIONAL MRI 3, 3–7 (C.T.W. Moonen & Peter A. Bandettini eds., 2000). Some of 
the studies discussed below employ positron emission tomography (“PET”) rather than fMRI. See 
generally Marcus E. Raichle & Mark A. Mintun, Brain Work and Brain Imaging, 29 ANN. REV. NEU-
ROSCI. 449 (2006) (discussing the development of PET and fMRI BOLD imaging). 
 152 See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Kensinger & Suzanne Corkin, Memory Enhancement for Emotional 
Words: Are Emotional Words More Vividly Remembered Than Neutral Words?, 31 MEMORY & 
COGNITION 1169, 1171 (2003). 
 153 See, e.g., Yoav Arieh & Daniel Algom, Processing Picture-Word Stimuli: The Contingent 
Nature of Picture and of Word Superiority, 28 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & 
COGNITION 221, 222–23 (2002). 
 154 See Goodenough & Tucker, supra note 18, at 65–66 (providing an overview of concerns). 
 155 See FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 7, at 9–11 (discussing reality and depiction); see also 
Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct Distinc-
tion, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 900–01 (2012) (using “cognitive illiberalism” to explain how people 
perceive “truth” to generate conclusions in line with their own values); Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 
903–04 (same). 
36
846 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:821 
the subject of this discussion. Indeed, the cases discussed here do not involve 
the veracity of photographs at all.156 Nonetheless, that body of literature is use-
ful beyond the question of veracity. Third, with respect to the difference be-
tween photographs and other visual images—such as religious symbolic repre-
sentations—it is significant to point out that many of the studies referenced in 
the following Subsections have employed a variety of visual stimuli, including 
photos and videos, but also drawings and other visual representations. 
Initially, “words and pictures as perceptions both represent just dataflow 
coming in from outside to be understood by the brain and processed for mean-
ing.”157 The difference results from what the brain does with the sensory inputs 
in different areas of the brain.158 Four aspects, discussed in turn, seem especially 
important in this context: speed of processing textual and visual information, 
connection to emotion, effect on memory, and persuasiveness. 
1. Speed 
First, the human brain processes visual images more quickly than 
words.159 In fact, the speed at which the brain can process images substantially 
exceeds the speed at which it processes words.160 There is an immediacy of 
reception connected with images that we do not have with words. 
Some studies combine words and pictures to test the speed at which our 
brains process images and words. In one study involving word-picture com-
pounds (e.g., the drawing of an apple with the word “lemon” written across it), 
                                                                                                                           
 156 Frequently the opinions themselves do contain photographs of the religious symbols at issue. 
See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 706 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 736 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 622 (1989); 
Trunk II, 629 F.3d 1099, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2011); Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095, 
1125–27 (10th Cir. 2010). But veracity of the image is not questioned. See generally Hampton 
Dellinger, Words Are Enough: The Troublesome Use of Photographs, Maps, and Other Images in 
Supreme Court Opinions, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1704 (1997) (discussing the dangers of incorporating 
photographs and other images into Supreme Court opinions because the neutrality and accuracy of the 
images are routinely presumed). 
 157 Spiesel, supra note 23, at 393. 
 158 See id.; see also Elizabeth A. Kensinger & Daniel L. Schacter, Processing Emotional Pictures 
and Words: Effects of Valence and Arousal, 6 COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE & BEHAV. NEUROSCI. 110, 123 
(2006) (finding that words are processed in the left amygdala and pictures bilaterally). 
 159 FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 7, at 9 (explaining that—due to the fact that sensory inputs 
are registered farthest from the frontal lobe where delayed response occurs—our brains process direct 
sensory inputs quicker than they process “language-mediated thoughts” involving reflection, critique, 
and suspicion); Christina M. Leclerc & Elizabeth A. Kensinger, Neural Processing of Emotional Pic-
tures and Words: A Comparison of Young and Older Adults, 36 DEVELOPMENTAL NEUROPSYCHOL. 
519, 520 (2011); Tushnet, supra note 7, at 691. 
 160 FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 7, at 7 (explaining that while both our eyes and brain can 
process visual information quicker than the conscious mind can notice, humans are able to “get the 
gist” of visual displays in less than a third of a second but take relatively longer to process the seman-
tic equivalent when received verbally). 
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it is interesting to note that participants named the word component faster than 
the image.161 But they categorized the pictures faster than the words.162 Anoth-
er study of word-picture compounds found that the evaluation of pictures was 
faster than that of words and the negative pictures were named faster than posi-
tive ones.163 
2. Emotion 
Second, images have a closer connection to emotion than words do.164 In-
deed, “pictures are especially well suited for conveying meaning through asso-
ciational logic, often infused with emotions that are triggered beneath our con-
scious awareness.”165 The appeal of images to emotion is not explicit.166 Ulti-
mately, one might argue, the source of “legal discomfort with images is the 
fear that they will make people feel rather than think.”167 
The proximity of perception and emotion, a result of the anatomy of the 
human brain, makes visual images particularly powerful.168 The valence-
dependent responses—meaning the perception of something as positive or 
                                                                                                                           
 161 Arieh & Algom, supra note 153, at 221–22. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Jan De Houwer & Dirk Hermans, Differences in the Affective Processing of Words and Pic-
tures, 8 COGNITION & EMOTION 1, 16 (1994). 
 164 Corbin, supra note 7 at 26 (stating that “images . . . often have an emotional impact in ways 
that words do not”); Leclerc & Kensinger, supra note 159, at 520–21 (“[P]ictures elicit activity within 
emotion processing regions at earlier time points than do words. Pictures also are believed to be more 
salient, and to activate emotional responses more easily than words.”); Tushnet, supra note 7, at 691 
(“[P]ictures can trigger emotions more reliably than words can.”). 
 165 FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 7, at 7–8 (“Words of course, can also prompt emotional 
associations, but pictures do this more rapidly.”); see also Annekathrin Schacht & Werner Sommer, 
Time Course and Task Dependence of Emotion Effects in Word Processing, 9 COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE 
& BEHAV. NEUROSCI. 28, 40 (2009) (discussing emotional content of verbal stimuli). 
 166 Tushnet, supra note 7, at 696. 
 167 Id. at 695. This concern is also evident in recent discussions concerning emotion and judging. 
See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, In Defense of Judicial Empathy, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1944, 1947 (2012). 
 168 FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 7, at 8; Spiesel, supra note 23, at 393. Feigenson and 
Spiesel further explain: 
The same areas of the brain that process visual perceptions are also responsible for 
mental imagery, and these are connected to the amygdala and other areas of the brain 
critical for emotion. And, because visual information acquires emotional valence before 
that information ever gets to the cortex, the whole picture passes along its emotional 
colors even as we begin to decode its parts. The initial emotional loading can occur 
nearly immediately and may influence further readings of the picture quite apart from 
any later contribution that cortical reflection makes. 
FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 7, at 393; see also K. Luan Phan et al., Functional Neuroanatomy 
of Emotion: A Meta-Analysis of Emotion Activation Studies in PET and fMRI, 16 NEUROIMAGE 331, 
331, 344 (2002) (reviewing 55 PET and fMRI studies investigating emotion). 
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negative—are more pronounced for pictures than for words.169 These results 
show that the brain responds more intensely to pictures than words. This 
statement is measurable by the intensity of the activation shift, made visible by 
means of fMRI. Importantly, this fMRI research confirms earlier findings of 
traditional psychological research that pictures have a closer connection to 
emotion than words and are processed faster than words for emotional infor-
mation.170 Because “religion is an emotional subject,”171 visual perception of 
religious symbols likewise is connected to emotion. 
3. Memory 
Third, related also to the previous point concerning emotion, is the observa-
tion that individuals remember emotional experiences more than non-emotional 
ones.172 In fact, memory is “[t]he cognitive domain where the influence of emo-
tion is best understood.”173 Traditional psychological research with respect to 
textual information confirms the commonsensical notion that “[i]ndividuals are 
more likely to remember negative information than neutral information.”174 This 
finding is confirmed by fMRI evidence.175 With respect to pictures, fMRI re-
                                                                                                                           
 169 Kensinger & Schacter, supra note 158, at 123 (finding a shift in localization of the response 
from the lateral prefrontal cortex to the medial prefrontal cortex); see also Leclerc & Kensinger, supra 
note 159, at 519, 533 (showing this to be true for different age groups of adults). See generally R.J. 
Davidson & W. Irwin, Functional MRI in the Study of Emotion, in FUNCTIONAL MRI, supra note 146, 
at 487 (discussing data from fMRI studies to assess human emotion). 
 170 De Houwer & Hermans, supra note 163, at 1 (finding support for their hypothesis “that pic-
tures have privileged access to a semantic network containing affective information”). 
 171 Elmbrook II, 697 F.3d 840, 873 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 172 Turhan Canli et al., Event-Related Activation of the Human Amygdala Associates with Later 
Memory for Emotional Experience, 20 J. NEUROSCI. 1, 1 (2000) (discussing two PET studies and one 
fMRI study that “reported significant correlations between amygdala activation related to emotional 
stimuli and subsequent memory.”). Of the three studies mentioned, one PET study used film clips, see 
Larry Cahill et al., Amygdala Activity at Encoding Correlated With Long-Term, Free Recall of Emo-
tional Information, 93 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 8016, 8016 (1996); another PET study used 
pictures, see Stephan B. Hamann et al., Amygdala Activity Related to Enhanced Memory for Pleasant 
and Aversive Stimuli, 2 NATURE NEUROSCI 289, 289 (1999); and the fMRI study also used pictures, 
see Turhan Canli et al., fMRI Identifies a Network of Structures Correlated with Retention of Positive 
and Negative Emotional Memory, 27 PSYCHOBIOLOGY 441, 441 (1999). 
 173 R.J. Dolan, Emotion, Cognition, and Behavior, 298 SCI. 1191, 1192 (2002). 
 174 Kensinger & Corkin, supra note 152, at 1169; see also Elizabeth A. Kensinger & Suzanne 
Corkin, Effect of Negative Emotional Content on Working Memory and Long-Term Memory, 3 EMO-
TION 378, 378 (2003) (finding that negative information is better remembered than neutral infor-
mation). 
 175 Matthias H. Tabert et al., Differential Amygdala Activation During Emotional Decision and 
Recognition Memory Tasks Using Unpleasant Words: An fMRI Study, 39 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 556, 
556 (2001). 
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search found that positive and negative images are more easily remembered than 
neutral ones.176 
Irrespective of emotional content, importantly, pictures are more likely to 
be remembered than words.177 This is known as the “picture superiority ef-
fect”178 for which the literature offers different theoretical accounts.179 In sum, 
if emotionally charged content is easier to remember than neutral content, and 
pictures are easier to remember than words, it logically follows that emotional-
ly charged pictures are particularly easy to remember. If it is true that religious 
content of religious visual symbols qualifies as emotionally charged, the in-
sight that emotionally charged visual information is easier to remember ap-
pears particularly salient. In particular, nonadherents or nonbelievers might 
have negative emotions associated with certain religious symbols.180 
4. Persuasiveness 
Finally, images “persuade without overt appeals to rhetoric”; this relates 
to the perception of text as rational and/or factual and images as irrational 
and/or nonfactual.181 One reason for the law’s bias in favor of text may be the 
association of the textual with “rationality” and “objectivity” and the associa-
tion of the visual with “irrationality” and “subjectivity.”182 The connection be-
tween text and rationality and images and irrationality accounts for a threat 
associated with the visual: “Images seem especially dangerous because their 
power is irrational.”183 The neuroscience evidence bears out the distinction be-
tween text as rational and images as irrational to some extent. Though the data 
of a text or a visual image is received in the same way, the image’s message is 
processed differently in the brain than a textual message. As compared with 
words, “for pictures, the effect of emotion might be in evidence immediately 
                                                                                                                           
 176 Florin Dolcos et al., Dissociable Effects of Arousal and Valence on Prefrontal Activity Index-
ing Emotional Evaluation and Subsequent Memory: An Event-Related fMRI Study, 23 NEUROIMAGE 
64 (2004); see also Cahill et al., supra note 172, at 8016 (relying on a PET study to find this to be true 
for film clips). 
 177 Miriam Z. Mintzer & Joan Gay Snodgrass, The Picture Superiority Effect: Support for the 
Distinctiveness Model, 112 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 113, 113 (1999); Tushnet, supra note 7, at 691 (stating 
that pictures “are easier to remember than (roughly equivalent denotational) words”). 
 178 Mintzer & Snodgrass, supra note 172, at 113 (“The picture superiority effect is the highly 
consistent empirical finding that stimuli presented for study in picture form are more likely to be re-
called on a subsequent free recall test and to be discriminated from nonstudied stimuli on a subsequent 
recognition memory test than stimuli presented in word form.” (citations omitted)). 
 179 Id. at 113–17. 
 180 See infra note 253 and accompanying text (discussing how nonadherents or nonbelievers may 
perceive religious symbols differently). 
 181 Tushnet, supra note 7, at 692. 
 182 See id. at 693–94. 
 183 Adler, supra note 146, at 213 (“[B]y bypassing reason and appealing directly to the senses, 
images fail to participate in the marketplace of ideas.”); see Tushnet, supra note 7, at 694. 
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and might be evoked relatively automatically, whereas activation of emotional 
responses for word stimuli may require more in depth and controlled pro-
cessing.”184 Indeed, this is likely to disprove “the First Amendment truism that 
those who do not like a visual sign can avoid it ‘simply by averting their 
eyes.’”185 If the perception of a visual symbol occurs all at once,186 it cannot be 
retroactively averted. Yet, this was one of the arguments that Justice Kennedy 
made in the County of Allegheny crèche case.187 
B. Judging the Visual and Textual 
Despite this empirical data on visual perception, judges largely rely on in-
tuition when it comes to evaluating images.188 In the Elmbrook graduation-at-
church case, Judge Posner in dissent lamented the lack of constitutional or so-
cial science guidance for evaluating visuals.189 Judge Posner noted that the ab-
sence of either causes “judges [to] inevitably fall back on their priors, that is, 
on beliefs based on personality, upbringing, conviction, experience, emotions, 
and so forth that people bring to a question they can’t answer by the methods 
of logic and science or some other objective method.”190 Thus, as an initial step 
to allay these concerns, courts should take empirical neuroscience data into 
account. When approaching cases involving visual symbolic representations, 
courts cannot dismiss visuals; instead, they must fully engage with their power. 
Since “pictures, like words, can make meanings symbolically,”191 consid-
ering First Amendment speech cases proves instructive. In past speech cases, 
the Supreme Court has displayed a considerably more nuanced approach to 
visual symbolic communication than in cases involving visual religious sym-
bols.192 This suggests that concerns regarding the institutional competence of 
courts to properly account for the role of the visual are negligible once the pre-
vailing resistance to dealing with visual matters is overcome.193 Judges, a crit-
ic’s argument might go, are good at dealing with words, but not necessarily 
with images. But despite the interpretive difficulties attached to symbols, re-
                                                                                                                           
 184 Leclerc & Kensinger, supra note 159, at 521. 
 185 Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 1753, 1770 (1996) (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)). 
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ence . . . .”). 
 187 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 188 See infra notes 189–238 and accompanying text. 
 189 Elmbrook II, 687 F.3d at 873 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 190 Id. 
 191 FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 7, at 7. 
 192 See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (plurality opinion) (cross burning); Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag burning); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (draft 
card burning). 
 193 See Zick, supra note 12, at 2340. 
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covering the symbolic meaning of a message is not beyond the judiciary’s ca-
pabilities.194 For instance, citing the Supreme Court cross burning case, Virgin-
ia v. Black, “as an exception to the general doctrines of interpretive indiffer-
ence and avoidance,” Timothy Zick asserts that the case “holds out the possi-
bility that symbolic meaning can be recovered judicially” and calls the deci-
sion a “methodological success.”195 
The First Amendment speech cases provide sufficient evidence that judg-
es are in fact capable of assessing the communicative impact of images.196 In 
speech cases involving symbolic expression, such as draft card burning,197 flag 
burning198 or cross burning,199 the Supreme Court routinely had to consider the 
“communicative impact”200 of visual representations. In these cases, the Court 
decided that expressive conduct is sufficiently analogous to “actual speech” to 
warrant First Amendment protection.201 As this Article argues in Part III, focus-
ing the inquiry on communicative impact better accounts for the underlying 
normative concerns of the Establishment Clause and, as a side effect, contrib-
utes to greater First Amendment symmetry as well.202 
In speech cases, the Court does not explicitly discuss the distinction be-
tween the textual and the visual beyond the observation that symbolic speech 
is speech for First Amendment purposes.203 But the Court’s discussion none-
theless appears relatively more attentive to the observations regarding the na-
ture of visual communication than in the Establishment Clause context. In 
Black, for example, Justice O’Connor observed that “[i]ndividuals burn crosses 
as opposed to other means of communication because cross burning carries a 
message in an effective and dramatic manner.”204 It is to a great extent the vis-
ual element of the “symbolic expression” that makes this form of communica-
tion so “effective and dramatic.”205 
                                                                                                                           
 194 See id. 
 195 See id. at 2340, 2347 (citing Black, 538 U.S. at 343). 
 196 See, e.g., Black, 538 U.S. at 360; Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406; O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 382. 
 197 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 367. 
 198 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 397. 
 199 Black, 538 U.S. at 347; R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379 (1992). 
 200 See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317–18 (1990) (communicative impact of 
flag burning); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412 (same); O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 382 (noncommunicative impact 
of draft card burning). 
 201 See, e.g., Black, 538 U.S. at 358 (“The First Amendment affords protection to symbolic or 
expressive conduct as well as to actual speech.”); see also Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (“The First 
Amendment literally forbids the abridgement only of ‘speech,’ but we have long recognized that its 
protection does not end at the spoken or written word.”). But see Adler, supra note 30, at 210 (arguing 
that the First Amendment provides more protection for verbal speech rather than visual). 
 202 See infra notes 300–364 and accompanying text. 
 203 See Black, 538 U.S. at 360; Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406; O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 382. 
 204 Black, 538 U.S. at 360. 
 205 Id. at 361. 
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Scholars, accordingly, have carefully examined the burning cross as a 
visual representation.206 The burning cross “communicates at a sensual, non- or 
pre-rational level, appealing to emotion and noncognitive understanding or 
interpretation.”207 This indicates that there is a difference between the visual 
and the textual; the former is “less susceptible to the cooling impact of cogni-
tive expression and reason.”208 In other words, although reading about a burn-
ing cross allows us to reflect rationally, witnessing a burning cross incites an 
automatic, irrational response.209 Likewise, it is the image of the burning flag 
that causes “serious offense.”210  And it is the effect of that image on the ob-
server that makes it different—contra Chief Justice Rehnquist—from someone 
“mak[ing] any verbal denunciation of the flag.”211 
Notably, neither the cross in the cross burning cases nor the flag in the 
flag burning cases were designated as “passive,” even though there is little that 
distinguishes those symbols from religious symbols deemed “passive.”212 In-
deed, “symbols of State often convey political ideas just as religious symbols 
come to convey theological ones.”213 And before they are symbols, they are 
visual images.214 In the flag cases, like in the cross burning cases just dis-
cussed, “the power of the symbol itself operates at a nonrational level.”215 
To be sure, there are profound differences between these cases involving 
flag burning and cross burning and those involving religious imagery.216 There 
are two layers of symbolism: the meaning of the symbol itself, and the symbol-
ic meaning of the act of burning the symbol. The cross was not just sitting 
there—it was burning. Aside from the obvious differences in substantive con-
tent, the message of destruction carries a specific connotation in the flag and 
cross burning cases. But the manner in which visual perception operates is the 
same. And while visual representations in the Establishment Clause context 
                                                                                                                           
 206 See, e.g., RANDALL P. BEZANSON, ART AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 218 (2009). 
 207 See id. at 239; see also Black, 538 U.S. at 400 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“That cross burning 
subjects its targets, and, sometimes, an unintended audience, to extreme emotional distress, and is 
virtually never viewed merely as ‘unwanted communication,’ but rather, as a physical threat, is of no 
concern to the plurality.” (citations omitted)). 
 208 BEZANSON, supra note 206, at 252 (noting that “it is an entirely different experience to read 
about a burning cross than to witness it firsthand or see its image on film or canvas”). 
 209 See id.; Tushnet, supra note 7, at 691. 
 210 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 411. 
 211 Id. at 431 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 212 See, e.g., Black, 538 U.S. at 360; Johnson, 491 U.S. at 397. 
 213 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632. 
 214 See Adler, supra note 146, at 214 (“[T]he flag’s message is . . . conveyed solely through its 
visual image. It is a wordless pattern of stars, stripes, and colors.”). 
 215 Kent Greenawalt, O’er the Land of the Free: Flag Burning as Speech, 37 UCLA L. REV. 925, 
944 (1990); see Black, 538 U.S. at 360; Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406. 
 216 See Black, 538 U.S. at 360; Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406. 
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have been deemed “passive,” the Court seems to be aware of their “activity” in 
the free speech context. 
Beyond the symbolic speech context, the most instructive examples of 
grappling with the textual and the visual are the opinions of Justices Samuel 
Alito and Stephen Breyer in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n—the 
case involving violent video games.217 Justice Alito closely examined the inter-
activity associated with video games; he seemed troubled by the majority’s 
equation of the textual and the visual experience.218 Whereas Justice Scalia 
contended for the majority—citing Judge Posner—that “all literature is interac-
tive,”219 Justice Alito, joined in concurrence by Chief Justice John Roberts, 
suggested that “the experience of playing video games (and the effects on mi-
nors of playing violent video games) may be very different from anything that 
we have seen before.”220 The degree of interactivity Justice Alito attributed to 
video games does not correspond exactly to the breakdown of the textual and 
the visual; in his assessment, there is a quality of active engagement in playing 
video games that exceeds exposure to images in movies or on television.221 
But, however the lines may be drawn, the immediacy of video games depends 
in large part on the visual stimuli provided to the player.222 As compared to 
literature, thus, “video games are far more concretely interactive”; in addition 
to sound and touch elements, the visual element contributes significantly to the 
more vivid experience.223 
Justice Breyer focused on the harm that extremely violent video games 
can cause in children; in doing so, he used the active/passive distinction.224 
Video games, in Justice Breyer’s view, “can cause more harm . . . than can typ-
ically passive media, such as books or films or television programs.”225 As in 
Justice Alito’s concurrence, Justice Breyer’s alignment of active (video games) 
and passive (books, films, and television) does not correspond to the visual 
                                                                                                                           
 217 See 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742–51 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2761–71 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 218 Id. at 2750–51 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (disagreeing with the majority’s assess-
ment that literature was as interactive as the violent video games at issue). 
 219 Id. at 2738 (“As Judge Posner has observed, all literature is interactive . . . . ‘Literature when it is 
successful draws the reader into the story, makes him identify with the characters, invites him to judge 
them and quarrel with them, to experience their joys and sufferings as the reader’s own.’” (quoting Am. 
Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001))); see also Tushnet, supra note 
7, at 745–47 (discussing Judge Posner’s assessment of the textual and visual in other cases). 
 220 Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2748 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 221 See id. at 2742. But see Tushnet, supra note 7, at 698 (suggesting that the lines may be drawn 
differently). 
 222 Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2748 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing 
the high quality and realistic appearance of images). 
 223 Id. at 2750 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 224 Id. at 2768 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 225 Id. 
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versus textual breakdown.226 Moreover, the “passive” label shifts between de-
scribing the medium itself and the viewer.227 Though less pronounced than in 
Justice Alito’s concurrence, the visual component in Justice Breyer’s dissent 
likely plays a significant role as well.228 Whether these opinions signal a new 
trend in Supreme Court opinions assessing visual experience on observers is 
unclear. But it seems worth noting that at least three justices seem aware of the 
potential importance of evaluating the power of visual images. 
In another context, two recent decisions concerning graphic warnings on 
cigarette packages illustrate how the distinction between the rational or factual 
associated with text and the irrational or nonfactual associated with images 
plays out. In one decision, the U.S Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held 
constitutional the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) graphic warn-
ing requirements.229 In doing so, the court considered the visual images to be 
subjective and acknowledged the “inherently persuasive character” of visual 
images.230 The dissent, moreover, elaborated on the emotional aspect of the 
images.231 In another decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
vacated the FDA’s graphic warning requirements on cigarette packages.232 In 
doing so, the D.C. Circuit addressed the distinction between textual warnings 
and visual graphic warnings.233 The panel majority and the dissent disagreed 
on whether the emotive nature of graphic images could render otherwise factu-
al accompanying text nonfactual or controversial.234 Notably, the dissent ar-
gued that the emotive nature of visual images “does not necessarily undermine 
the warnings’ factual accuracy.”235 
                                                                                                                           
 226 See id. at 2768. 
 227 Id. at 2769 (using the term in both ways—at times describing interactive games as more “pas-
sive” than other media types, but also describing the “passive” viewing experience of television and 
films). 
 228 See id. at 2767 (discussing “images of human beings as targets”); id. at 2771 (discussing de-
pictions and images). 
 229 R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Disc. Tobacco 
City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 526 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 230 Disc. Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 526 (“But, in contrast to the textual warnings, there can be no 
doubt that the FDA’s choice of visual images is subjective, and that graphic, full-color images, be-
cause of the inherently persuasive character of the visual medium, cannot be presumed neutral.”). 
 231 Id. at 528 (Clay, J., dissenting). 
 232 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1208. 
 233 Id. at 1211. 
 234 Compare id. at 1216 (stating that the graphic warnings did not constitute information that was 
“purely factual and uncontroversial”), with id. at 1230 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (“That such images are 
not invariably comforting to look at does not necessarily make them inaccurate.”). In Discount Tobac-
co City, the Sixth Circuit said the images were factual. 674 F.3d at 569; see also Corbin, supra note 7, 
at 39 (agreeing with the Sixth Circuit’s determination that the emotion-invoking images were never-
theless factual and contrasting the reasoning with that of the D.C. Circuit in R.J. Reynolds). 
 235 R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1230. 
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In all of these examples, only Justice Breyer’s dissent in the video games 
case explicitly referenced neuroscience research.236 Otherwise, the distinctions 
between textual and visual appear to be largely a product of the judges’ intui-
tions. That does not mean that these intuitions are necessarily wrong in light of 
cognitive neuroscience insights; the speech cases discussed here illustrate that 
they may well be correct.237 But the absence of an empirical basis for these intui-
tive assumptions should give us pause. Indeed, as this Article argues with respect 
to religious symbols, such intuitive assumptions may just as well turn out to be 
wrong. And at least some judges seem acutely aware of this problem.238 
C. Distinguishing Visual Perception and Cultural Meaning 
So far, the discussion of religious visual symbols as images has largely 
disregarded the symbolic dimension. To reiterate, how visual images com-
municate is an empirical, objective question whereas the question of meaning 
is subjective and context-dependent. The neuroscience data presented in Sec-
tion A of this Part undermines the claim that visuals are somehow less power-
ful or even “passive” as compared to text.239 This Section shows that to the 
extent “passive” is shorthand for a bundle of factors related to context or cul-
tural meaning, the label is misleading at best, and therefore not useful.240 
For purposes of the Establishment Clause, we are only concerned with 
visual representations that are religious symbols. Thus, problems arise espe-
cially when visual representations are not obviously religious.241 Which visual 
symbols are religious? Semiotics teaches us that multiple steps are involved in 
getting from a visual image to a symbolic religious message.242 Simply put, 
cultural meaning is given to the symbolic representation. 
Images, like texts, must be interpreted to fully make their meaning acces-
sible. Images “acquire meaning from our associations to them, drawn from our 
perceptual knowledge, experience, [and] cultural setting.”243 This brings the 
communicative impact of visuals into conversation with more traditional ap-
proaches to the interpretation of texts and symbols, including literary criticism, 
                                                                                                                           
 236 See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2768 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 237 See supra notes 192–235 and accompanying text. 
 238 See Elmbrook II, 687 F.3d at 873 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 239 See supra notes 151–187 and accompanying text. 
 240 See infra notes 241–299 and accompanying text. 
 241 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 32, at 69 (“The interesting, and constitutionally troublesome, 
issues arise in more ambiguous situations, in which it is unclear either whether words or symbols are 
religious or whether the state supports the religious message that they indisputably convey.”). 
 242 See Zick, supra note 12, at 2330–32 (outlining semiotics in order to appropriately interpret 
enigmatic signs). 
 243 Spiesel, supra note 138, at 41. 
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ethnography, and other interpretive tools discussed in the legal literature.244 
Legal scholars have proposed various approaches to determine the symbolic 
meaning of a message.245 For example, several scholars have suggested look-
ing to the work of anthropologist Clifford Geertz.246 Using an ethnographic 
approach, these scholars argue, facilitates the recovery of the cultural meaning 
of the symbol.247 Cultural literacy in interpreting religious symbols thus be-
comes key; the observer must recognize the religious nature of the symbol or 
act. Indeed, as Justice Felix Frankfurter stated in his dissent in West Virginia 
Board of Education v. Barnette, “The significance of a symbol lies in what it 
represents.”248 
But who decides what the symbol represents? As Rebecca Tushnet ex-
plains, “we trust our own (natural-seeming and immediate) reactions to imag-
es, but we worry that other people’s reactions to images may be irrational—
especially if they don’t see the same things we do.”249 But what individual ob-
servers see is determined by their characteristics; what one may deem natural 
and immediate may not be at all obvious to someone else looking at the same 
visual representation. Whether the observer views a football game of his own 
team250 or is otherwise affiliated with one side,251 the same is likely true for the 
religious affiliation of the observer.252 If the observer is affiliated with a reli-
gious group whose symbol is on display, the perception is likely different than 
if the observer is not affiliated with that particular group or, even more prob-
lematically perhaps, not affiliated with any religion.253 Perception of the visual 
symbol, in short, arguably “depends on which team you favor.”254 
                                                                                                                           
 244 See, e.g., Hill, supra note 10, at 493 (using a literary criticism approach); Zick, supra note 12, 
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Moreover, in the context of religious symbols, in Lynch v. Donnelly, the 
Supreme Court suggested that to “[f]ocus exclusively on the religious compo-
nent of any activity would inevitably lead to its invalidation under the Estab-
lishment Clause.”255 Though questionable with respect to the conclusion on the 
merits, the idea is the same as the proposition that we tend to more easily find 
something we are looking for.256 This is not to say that the merits question will 
be answered differently, and uniformly, according to the religious background 
of the viewer.257 Instead, it simply means that perception is influenced by indi-
vidual characteristics. Moreover, this observation highlights the importance of 
distinguishing between perception, interpretation of the message, and the mer-
its question. It also illustrates one of the key problems of the endorsement 
test’s “reasonable observer” persona that (still) is predominantly used to assess 
whether public displays violate the Establishment Clause.258 
Justice Jackson in Barnette overstated the subjectivity of symbolic speech.259 
Sometimes symbols, including religious symbols, are relatively clear in their 
meaning.260 This creates a conundrum that explains why visual perception 
alone cannot provide an answer to Establishment Clause inquiries. Two exam-
ples, the Latin cross and holiday displays, illustrate this problem. If images are 
                                                                                                                           
Clause even if it only offends nonbelievers); Nelson Tebbe, Nonbelievers, 97 VA. L. REV. 1111 
(2011) (arguing that courts should treat nonbelievers differently in Establishment Clause analysis). 
 254 Tushnet, supra note 7, at 701. Some advocate for a larger role of the faithful. Timothy Zick 
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 255 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984). 
 256 Though beyond the scope of this discussion, it is worth pointing out that there is a body of 
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ture, see generally Kathleen M. O’Craven et al., fMRI Evidence for Objects as the Units of Attentional 
Selection, 401 NATURE 584 (1999). 
 257 See Hill, supra note 10, at 531–32 (arguing that religious background does not determine the 
outcome on the merits in religious symbol cases). 
 258 See 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 32, at 87 (“The test, at least in its basic outline, has consider-
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judgment, courts should respond to texts and symbols that people may perceive differently.”); see also 
B. Jessie Hill, Anatomy of the Reasonable Observer, 79 BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), availa-
ble at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2330338, archived at http://perma.cc/EWB7-TGP3 (addressing criti-
cisms of the reasonable observer). 
 259 319 U.S. at 632–33 (“A person gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into it, and what is one 
man’s comfort and inspiration is another’s jest and scorn”). 
 260 See Laycock, supra note 47, at 1244–49 (rejecting the “assault on meaning” in cases involving 
textual and visual religious symbols); Zick, supra note 12, at 2336 (“Some symbols more or less 
speak for themselves; they are ‘uncontested’ in the legal sense of the term.”). 
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as powerful as the neuroscience data suggests, they may still differ in their de-
grees of sectarianism. Arguably, the Latin cross conveys a more clearly reli-
gious message than the crèche as a component of Christmas displays. Thus, 
Part III provides a conceptual framework rather than an empirics-based one to 
reconceptualize Establishment Clause inquiries. 
1. Latin Cross 
One purportedly “passive” symbol in particular has been the subject of 
recent litigation, both domestically and abroad: the Latin cross. In determining 
the religious nature of a symbolic message, “the preeminent symbol of Christi-
anity”261 is the seemingly easy case. Federal courts have consistently interpret-
ed the Latin cross to be a religious symbol.262 Yet, even the Latin cross causes 
interpretive difficulties. Are we dealing with a bare cross, customary in many 
Protestant denominations, or a crucifix depicting the corpus, common in the 
Catholic, Lutheran, Eastern Orthodox, and Anglican traditions? The symbolic 
message communicated differs accordingly, and at least one judge has suggest-
ed a distinction in meaning on this basis.263 Despite general consensus that the 
cross is a religious symbol, there is a decided lack of agreement on the ques-
tion whether it has additional secular meaning.264 The “passive” label fails ad-
equately to capture these contextual concerns. 
One nonreligious alternative meaning of the Latin cross is evident. The 
burning cross conveys a message of racial hatred;265 one that also attaches to 
the Ku Klux Klan’s (KKK) use of the cross when it is not set ablaze.266 In Cap-
itol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette—a case in which the KKK 
                                                                                                                           
 261 Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 725 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
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 262 See, e.g., Trunk II, 629 F.3d 1099, 1101 (9th Cir. 2011); Am. Atheists, Inc., 616 F.3d at 1160; 
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 265 Black, 538 U.S. at 357 (noting that the burning of a cross was a “symbol of hate”). 
 266 Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
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sought to place an unadorned (and not burning) cross in a display on public 
property—Justice Clarence Thomas pointed out the nonreligious meaning of 
erecting such a cross, characterizing it as “a political act, not a Christian 
one.”267 To be sure, the cross remains primarily a Christian symbol, but accord-
ing to Justice Thomas, “[t]he Klan simply . . . appropriated one of the most 
sacred of religious symbols as a symbol of hate.”268 The symbolic message 
communicated by the cross in this instance, therefore, is only apparent in light 
of the KKK’s authorship. 
In several more recent cases, another secular message has been ascribed 
to the cross. Several judicial decisions have found it to be a marker of the rest-
ing place of the dead, with various secular messages of honor, valor, and sacri-
fice attached.269 Justice Kennedy, writing for the plurality in Salazar v. Buono, 
interpreted the cross in this manner.270 Both Justice Kennedy and Justice Alito 
further interpreted the meaning of the cross as reminiscent of military cemeter-
ies in the United States and abroad.271 Likewise, in American Atheists, Inc. v. 
Davenport, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit—in a case involv-
ing Utah highway crosses—acknowledged that “a reasonable observer would 
recognize these memorial crosses as symbols of death.”272 But the Tenth Cir-
cuit also pointed out that there is a distinctly Christian dimension to the use of 
the cross as a marker of death.273 And though common as a symbol of death, it 
is not therefore secular.274 Likewise, in Buono, Justice Stevens expressed the 
view that “[m]aking a plain, unadorned Latin cross a war memorial does not 
make the cross secular. It makes the war memorial sectarian.”275 Therefore, 
even if there were a secular message grafted onto the religious message of the 
cross, it does not become “passive” in its meaning. 
Scholars and courts disagree whether meaning is an empirical question,276 
but that is a different question than the empirical claim regarding visual per-
                                                                                                                           
 267 Id. (noting “the fact that the legal issue before us involves the Establishment Clause should not 
lead anyone to believe that a cross erected by the Ku Klux Klan is a purely religious symbol”). 
 268 Id. at 771. 
 269 See, e.g., Buono, 559 U.S. at 721 (plurality opinion); Davenport, 637 F.3d at 1111. 
 270 Buono, 559 U.S. at 721 (plurality opinion). 
 271 Id.; id. at 723–24 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 272 637 F.3d at 1122. 
 273 Id. As the Tenth Circuit put it, “a memorial cross is not a generic symbol of death; it is a 
Christian symbol of death that signifies or memorializes the death of a Christian.” Id. Further, the 
court found “no evidence . . . that the cross has been widely embraced as a marker for the burial sites 
of non-Christians or as a memorial for a non-Christian’s death.” Id. Similarly, an exchange during oral 
argument in Buono illustrated the difference between a generic marker and a distinctly Christian 
marker. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38–39, Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (No. 08-472). 
 274 Davenport, 637 F.3d at 1122–23. 
 275 Buono, 559 U.S. at 747 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 276 See, e.g., Hill, supra note 10, at 529 (asserting that lower courts treat meaning “as primarily an 
empirical question” and disagreeing with that approach). 
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ception. Does it matter for the assessment of the religious character of a cross 
memorial in Utah that the designers do not revere the cross as a religious sym-
bol277 and only eighteen percent of that state’s population does so?278 The larg-
er question is to what extent the local should matter in questions of Establish-
ment Clause application in general, and its application to religious symbolic 
expression in particular.279 But on the narrower question posed here, the con-
text of determining the symbol’s meaning, it is largely irrelevant whether the 
cross is revered as a symbol of faith in the local community.280 What matters is 
that it is recognizable as a religious symbol, even if it is not the object of reli-
gious reverence. Put another way, the majority of Utah citizens likely knows 
that the Latin cross is a religious symbol. Likewise, as cases such as Davenport 
show, the intent of the designers (and possible testimony as to intent) will not 
necessarily matter for the court’s interpretation of the symbol.281 Courts should 
attempt to inquire into the range of plausible meanings, including potential 
religious and secular meanings of the symbols, in coming to a context-
dependent conclusion.282 The difficulty of this analysis will vary case-by-case. 
If the Latin cross has additional meaning(s), should that matter for Estab-
lishment Clause purposes? Scholars have examined similar questions under the 
headings of contested and uncontested meanings,283 social meaning,284 as well 
as consensus on meaning.285 As in the First Amendment speech context, there 
are standard and nonstandard interpretations of visual religious symbols.286 
The secular message of the cross in particular is far less obvious and far more 
contested than its religious message. As Douglas Laycock notes, the nonreli-
                                                                                                                           
 277 Davenport, 637 F.3d at 1118 (“The secular nature of the UHPA motive is bolstered by the fact 
that the memorials were designed by two individuals who are members of the Mormon faith, the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Saints [sic] (‘LDS Church’), a religion that does not use the cross as a 
religious symbol.”). 
 278 Id. 1121–22 (noting that “a majority of Utahns do not revere the cross as a symbol of their 
faith”). The Tenth Circuit did not find that to be the case. See id. at 1122–24 (“Similarly, the fact that 
cross-revering Christians are a minority in Utah does not mean that it is implausible that the State’s 
actions would be interpreted by the reasonable observer as endorsing that religion.”). 
 279 See Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious 
Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810, 1874–91 (2004). 
 280 See Laycock, supra note 47, at 1243 (reaching the same conclusion). 
 281 See Davenport, 637 F.3d at 1118; Hill, supra note 10, at 529 (discussing problems associated 
with treating “[t]he meaning of . . . allegedly religious symbols . . . as primarily an empirical ques-
tion”). But see Zick, supra note 12, at 2337–38 (noting that “the speakers testified with respect to their 
intended messages, thus removing any remaining symbolic uncertainty”). 
 282 Zick, supra note 12, at 2367. 
 283 Id. at 2336. 
 284 CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CON-
STITUTION 124–28 (2007). 
 285 Hill, supra note 10, at 518. 
 286 See Schauer, supra note 138, at 226 (discussing nonstandard meaning of nonlinguistic com-
munication). 
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gious meaning of the cross, as discussed in these cases, depends entirely on its 
religious meaning.287 Thus, there is so little ambiguity in the message of the 
cross that, even if it communicates an alternative message—and especially if 
that alternative meaning is indeed entirely dependent on the religious mes-
sage—the alternative meaning should not matter for the message of the cross. 
And none of these alternative meanings, even if they were plausible, are help-
fully summarized under the label “passive.” 
2. Christmas Displays 
The ostensible problem of ambiguity we see in connection with the Latin 
cross does not arise in the same way in the Christmas display cases, because 
the crèche—with figures of Mary and Joseph, the baby, and the shepherds—
can be identified as the visual representation of the textual Biblical story of 
Jesus’s birth.288 This identification, of course, requires that the audience knows 
of the scriptural source. Perhaps more problematic, once the crèche is com-
bined in a Christmas display with other, secular features,289 selective observa-
tion may factor into the display’s assessment. We may focus on the religious or 
secular elements of such “mixed” holiday displays, depending on what we are 
looking for.290 Indeed a similar problem arises when the cross is only one ele-
ment of a larger display, such as the Mt. Soledad war memorial.291 
But there is another complication with respect to Christmas displays: the 
Christmas holiday, and the crèche as its representation, may have undergone a 
process of secularization.292 The Tenth Circuit, for instance, contrasted Christ-
mas, “which has been widely embraced as a secular holiday,” with the cross, 
for which the court discerned “no evidence” of being “widely embraced by 
non-Christians as a secular symbol for death.”293 Although courts often assert 
that certain symbols or expressions have lost their religious content, it remains 
unclear how exactly they make this determination.294 Addressing this short-
coming, Jessie Hill suggests taking a linguistic speech act theory approach to 
                                                                                                                           
 287 Laycock, supra note 47, at 1240–42. Laycock concludes that “[t]here is no ambiguity about 
the primary meaning of a Christian cross.” Id. at 1239. 
 288 See Luke 2:1–:20 (New American Bible); Matthew 2:1–:11 (New American Bible). 
 289 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671. 
 290 See supra notes 252–256 and accompanying text; cf. Tushnet, supra note 7, at 748 n.290 (col-
lecting sources that discuss how people will not notice things if they are not actively looking for 
them). 
 291 Trunk II, 629 F.3d at 1103. 
 292 See Hill, supra note 127, at 715–26 (discussing secularization thesis and criticisms); see also 
Ravitch, supra note 10, at 1059–61 (discussing the distinction between desacrilization and seculariza-
tion). 
 293 Davenport, 637 F.3d at 1122. 
 294 Hill, supra note 127, at 714–26. 
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the “methodological question whether the religiosity of a particular practice, 
symbol, or phrase has faded.”295 In the context of advocating a Geertzian ap-
proach, Timothy Zick argues that judicial interpretation has led to desacraliza-
tion of holiday displays in most instances.296 But even if an “authoritative 
means of resolving the meaning of sacred symbols” appears out of reach, a 
more attentive evaluation and interpretation is necessary.297 Some, however, 
point out that it is not the loss of religious meaning—the desacralization of the 
symbols themselves that is caused by adding secular elements—but rather the 
secularization of the overall display.298 It appears less important to determine 
who is right; it is, however, important to note that a shift in symbolic meaning 
seems to occur that changes the message communicated. Nevertheless, the 
core meaning of the symbolic representation is unambiguously religious.299 
Here, too, none of the shifts in meaning are usefully described as “passive.” 
 * * * 
Visual symbols are at least as “active” as textual speech, an empirical 
finding that is objectively ascertainable by neuroscience data. The data refutes 
the empirical claim that visual symbols are merely “passive” as compared to 
text. Judges seem to be aware of the activity of symbols in the speech cases 
discussed. The result of the empirical question—how images communicate, in 
light of the neuroscience data presented—is that text and visual images should 
be treated the same way in terms of their communicative impact. The separate 
question of symbolic meaning is context-dependent and subjective. At this 
point, the empirical literature can be brought into conversation with the inter-
pretive literature that concerns the meaning of symbols. The cultural interpre-
tation of symbols also is the same for visual and textual messages; text and 
images can equally be used to convey symbolic messages that must be inter-
preted in order to make their meaning accessible. Interpreting the meaning of 
symbols, thus, has nothing to do with whether the medium is textual or visual. 
III. COMMUNICATIVE IMPACT 
What prescriptive lessons follow from these insights for the Establish-
ment Clause and for First Amendment theory as it concerns visual symbols 
more broadly? Images speak at least as loudly as words, and sometimes—as 
the discussion in Part II suggests—a message may be conveyed even more in-
                                                                                                                           
 295 Id. at 731. 
 296 Zick, supra note 12, at 2367 (“The upshot, where some secular purpose, as is generally the 
case, can be ascertained or judicially imagined is that judges . . . will only in the rarest of circumstanc-
es perceive an unconstitutional establishment from the display of sacred symbols.”). 
 297 Id.  
 298 Ravitch, supra note 10, at 1059–61. 
 299 See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 284, at 134 (reaching the same conclusion). 
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tensely by images than by words. There should not be a constitutionally rele-
vant distinction between images and words that discounts the communicative 
impact of images and privileges words. Having discarded the active/passive 
distinction and textual privilege, this Part provides a novel conceptual frame-
work for assessing symbolic religious messages according to their communica-
tive impact irrespective of the medium. It argues that endorsement and coer-
cion should be reconceptualized as matters of degree rather than kind, because 
doing so provides a better account of what matters: the communicative impact 
of a message. This conception is more responsive to the underlying normative 
concern that the State may not adopt a religious identity of its own. 
The most obvious immediate justification for the medium-neutral pre-
scriptive position stems from the text of the Establishment Clause itself. Textu-
ally, the Establishment Clause is medium-neutral; “Congress shall make no 
law respecting an establishment of religion”300 does not indicate by which 
communicative means an establishment results. To adapt the classic principle 
of media neutrality in copyright law, it is the establishment of religion that the 
Establishment Clause prohibits, and not the particular form by which such es-
tablishment is ultimately achieved.301 If textual messages are capable of pro-
ducing an Establishment Clause violation by communicating the state’s own 
religious identity and resulting preference for one particular religion, the same 
is true for visual messages. In light of the provision’s medium-neutrality, 
courts ought to assess textual and visual religious messages alike in terms of 
their communicative impact. 
This Part argues that courts should examine visual religious symbols un-
der a communicative impact framework. First, Section A explains that the pro-
posed communicative impact framework for visual symbols would result in 
greater First Amendment symmetry.302 Next, Section B addresses the question 
of when the communicative impact of religious symbols can be attributed to 
the State and accordingly trigger the Establishment Clause.303 Finally, Section 
C reframes familiar themes of Establishment Clause doctrine under the prem-
ise that the State may not communicate a religious identity, regardless of 
whether through endorsement or coercion.304 
                                                                                                                           
 300 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 301 Cf. Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 98 (1899) (“It is the intellectual production of the author which 
the copyright protects, and not the particular form which such production ultimately takes . . . .”). 
 302 See infra notes 305–327 and accompanying text. 
 303 See infra notes 328–339 and accompanying text. 
 304 See infra notes 340–364 and accompanying text. 
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A. First Amendment Symmetry 
Communicative impact is routinely examined in free speech doctrine and 
theory.305 There, the question is whether a law is aimed at the communicative 
impact of the expression or whether it is a law of general application that has an 
incidental effect on the communication.306 This question has relevance in the 
context of both textual and symbolic speech. For a symbolic speech example, 
recall only Virginia v. Black, the cross burning case.307 Communicative impact in 
the free speech area is employed to discuss the content of the message con-
veyed.308 Likewise, we are concerned with the question of content of the mes-
sage in the Establishment Clause context. In free speech scholarship, the content 
of the message conveyed is often expressed in terms of the speech’s communica-
tive impact.309 Importantly, scholars in the free speech context sometimes speak 
of communicative impact in terms suggesting a distinction of degrees.310 
In its focus on communicative impact, the framework proposed in this Ar-
ticle results in greater First Amendment symmetry. Text should no longer be 
given special status in the Establishment Clause context; as previously demon-
strated, this distinction does not exist in the speech context.311 To be sure, the 
                                                                                                                           
 305 See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (cross burning); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 
397 (1989) (flag burning); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (draft card burning). 
 306 See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376–77; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
§ 12-2 (2d ed. 1988) (subsequently elaborating the O’Brien idea of communicative impact as govern-
ment motivation); John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and 
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1496–98 (1975) (analyzing 
O’Brien’s communicative impact inquiry). 
 307 See 538 U.S. at 360–61; cf. Schauer, supra note 138, at 201 (explaining that “the case turned 
not on whether Virginia had targeted the communicative impact of cross-burning, for of course it had, 
but instead on whether this was one of the communicative impacts whose delivery the First Amend-
ment did not protect”). 
 308 Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 244 (2012) (explain-
ing that “content is most frequently glossed in terms such as ‘message,’ ‘substance,’ ‘meaning,’ or 
‘communicative significance’”). 
 309 Id. Sometimes “message” and “communicative impact” are used interchangeably. See Martin 
H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 117 (1981) 
(rejecting the O’Brien-Hart-Tribe concept but still agreeing with this point). 
 310 See, e.g., William E. Lee, The Futile Search for Alternative Media in Symbolic Speech Cases, 
8 CONST. COMMENT. 451, 457 (1991) (discussing alternative mediums for speech: “another medium 
will be adequate even though the communicator must sacrifice some intensity or communicative im-
pact”; “the alternatives must not result in diminished communicative impact”; and “the comparison of 
the communicative impact of various forms of speech”). Likewise, in the context of (usually textual 
expressions of) ceremonial deism, one scholar asserts that such messages, “though religious in origin 
. . . no longer carry any religious impact.” See Hill, supra note 127, at 712 (emphasis added). Further, 
she argues that city names “have lost their religious impact over time,” and concludes that “one might 
doubt whether the city names of Corpus Christi and San Francisco, or perhaps even the use of ‘A.D.’ 
on public documents, should be unconstitutional given the apparent lack of religious impact those 
terms convey.” See id. at 726, 759 (emphasis added). 
 311 See supra notes 188–238 and accompanying text. 
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underlying concerns are different.312 We are not worried about preferential 
messages in the speech context; indeed, government speech can advance spe-
cific positions (e.g., anti-smoking or anti-obesity).313 There is, moreover, no 
inherent value in greater First Amendment symmetry for symmetry’s sake; the 
chief concern here is the empirical approach to visual perception. Why is the 
theoretical and doctrinal approach to a cross on the wall different than to a 
burning cross? On the level of visual perception, it should not be.314 
On the question of interpretation of the cultural meaning, historical and 
cultural context plays a crucial role. In Black, the burning cross was not merely 
an image, it was a symbol; what makes an image a symbol is the cultural 
meaning we attach to it.315 It was the visual character of the burning cross that 
was central to conveying a message that could hardly have been communicated 
in a textual form.316 The message’s specific “meaning—lynching, burning, vio-
lent racism—lay not in the image itself when viewed as a bare text.”317 Rather, 
it is the interpretation of its symbolism that gives it meaning. Thus, the “burn-
ing cross—a symbol—was understood to constitute essentially an explicit 
threat, allowing the state to ban cross-burning carried out for the purposes of 
intimidation.”318 
The cultural dimension of interpreting the symbol of the burning cross is 
well understood by the Supreme Court. Justice Thomas stated in his dissent in 
Black that “[i]n every culture, certain things acquire meaning well beyond what 
outsiders can comprehend. That goes for both the sacred, and the profane. I 
believe that cross burning is the paradigmatic example of the latter.”319 In the 
same case, Justice O’Connor stated in her partial majority and partial plurality 
opinion that a finding of intent to intimidate makes it essential to evaluate “all 
of the contextual factors that are necessary to decide whether a particular cross 
burning is intended to intimidate.”320 A key difference between Justice Thom-
as’s dissent and Justice O’Connor’s as well as Justice David Souter’s opinions 
                                                                                                                           
 312 See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 526 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(permitting preferential messages in the speech context). 
 313 See id. 
 314 See supra notes 151–187 and accompanying text. 
 315 See BEZANSON, supra note 206, at 239 (explaining that “historically grounded cultural mean-
ing attached to the burning cross” was due in large part to the experiences by people who witness the 
burning cross in public, especially for those people of race who “had deeply internalized the brutal 
connotations”). 
 316 See Tushnet, supra note 7, at 697. 
 317 BEZANSON, supra note 206, at 239. 
 318 See Tushnet, supra note 7, at 697. 
 319 538 U.S. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 320 Id. at 367 (plurality opinion); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 432 (1992) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (discussing the message sent by cross burning in context). 
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lies in the role of standard and nonstandard meanings.321 Whereas Justice 
Thomas focused on the standard meaning of cross burning that communicates 
intimidation based on racial hatred, Justices O’Connor and Souter respectively 
emphasized nonstandard interpretations.322 This type of difference in interpre-
tive focus was equally evident in interpretations of the Latin cross.323 And, im-
portantly for the distinction between images and words, Frederick Schauer ar-
gues that the result in Justice O’Connor and Justice Souter’s opinions would 
likely have been different if the case had dealt not with a visual but rather a 
textual message.324 
In the flag burning cases, the Supreme Court, as one scholar put it, “seemed 
struck by the strange force of the flag as a visual symbol.”325 The range of mean-
ings possibly communicated by the flag thus played an important role, as the 
visual symbol’s various meanings could not be contained in a single message.326 
Interpretations of the Confederate flag offer a similar insight on varying interpre-
tations of the symbol. Courts have struggled to define the line between the flag 
being a symbol of hate and a symbol of historical significance.327 
We must distinguish how the observer sees, what the observer sees—a re-
ligious message or a secular message?—and how the observer interprets the 
possible effect of a religious message—endorsement?—that results from the 
display. Whenever there is communicative impact, two questions follow: first, 
whether the State is responsible for the message and, second, whether the im-
pact is coercive, endorsing, or otherwise has an effect that the Establishment 
Clause prohibits. 
B. Calibrating Communicative Impact 
At a minimum, the Establishment Clause prohibits the State from adopting 
a religious identity as its own. Consequently, the Establishment Clause contains 
a content-based restriction on speech attributable to the government, prohibiting 
                                                                                                                           
 321 Schauer, supra note 138, at 223–24. 
 322 Id. 
 323 See supra notes 261–287 and accompanying text. 
 324 Schauer, supra note 138, at 225–26 (using the textual message “We will lynch you just like we 
lynched your ancestors”). 
 325 Adler, supra note 146, at 215. 
 326 Id. (“Visual images by their nature cannot be confined.”). 
 327 Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social Meanings, 
97 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1316–23 (2011) (discussing the Confederate battle flag); Zick, supra note 12, at 
2291, 2350–54 (same); see, e.g., Briggs v. Mississippi, 331 F.3d 499, 506–08 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that the Mississippi state flag—which incorporates the Confederate flag including a religious symbol, 
the St. Andrew’s Cross—does not violate the Establishment Clause); NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 
1565 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause is not violated by flying a Confeder-
ate flag over the state capitol); see also Haupt, supra note 100, at 621–23 (discussing “Sons of Con-
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cated, not the form of communication. Evaluating the message based on com-
municative impact corresponds to the normative question of at what point the 
State has assumed a distinct religious identity. 
Medium neutrality means that some visual symbolic messages may have 
similarly low communicative impact as textual messages such as “under God,” 
“In God We Trust,” or “God save the United States and this Honorable Court.” 
These statements do not violate the Establishment Clause.336 Similarly, visual 
messages may be deemed to have low communicative impact, as a result of 
their symbolic valence or strength of the religious message. Examples might 
include crosses in public buildings as an architectural feature, the frieze includ-
ing the Ten Commandments at the Supreme Court,337 or crosses in flags or 
coats of arms. Yet, the resulting permissibility under the Establishment Clause 
has little to do with their “passive” character but rather the low communicative 
impact of the religious message conveyed. 
Where does the cognitive neuroscience matter? Calibrating communica-
tive impact in light of the neuroscience data debunks the notion that visual re-
ligious symbols are somehow less powerful than text as an empirical matter, or 
“passive” due to their visual nature.338 But the focus on communicative impact 
in a medium-neutral manner is a conceptual tool rather than an empirical pro-
posal. In terms of relevancy for constitutional inquiry, there are limits on the 
lessons to be drawn from neuroscience. Neuroscience data does not provide a 
yardstick of constitutional wrong based on how individuals perceive visual 
representations of religious symbols. One might see some validation of the 
idea of a reasonable religious outsider as the reasonable person,339 assuming 
that such a person would have a negatively charged reaction to religious sym-
bols of groups other than their own. That negative reaction would have to rise 
                                                                                                                           
 336 In dicta, current and former Supreme Court justices have indicated their approval for these and 
other forms of ceremonial deism. See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, No. 12-696, slip op. at 22 
(U.S. May 5, 2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting); McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 887–93 
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 26 (2004) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 35–36 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judg-
ment); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 624–25 (1989) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 670–74 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 676–77 (1984); 
id. at 692–93 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Hill, supra note 127, at 717–20 (discussing Su-
preme Court cases addressing instances of ceremonial deism). 
 337 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 689–90 (2005) (plurality opinion). 
 338 See supra notes 151–187 and accompanying text. 
 339 See Caroline Mala Corbin, Ceremonial Deism and the Reasonable Religious Outsider, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 1545, 1598 (2010) (arguing that government speech should be considered through the 
lens of a “religious outsider”); Hill, supra note 127, at 751; see also Capitol Square Review & Advi-
sory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 799 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is especially important to 
take account of the perspective of a reasonable observer who may not share the particular religious 
belief it expresses.”). 
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to the level of feeling like an outsider in the political community, which is not 
measurable by gauging visual perception. But Establishment Clause theory and 
doctrine should take the broader lessons about visual perception into consider-
ation as judges conduct the inquiry into communicative impact. 
This does not preclude an empirics-driven solution at some future point. 
Several factors might be taken into account in determining the degree of com-
municative impact. A list might include spatial considerations such as size and 
location of the symbol, duration of exposure, religiosity, symbolic valence, and 
ambiguity. Unavoidable attention to a specific religious message also indicates 
a high degree of communicative impact; the message, of course, might be con-
veyed in textual or visual form. A bit lower on the communicative impact spec-
trum would be an avoidable religious message. And the lowest communicative 
impact results from a message that is not clearly religious, ambiguous, or 
commonly understood as nonreligious. To validate this list of factors, cognitive 
neuroscience research could potentially provide useful insights. If indeed a 
majority of individuals is affected in a certain way by these factors, they ought 
to be relevant in assessing the communicative impact of a message. We might 
be able to generate a presumption for different levels of communicative impact 
with respect to certain visual and textual symbolic messages in a variety of 
situations if we have an evidentiary basis; this evidentiary basis could conceiv-
ably be provided by future neuroscience research. 
C. Coercion and Endorsement as Matters of Degree 
On the merits, Establishment Clause jurisprudence is notoriously un-
clear.340 The Supreme Court’s most recent major Establishment Clause opinion 
held the practice of legislative prayer at town board meetings to be constitu-
tional.341 Applying the resulting framework to religious symbols is the next 
important step in clarifying current uncertainties in Establishment Clause doc-
trine. The first step in determining the proper merits test for religious symbols 
is to end misconceptions about how images, and in particular visual religious 
symbols, communicate. This is a matter of empirical evidence. So far, the 
courts have guessed—and in light of the cognitive neuroscience data, guessed 
wrongly—that visual representations of religious symbols are constitutionally 
less troublesome than textual ones. But this wrong guess should not be perpet-
uated in the doctrine. To the extent that coercion and endorsement matter, these 
approaches must equally engage the power of the visual and textual. 
                                                                                                                           
 340 See, e.g., Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 22 (2011) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (urging the Court to “clean up our mess”). 
 341 See Greece, No. 12-696, slip op. at 1; supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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This Section reframes familiar themes of Establishment Clause doctrine 
on the merits, proceeding from the normative premise that the State may not 
adopt its own religious identity and communicate it, regardless if it seeks to 
enforce it by means of coercion or promote it by means of endorsement. This 
theory conceptualizes endorsement and coercion as matters of degree rather 
than kind. Notably, however, abandoning the false notion of “passive” symbols 
is not predicated on adopting this theory. Within the framework of an underly-
ing theory of coercion or endorsement as alternative categories of state activity 
prohibited by the Establishment Clause, the implications of treating visual reli-
gious symbols as “active symbols” still apply. But reconceptualizing endorse-
ment and coercion helps address issues of varying degrees of communicative 
impact that might otherwise be insufficiently analyzed. This is particularly rel-
evant for communication at the margins that either falls between endorsement 
and coercion or under the rubric of mild endorsements. 
Reconceptualizing endorsement and coercion as matters of degree, there-
fore, serves as a more accurate way to think about the impact of religious mes-
sages, regardless of the medium. Although courts need not abandon the labels 
of coercion and endorsement, the advantage of this conceptual tool is to inte-
grate the two traditionally separate Establishment Clause inquiries into one. 
For both inquires, most important is the degree of communicative impact of 
the message. The existing labels correspond to different degrees of impact: 
coercion has high impact, endorsement has medium impact, and mild en-
dorsements have low impact. The existent categories thus are consistent with 
this proposal. But the concept of endorsement and coercion as matters of de-
gree provides a better account of the underlying concern: the communicative 
impact of the religious message conveyed, irrespective of its medium. Moreo-
ver, it does not invite the kind of sorting into active and passive that a distinc-
tion among endorsement and coercion as different in kind invites. A focus on 
the communicative impact of the message requires full attention to how a 
symbolic message communicates—whether visual or textual in nature. 
Reconceptualizing endorsement and coercion as matters of degree starts 
from the premise that the state may not adopt a religion as its own and com-
municate that preference. This can conceivably be done in various degrees on a 
spectrum. The spectrum would range from a weak form of state identity, which 
would be communicated via endorsement of religious preferences, to a strong 
form of state identity, which would be communicated and, indeed, enforced by 
coercion.342 This approach renders the expansion of the coercion category un-
necessary; it takes into account that some forms of coercion are stronger than 
                                                                                                                           
 342 Cf. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 604 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Government 
pressure to participate in a religious activity is an obvious indication that the government is endorsing 
or promoting religion.”). 
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others. It also helps provide an account of how some forms of endorsement 
might be considered as troublesome as coercion. 
What does the communicative impact scale look like and how does it give 
guidance in deciding cases involving textual or visual religious symbols? In 
terms of degrees, the State might adopt its own religious preference and im-
plement it by legal coercion at the far end. In this strong form of religious state 
identity, the State has adopted a particular religion as its own and forces its 
citizens into compliance. If the State demands that people act a certain way, it 
has adopted an orthodoxy that it seeks to impose on everyone, and asks every-
one to actively subscribe to that orthodoxy and act accordingly. Coercion indi-
cates a necessarily high degree of communicative impact. It demands partici-
pation in or at least compels attendance of religious practice. Yet when Justice 
Kennedy, for instance, speaks of “subtle coercive pressure” in Lee v. Weis-
man,343 this suggests that degrees of communicative impact matter. 
But coercion is not necessary to achieve a high level of communicative 
impact. As Justice Scalia concedes in his dissent in Lee, messages of endorse-
ment may be as troublesome as legal coercion.344 A relatively high degree of 
communicative impact can also be reached via endorsement; this represents a 
weaker form of the same idea, where the State wants to convince everyone to 
follow state religion by means other than coercion, such as overt proselytizing. 
In County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, Justice Kennedy 
took this into consideration when he discussed the noncoercive, yet apparently 
equally troublesome, cross atop a city hall.345 In between, there are various 
conceivable degrees of endorsement indicating support for religious positions 
the State deems favorable.346 A parallel to free speech might consider persua-
sive effect,347 distinguishing the degree of persuasive/coercive force of the 
message. To pick up an example Douglas Laycock uses: “If a Christian cross 
has sufficient secular meaning to fall outside the Establishment Clause, then so 
might a sectarian prayer.”348 The example illustrates the importance of as-
sessing communicative impact irrespective of the medium. 
                                                                                                                           
 343 Id. at 588 (majority opinion) (holding that “subtle coercive pressures” exist in an overt reli-
gious exercise in a secondary school environment where a student has no real alternative which would 
have allowed her to avoid the appearance of participation). 
 344 Id. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the country’s constitutional tradition has “ruled 
out of order government-sponsored endorsement of religion”). 
 345 492 U.S. at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (not-
ing that a cross atop a city hall would violate the Establishment Clause because the symbolic recogni-
tion would place government weight behind a specific religion). 
 346 See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 284, at 138; 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 32, at 186. 
 347 Kendrick, supra note 308, at 245–46 (discussing persuasion-related discrimination); David A. 
Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 334–35 (1991). 
 348 Laycock, supra note 47, at 1248. 
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At the low end of the communicative impact spectrum, this concept al-
lows for recognition that some messages, though religious in nature, are “un-
profound.”349 To illustrate, recall Van Orden v. Perry, where Chief Justice 
Rehnquist compared a freestanding Ten Commandments monument to the vis-
ual depiction of Moses as a lawgiver among other lawgivers in the Supreme 
Court chamber’s frieze.350 Although the same religious symbol is at issue, the 
degree of communicative impact is different. Thus, when Laycock discusses 
“enormous differences of degree” in various representations of the Ten Com-
mandments,351 the underlying concern is about communicative impact. But, as 
already emphasized, none of this depends on the form of communication; the 
communicative impact assessment applies to both visual and textual messages. 
Thus, there may be textual messages with less communicative impact 
than visual messages. The motto “In God We Trust” may have less impact on 
the audience than sitting through a graduation ceremony at a church richly out-
fitted with religious imagery. Similarly, a short prayer at a graduation or in a 
legislature is over within seconds, while a cross by the side of a highway can 
easily and immediately be registered as such—even with the observer travel-
ling at 55 mph352—and can trigger emotions accordingly. This results in signif-
icant communicative impact, and depending on the circumstances, the impact 
is perhaps as significant as a brief spoken prayer. 
To illustrate, consider three examples: first, the graduation-at-church case; 
second, the graduation prayer case; and third, the case of legislative prayer. 
Following this conceptual framework, the en banc decision in the Elmbrook 
graduation-at-church case probably came out the right way, though for the 
wrong reason.353 As discussed, the en banc majority in that case focused on the 
textual elements in the church.354 Giving the visual symbol of the cross short 
shrift is an indicator of the hierarchy of words over images implicit in many 
religious symbol cases. But paying close attention to the communicative im-
                                                                                                                           
 349 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 32, at 91. 
 350 545 U.S. at 688 (plurality opinion) (noting the similarities between the two displays). 
 351 Laycock, supra note 47, at 1220; see also EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 284, at 142–43 
(contrasting the depiction of Moses in the Supreme Court frieze with other Ten Commandment mon-
uments). 
 352 See Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095, 1112 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Because general-
ly drivers would be passing a memorial at 55-plus miles per hour, the UHPA determined that the cross 
memorials ‘needed to prominently communicate all of this instantaneously.’”); id. at 1121 (noting that 
although a motorist driving by at 55-plus miles per hour may not notice the biographical information 
on the memorial cross, the motorist would be “bound to notice the preeminent symbol of Christianity 
and the UHP insignia, linking the State to the religious sign”). 
 353 Elmbrook II, 687 F.3d 840, 856 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (holding that conducting a gradua-
tion ceremony in a church violates the Establishment Clause). 
 354 Id. at 852–53 (noting that the numerous pamphlets and other persuasive literature contributed 
to a finding that the selected location violated the Establishment Clause); see supra notes 112–117 and 
accompanying text. 
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pact of the cross itself—the duration of exposure of the audience, the spatial 
setup with the cross as the centerpiece, the lack of ambiguity in the message 
conveyed by the cross given the spatial dimension—makes it a powerful vehi-
cle for a religious message. Indeed, it might be a more powerful vehicle than a 
short, nondenominational textual prayer as the one at issue in Lee.355 Thus, a 
focus on the symbol itself, rather than the textual surroundings that supple-
mented it, would likely have led to the same outcome, but with a rationale that 
pays heed to a medium-neutral evaluation of communicative impact of the 
message. 
This assessment does not necessarily place all other graduation-at-church 
scenarios in the same category of relatively high communicative impact. In 
Elmbrook, a high degree of communicative impact resulted from the presence 
of the cross and its surroundings, richly outfitted with other religious symbols. 
A lesser degree of communicative impact would be achieved in an unadorned 
church building; this, of course, relates back to interpreting the cultural mean-
ing.356 In terms of placing the message on the communicative impact spectrum, 
however, we are here only dealing with matters of degree when the religious 
nature of the message is clear. A low degree would be achieved if the gradua-
tion ceremony took place in a building owned by a religious group that did not 
function as a site of worship. 
The medium-neutral assessment guided by the communicative impact of 
the message likewise applies to textual religious messages. In the graduation 
prayer case, the length of the prayer and its denominational valence can in-
crease or decrease its communicative impact. In the school context, moreover, 
compelled attendance (whether direct or indirect) places school-related activi-
ties closer toward the coercion side. 
The final example, legislative prayer, illustrates how the mixed-speech con-
tinuum—the x-axis—relates to the communicative impact spectrum.357 Respon-
sibility for the speech may shift along the x-axis. If a member of the legislative 
body or a paid chaplain—as in Marsh v. Chambers—offers the prayer, such ac-
tions would be situated on the government speech end.358 Conceivably, however, 
the legislative body can open participation to other members of the communi-
ty—as the town board did in Town of Greece v. Galloway—inviting a rotating 
                                                                                                                           
 355 See 505 U.S. at 578–79 (holding that a nonsectarian prayer at an official public school gradua-
tion ceremony imposes a high risk of compulsion and therefore violates the Establishment Clause). 
 356 See supra notes 239–299 and accompanying text. 
 357 To a lesser extent, a similar shift along the x-axis can occur in the context of graduation prayer 
if the prayer is offered by students. In the public school setting, however, the State generally retains a 
high degree of control over the message. See Haupt, supra note 100, at 592–93. 
 358 See 463 U.S. 783, 792–95 (1983) (holding that the practice of opening legislative sessions 
with prayer by a chaplain paid by the state does not violate the Establishment Clause because it is 
simply an acknowledgement of widely held beliefs); Haupt, supra note 100, at 616–17. 
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selection of speakers or (though highly unlikely to happen in practice359) even 
creating a public forum. Doing so would push the speech further toward the pri-
vate end of the continuum as effective control over the message shifts.360 On the 
communicative impact spectrum—the y-axis—the degree of impact can shift 
from coercion to lesser forms of noncoercive, yet high impact, to low impact. A 
clearly impermissible coercive practice might entail prayer by a member of the 
legislative body or a paid chaplain where attendance of the meeting is required 
(in such a case, moreover, the Free Exercise clause would certainly require an 
opt-out). A noncoercive practice of legislative prayer may also vary in its com-
municative impact. Notably, Marsh and Greece recognized that at some point, 
otherwise permissible legislative prayer could become impermissible.361 The 
idea of degrees of impact tracks closely with these concerns. 
To illustrate, consider the different degrees of impact if a legislative body 
adopts a policy, whereby at the beginning of the term all members vote in a 
secret ballot whether to: (a) open the session without any specified activity; (b) 
open the session with some purely civic activity (though the reference to God 
in the Pledge might already complicate matters); (c) hold a minute of silence; 
(d) say a nonsectarian prayer; or (e) pray in the name of Jesus.362 Assuming a 
truly secret and unanimous vote, there is no free exercise violation. Under a 
strict coercion theory, there would be no Establishment Clause violation if at-
tendees are given an opt-out.363 But seen on the communicative impact spec-
trum, other factors to be taken into consideration would include whether there 
is an audience364 or even whether the opening remarks are included in the leg-
islative record. 
These examples illustrate that conceptualizing coercion and endorsement 
as matters of degree along a communicative impact spectrum more accurately 
                                                                                                                           
 359 See Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious Endorsements, 
94 MINN. L. REV. 972, 1030 (2010) (arguing that although the public-forum concept can solve the 
problems associated with legislative prayer, the idea will not work because no government will likely 
be willing to give up control over legislative prayer). 
 360 Haupt, supra note 100, at 617–18. 
 361 See Greece, No. 12-696, slip op. at 14–15 (“If the course and practice over time shows that the 
invocations denigrate nonbelievers or religious minorities, threaten damnation, or preach conversion, 
many present may consider the prayer to fall short of the desire to elevate the purpose of the occasion 
and to unite lawmakers in their common effort.”); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794 (noting that indications that 
a prayer opportunity was exploited to advance or disparage one particular faith may render legislative 
prayers impermissible). 
 362 Cf. Lund, supra note 359, at 1002 (discussing what makes legislative prayer more or less sec-
tarian). 
 363 See Greece, No. 12-696, slip op. at 22 (discussing the possibility of members of the public 
“leaving the meeting room during the prayer, arriving late, or even . . . making a later protest”); cf. 
Lee, 505 U.S. at 588 (noting that coercive pressures exist where an individual is left with no real alter-
native which would have allowed them to avoid the fact or appearance of participation). 
 364 See Greece, No. 12-696, slip op. at 12–13 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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tracks changes in the message than does a single rule for legislative prayer, 
graduation prayer, or graduations held in houses of worship. Most importantly, 
in all instances the degree of impact is not contingent on the medium by which 
the message is conveyed. 
CONCLUSION 
Establishment Clause cases initially shifted from money to messages; 
within the latter, there is now a noticeable shift from textual to visual messag-
es.365 Contemporary Establishment Clause theory and doctrine still privileges 
the written or spoken word though an increasing number of high-profile cases 
now involve visual representations of religious imagery. In an era when visuals 
“increasingly dominate our culture,”366 scholars have detected a “changing le-
gal culture” when it comes to the role of images in the law.367 Heightened sen-
sibility with respect to visual representations would benefit Establishment 
Clause analysis of religious symbols as well. 
As Justice Breyer articulated, judges typically lack the social science 
training to evaluate empirical findings, such as neuroscience.368 Erroneously 
designating religious imagery as merely “passive” is a case in point. As this 
Article has demonstrated, religious symbols are not “passive;” visual religious 
symbols can be as active as—if not sometimes more active than—textual reli-
gious speech. Insights from neuroscience are gaining importance in a wide va-
riety of areas of the law; Establishment Clause theory and doctrine should 
likewise benefit from these insights. Arguably, “[t]he legal academy has yet 
seriously to come to grips with the changes that this infusion of the visual 
means for legal thinking and rhetoric.”369 Likewise, dealing with visual repre-
sentations in the area of religious symbols requires an appreciation for the na-
ture of images. If, for instance, Judge Posner is “invit[ing] a new jurisprudence 
of iconography,”370 a good starting point to assess Establishment Clause juris-
                                                                                                                           
 365 Lupu, supra note 24, at 773. 
 366 FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 7, at 2; see also Zick, supra note 12, at 2263 (“We live in a 
culture of symbols.”). 
 367 FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 7, at xi–xii (focusing on the role of digital pictures and 
multimedia in the courtroom). 
 368 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2769 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 369 Spiesel, supra note 23, at 391; see also FEIGENSON & SPIESEL, supra note 7, at xi (“Under-
standing [pictures] requires new skills. That’s unsettling to many lawyers and judges; law school 
doesn’t train them to deal with pictures, and their experiences in practice may not have prepared them 
well, either.”); Sanger, supra note 148, at 361 (“[T]here has been no considered study of the role of 
visuality in law.”). The diverging results in cases involving the constitutionality of compelled visual 
speech underscore the legal uncertainty that currently accompanies visual images. See Corbin, supra 
note 7, at 10 (“Mandatory cigarette graphics have been struck but mandatory abortion ultrasounds 
have been upheld.”). 
 370 Elmbrook II, 687 F.3d at 857 (Hamilton, J., concurring). 
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prudence as it relates to religious symbols is to look to other fields that teach 
us how images communicate. 
Judicial decisions dismissing the visual as merely passive are based on a 
misconception of how visual images communicate. The data provided in this 
discussion refutes the notion that visuals are passive and supports the notion 
that they are at least as active as words. For someone who intuitively agrees 
with the old adage that “a picture is worth a thousand words,” the neuroscience 
discussion may seem superfluous. But it matters because it provides data em-
pirically confirming the intuition. 
There is a larger trend in the law that has led to a re-examination of the 
role of images as distinct from words. Establishment Clause theory as it con-
cerns religious symbols must sufficiently account for the communicative im-
pact of visuals. Reconceptualizing endorsement and coercion as matters of de-
gree focuses attention on the communicative impact of the message. It discards 
misleading labels and categorizations, such as the notion of “passive” symbols, 
in favor of a comprehensive approach to religious symbolic messages irrespec-
tive of the medium by which they are communicated. After the Supreme Court 
has now revisited the textual by affirming the permissibility of legislative 
prayer, scholarship concerned with the future of the Establishment Clause must 
consider how the resulting doctrinal structure might apply to the role of reli-
gious symbols. A medium-neutral approach within a framework of communi-
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Professionals speak; some speak a lot. Lawyers use verbal communication 
to exercise their profession. So do psychologists. Medical advice is dispensed 
via such communication as well. The list goes on. The content of these 
communications, we intuitively assume, is protected. The scope of protection, 
however, is elusive. At the same time, the state can regulate the professions. 
Traditional forms of regulation include licensing requirements, advertising 
regulations, and the imposition of professional malpractice liability. But new 
forms of regulation go further: they target the content of the communication 
between a professional and her client. Sometimes, such regulation aligns with 
professional insights, but sometimes it contradicts them. The resulting tension 
between state regulation of the professions and professionals’ free speech 
interests remains underexplored.  
Recent cases involving professional speech1 have made this tension 
apparent. Can the State of California and the State of New Jersey ban sexual 
orientation change efforts (SOCE)?2 Can the State of South Dakota require 
that abortion providers read to their patients a legislatively drafted statement 
that does not correspond to the current state of medical science?3 In other 
words: do psychologists have a First Amendment right to engage in conversion 
therapy? Do physicians have a First Amendment right not to be compelled to 
make state-scripted, erroneous claims about abortion to their patients? These 
examples represent potential infringements on a professional’s right to free 
 
1. Following Daniel Halberstam and Robert Post, I will refer to “professional speech” as 
speech “uttered in the course of professional practice” as distinct from “speech . . . uttered 
by a professional.” Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the 
Constitutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 843 (1999); Robert Post, 
Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 
U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 947 [hereinafter Post, Informed Consent to Abortion]. 
2. See Pickup v. Brown (Pickup I), 728 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2013) (upholding the California law 
prohibiting licensed mental health providers from providing SOCE therapy to children 
under eighteen against a First Amendment challenge), aff’d, remanded, and reh’g denied, 740 
F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2871 (2014); King v. Christie (King I), 981 F. 
Supp. 2d 296 (D.N.J. 2013) (upholding the New Jersey conversion therapy ban), aff’d sub 
nom., King v. Governor of N.J. (King II), 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 
2048 (2015); see also Doe v. Christie, 33 F. Supp. 3d 518 (D.N.J. 2014) (same). 
3. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds II), 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(en banc) (upholding the South Dakota informed consent statute requiring abortion 






speech. But federal appellate courts have taken opposing approaches to 
indistinguishable questions.4  
What is strikingly—and perhaps somewhat surprisingly—still absent from 
the case law and the legal literature is a comprehensive theory of professional 
speech.5 The Supreme Court has never identified, with any clear boundaries, 
the category of professional speech. Nonetheless, it is implicit in a number of 
decisions involving government-funded speech,6 commercial speech,7 and 
other areas.8 This Article seeks to fill the lacuna left by courts and scholars by 
offering an account of the doctrinal and theoretical bases of professional speech 
and its application to controversial First Amendment questions. 
First Amendment protection for professional speech, I argue, rests on 
distinctive theoretical justifications, and the key to understanding professional 
speech lies in understanding the character of the so-called “learned” 
professions. These learned professions, I submit, should be thought of as 
knowledge communities, that is, communities whose principal raison d’être is 
the generation and dissemination of knowledge.9 Conceptualizing the 
professions as knowledge communities not only informs the theoretical 
justifications for First Amendment protection10 but also the limits of that 
 
4. Compare Pickup I, 728 F.3d 1042 (upholding California’s conversion therapy law as a 
permissible regulation of conduct), with King II, 767 F.3d 216 (upholding New Jersey’s 
conversion therapy law as a permissible regulation of speech). 
5. See Halberstam, supra note 1, at 772 (“[W]e still have . . . no paradigm for the First 
Amendment rights of attorneys, physicians, or financial advisers when they communicate 
with their clients.”); id. at 834-35 (“[T]he Supreme Court and lower courts have rarely 
addressed the First Amendment contours of a professional’s freedom to speak to a client. 
Accordingly, courts have failed to develop a general method for reviewing restrictions on 
professional speech.”); Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note 1, at 947 (explicitly 
abstaining from offering a comprehensive theory of the “constitutional status of professional 
speech”); Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of 
Conduct, “Situation Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 
1342-43 (2005) (“[C]ourts need to develop First Amendment standards to judge the 
constitutionality of laws that restrict professionals’ speech to clients.”). 
6. See, e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 
(1991).  
7. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (lawyer direct mailing to victims); 
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (lawyer in-person solicitation); Bates 
v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (newspaper advertisements for legal services); 
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (advertising for abortion services). 
8. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (mentioning 
abortion providers’ First Amendment rights “as part of the practice of medicine, subject to 
reasonable licensing and regulation by the State”). 
9. See infra Section I.A.1. 
10. See infra Part II. 
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protection, the permissibility of regulating the professions, and the imposition 
and extent of tort liability for professional malpractice.11 Imposing professional 
malpractice liability has never been found to offend the First Amendment. 
Why that is so, however, merits further investigation. Conceptualizing the 
learned professions as knowledge communities guides this undertaking. 
Professionals speak not only for themselves but also as members of a 
learned profession: they “assist[] individuals in making personal choices based 
on the cumulative knowledge of the profession.”12 The professions as 
knowledge communities thus function in a way akin to what Paul Horwitz  
calls “First Amendment institutions.”13 First Amendment scholars concerned 
with professional speech have hinted at the connection between the professions 
and institutions14 but have yet to provide a full explication. This Article takes 
on that task. 
My analysis abuts and engages the emerging institutionalist First 
Amendment literature.15 In my account, it is the institutionalization of 
professional discourse that builds the basis for the knowledge community.  
The subsequent dissemination of that knowledge within the professional-client 
relationship ties the individual professional back to the knowledge community. 
That the individual professionals are bound together by the knowledge 
community is also the underlying assumption of professional malpractice  
law, in which the knowledge community’s standard of care determines the 
benchmark against which the individual professional’s liability is assessed. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a definition of 
professional speech, with particular attention to the role of the learned 
professions as knowledge communities. It then situates professional speech in 
 
11. See infra Part III. 
12. Halberstam, supra note 1, at 773. 
13. PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 247-54 (2012) (discussing professional 
speech within “the borderlands of institutionalism”). Halberstam appears to make a similar 
proposal when he speaks about “First Amendment protection of relational speech 
institutions,” Halberstam, supra note 1, at 851, although he does not consider professional 
associations but rather the bounded nature of the professional-client relationship as the 
basis for identifying the institutionalized nature of the speech. My approach is perhaps best 
characterized as situated between these two. See infra Section I.A.1. Moreover, I do not 
necessarily subscribe to all First Amendment institutionalist implications. I do not aim to 
give an institutional account across the First Amendment; nor do I confine the 
institutionalization to the professional-client relationship. 
14. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 13, at 350 n.38 (explaining the connection between law, 
medicine, and journalism and the university). 
15. See, e.g., id. at 9; Frederick Schauer, Institutions as Legal and Constitutional Categories, 54 
UCLA L. REV. 1747 (2007); Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First Amendment, 89 






the doctrinal context of the First Amendment. Commentators have analyzed 
professional speech primarily in relation to—and by analogy with—commercial 
speech,16 which has received increasingly robust First Amendment protection.17 
But the underlying comparison, I argue, is tenuous. The speech interests are 
fundamentally different. The doctrinal fate of professional speech, therefore, 
ought not to be tied to that of commercial speech. 
Part II undertakes a normative defense of First Amendment protection for 
professional speech. The traditional justifications for speech protection apply 
in a distinctive fashion to professional speech. Professional speech is unique in 
the way it implicates the autonomy interests of both the speaker and the 
listener. I will call “decisional autonomy interests” the interests of the listener 
who depends on the information provided by a professional to make an 
informed decision.18 The professional-client relationship is typically 
characterized by an asymmetry of knowledge. The client seeks the 
professional’s advice precisely because of this asymmetry. At the same time, the 
agency of the listener requires that the ultimate decision rest with her. The 
other autonomy interests are those of the speakers, which I will call 
“professional autonomy interests.” The qualifier “professional” signals that it is 
not the autonomy interest to freely express one’s personal opinions that is at 
stake—as is the case in most free speech theory—but rather to express one’s 
professional opinion as a member of the knowledge community.  
Turning then to marketplace considerations, I argue that the classic notion 
of a “free trade in ideas”19 has little purchase as between the professional and 
the client. The professional does not seek to subject her professional opinion to 
“the competition of the market”20 when speaking within the confines of the 
professional-client relationship. Yet, there is a dimension to the marketplace 
idea in the professional speech context that is generally underappreciated and 
 
16. See, e.g., Halberstam, supra note 1, at 838; Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note 1, at 
974-90. But see Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient Discourse and 
the Right to Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U. L. REV. 201, 239 (1994) (asserting that 
“conversations between doctors and patients about diagnosis and treatments are not 
commercial speech” but providing no analysis explaining why that is the case). 
17. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011); Thompson v. W. States Med. 
Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Greater New 
Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999). 
18. The Court’s failure to consider the patient’s interest in receiving information has been 
repeatedly criticized in the reproductive rights context. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 16, at 219-
20. 
19. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he best test 
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
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comes into relief when the professions are thought of as knowledge 
communities. Within the discourse of the knowledge community itself—that 
is, outside the professional-client relationship—a marketplace of ideas exists, 
which we might call an epistemic marketplace. Professional standards are 
generated by testing insights in that marketplace. The current state of the 
knowledge community’s discourse provides the foundation for the 
professional’s advice.  
Finally, theories of democratic self-government also provide a normative 
basis for the protection of professional speech. The information that the 
knowledge community communicates to clients through individual 
professionals cumulatively enhances the basis upon which public opinion is 
formed. This is not simply a matter of enabling self-government through 
ordinary deliberation by adding another opinion to the public discussion. 
Rather, professionals contribute specialized, technical knowledge to which lay 
citizens would not otherwise have access. It is precisely in their capacity as 
members of knowledge communities that professionals enhance the process of 
self-governance, and so as members of knowledge communities that they 
should enjoy First Amendment protection. 
Part III considers the appropriate limits on professional speech. It 
interrogates the extent to which the state may regulate the professions’ 
educational and knowledge standards. It also considers the interplay between 
the First Amendment and tort liability for professional malpractice. In order to 
avoid malpractice liability, professionals must exercise their profession 
according to the degree and skill of a well-qualified professional. For example, 
the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers states, “[A] lawyer 
who owes a duty of care must exercise the competence and diligence normally 
exercised by lawyers in similar circumstances.”21 It is thus the knowledge 
community that determines the standard of care. This Part engages 
contemporary tort scholarship that incorporates this insight by focusing on the 
profession’s distinctive expertise.22 This emerging approach mirrors my 
concern with granting deference to the knowledge community’s insights.  
The extent of tort liability, I argue, should be consistent with the scope of 
protection of the knowledge community’s discourse under the First 
Amendment. Only if liability and protection are coextensive can this liability 
mechanism yield fair results. If liability is properly measured against the 
standard of care determined by the profession, the knowledge community’s 
 
21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
22. See Alex Stein, Toward a Theory of Medical Malpractice, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1201, 1207-08 (2012); 
see also Eleanor D. Kinney, What Does New Theory Contribute to the Evolution of the Tort of 






formation of this standard should remain uncorrupted and its application 
within the professional-client relationship should receive robust First 
Amendment protection. 
Part IV applies this approach to controversial First Amendment disputes, 
returning to the cases referenced at the outset. In so doing, it considers how the 
theory of professional speech focused on knowledge communities plays out in 
litigation terms, a question that traditionally remains underexamined in the 
First Amendment literature.  
State regulation interacts with knowledge communities’ insights in 
multiple and varied ways. It sometimes reinforces professional knowledge, and 
it sometimes contradicts such knowledge. The questions raised in cases 
challenging regulations that contradict professional knowledge play out against 
the larger jurisprudential backdrop concerning the role of legislative findings of 
fact. Whose knowledge should state regulation rely on? The knowledge 
community theory of professional speech provides a conceptual framework to 
assess this question. This theory of professional speech, informed by the role of 
knowledge communities, thus allows us to reconceptualize how we think about 
government involvement in professional speech. Under this view, to borrow 
loosely from Alexander Meiklejohn, the First Amendment is directed against 
the “mutilation of the thinking process” of the knowledge community.23 
i .  s ituating professional speech 
When a lawyer advises a client, she engages in professional speech. 
Likewise, when a physician advises a patient, she engages in professional 
speech. Scholarship and case law seem to assume, almost intuitively, that 
professional speech exists. But the instinct that professional speech is 
distinctive as a category of speech, and the way in which it is distinctive, is not 
sufficiently explained in the case law or First Amendment theory.  
This Part first explores the character and function of the professions  
before distinguishing professional speech from professionals’ private speech 
and from government speech. Throughout this Article, I argue that the 
professions should be thought of as knowledge communities. The role of 
knowledge communities defines the type of speech that ought to be protected 
from outside—particularly, state—interference, and the extent to which state 
regulation of the professions is permissible.  
 
23. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE 
PEOPLE 27 (1960) (“It is that mutilation of the thinking process of the community against 
which the First Amendment to the Constitution is directed.”). 
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This Part then situates professional speech in First Amendment doctrine. 
The concept is implicit in numerous Supreme Court decisions, though it is not 
identified as a separate category of speech. Courts and scholars sometimes 
analogize professional speech to commercial speech, which is increasingly 
receiving First Amendment protection from state interference. While a 
heightened level of protection is desirable as a doctrinal matter in the 
professional speech context as well, the underlying analogy is tenuous. In 
questioning the analogy between commercial speech and professional speech, I 
suggest that professional speech more than commercial speech should receive 
robust First Amendment protection. 
A. What Is Professional Speech? 
The First Amendment fragments speech. We treat different types of speech 
differently all the time.24 But to the extent we treat professional speech 
differently for different professions—thus distinguishing between speakers 
engaged in arguably the same type of speech—differential treatment is 
problematic. For example, why should the speech of a lawyer be more 
protected than that of a physician?25 Nonetheless, the level of attention 
afforded to the regulation of professional speech varies significantly across 
professions. First Amendment questions surrounding lawyers’ professional 
speech, for instance, remained largely unexplored until recently.26 Legislative 
interference with physician speech, conversely, has received comparatively 
more attention.27  
 
24. Schauer, Institutional First Amendment, supra note 15, at 1263 (“[I]t seems a permissible 
generalization to conclude that First Amendment doctrine has been hesitant to draw lines 
between or among speakers or between or among communicative institutions, preferring 
overwhelmingly to demarcate the First Amendment along lines representing different types 
of speech.”). 
25. Some have argued that lawyers’ professional speech deserves special protection because of 
the role lawyers play in society. See, e.g., Renee Newman Knake, Attorney Advice and the First 
Amendment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 639, 712 (2011) (“Given the integral role of attorneys in 
America’s democratic government, it seems reasonable, if not imperative, that this category 
of speech—attorney advice—should be fiercely guarded from unnecessary regulation.”); 
Margaret Tarkington, A First Amendment Theory for Protecting Attorney Speech, 45 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 27, 36 (2011) (“[A]ttorney free speech is essential to the proper functioning of the 
United States justice system.”). But see W. Bradley Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 305, 313 (2001) (“[N]o single model of lawyering theory can account 
for the function of lawyers in our society.”). 
26. Knake, supra note 25, at 646.  
27. See generally Berg, supra note 16, at 206 (discussing the Rehnquist Court’s regulation of 
physician speech and developing “a First Amendment theory of doctor-patient discourse 







Unlike other analyses focused on specific professions,28 I aim to develop a 
broad conceptual approach to professional speech. Doing so avoids creating 
professional speech silos within the First Amendment and the subsequent 
problem of sorting professional speech into subcategories. A unified approach 
to professional speech also shields some professions from being “especially 
vulnerable to excess constriction by judges and juries too concerned with the 
moral or social undesirability of those . . . carrying the First Amendment 
claim.”29 Consider, for example, the situation of reproductive health care 
providers. There may be less desire to protect professional speech concerned 
with abortion—and more tolerance for government demands to read 
inaccurate, legislatively drafted scripts, compelled descriptions of mandatory 
ultrasounds and the like—based on moral disapproval.30 But if professional 
speech is worthy of protection as such, then the underlying topic of the speech 
is irrelevant to its protection. A unified approach to professional speech, then, 
provides protection for all professional speech.  
I submit that the kind of professional speech worthy of protection, 
irrespective of the particular profession involved, includes three core elements: 
(1) a knowledge community’s insights, (2) communicated by a professional 
within the professional-client relationship, (3) for the purpose of providing 
professional advice. The first element concerns the role of knowledge 
 
information and advice”); Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note 1 (analyzing “the 
First Amendment principles that should apply to compelled physician speech”). 
28. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 16; Tarkington, supra note 25; Wendel, supra note 25, at 306 
(pointing out “the categorization problems presented by lawyers’ speech”). 
29. Schauer, Institutional First Amendment, supra note 15, at 1268. This approach differs markedly 
from others in its sole focus on professional speech. See, e.g., Wendel, supra note 25, at 308 
(arguing in favor of an approach that also considers other “expressive-rights” contexts 
involving lawyers). 
30. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Abortion Distortions, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1175 (2014); 
Christina E. Wells, Abortion Counseling as Vice Activity: The Free Speech Implications of Rust v. 
Sullivan and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1724, 1764 (1995) (asserting 
that “the Court has been less willing to extend First Amendment protection to speech 
related to [abortion]”); Wells, supra, at 1759-60 (“[Abortion] is an activity that many people 
find abhorrent and corrupt. . . . Supreme Court Justices are not immune from such personal 
views. As a portion of the Court has indicated, ‘Some of us as individuals find abortion 
offensive to our most basic principles of morality.’” (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992))). See generally Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and 
the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1985). Vincent Blasi observes that some 
periods of time are more “pathological” than others, and in these pathological time periods, 
there exist “certain dynamics that radically increase the likelihood that people who hold 
unorthodox views will be punished for what they say or believe.” Blasi, supra, at 450. Blasi’s 
central thesis is that “[t]he first amendment . . . should be targeted for the worst of times” to 
assure that speech is protected. Blasi, supra. 
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communities; the second and third elements distinguish the context and 
purpose. I will address these elements in turn.  
1. The Role of Knowledge Communities  
The connection to a knowledge community circumscribes the type of 
communication rendered as professional advice. Not all occupations are 
considered professions. There are certain core professions we intuitively think 
of, medicine and law traditionally chief among them.31 Psychologists, dentists, 
pharmacists, and accountants—to only name a few—are likely part of the 
group as well. The list has expanded historically, and some occupations that 
were once considered only marginally professionalized have now come to be 
understood as professions.32 The process of professionalization is contested, 
and I do not aim to offer my own theory. Rather, I am concerned with the 
question of what First Amendment protection for professional speech looks 
like once an occupation has attained professional status. Thus, for the 
remainder of this Article, whatever the current debates are at the margins, I am 
primarily concerned with the core professions. And although the clergy is 
historically considered the third quintessential learned profession next to 
 
31. See, e.g., Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 7 (1976) 
(“At one time the learned professions were those of theology, law, and medicine.”); 
Maxwell J. Mehlman, Professional Power and the Standard of Care in Medicine, 44 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 1165, 1225 (2012) (“Medicine is one of the three classic learned professions, the other two 
being law and the clergy.”). 
32. The historical development is evident in this 1964 enumeration from the sociology 
literature: 
Established solidly since the late Middle Ages have been law, the clergy, 
university teaching (although the church did dominate universities, medieval 
faculty were by no means all clergy), and to some extent medicine (especially in 
Italy). During the Renaissance and after, the military provided professional 
careers . . . . Dentistry, architecture, and some areas of engineering (e.g., civil 
engineering) were professionalized by the early 1900’s; certified public 
accounting and several scientific and engineering fields came along more recently. 
Some are still in process—social work, correctional work, veterinary medicine, 
perhaps city planning and various managerial jobs for nonprofit organizations—
school superintendents, foundation executives, administrators of social agencies 
and hospitals. There are many borderline cases, such as schoolteaching, 
librarianship, nursing, pharmacy, optometry. Finally, many occupations will 
assert claims to professional status and find that the claims are honored by no one 
but themselves. I am inclined to place here occupations in which a market 
orientation is overwhelming—public relations, advertising, and funeral directing. 






medicine and law,33 I explicitly exclude that group from my discussion of 
professions and professional speech.34 
Definitions of “the professions” vary,35 but the most relevant defining 
feature for present purposes—and one generally shared among the numerous 
definitions—is their knowledge-based character.36 As we have already 
 
33. See supra text accompanying note 31. 
34. Aside from the protection of religious speech otherwise afforded by the Free Exercise Clause 
of the First Amendment, it seems problematic to fit the clergy into the knowledge 
community concept, particularly across denominations. Exclusive claims to ultimate truth 
will be difficult to reconcile with a knowledge community’s underlying shared notions of 
validity and a common way of knowing and reasoning. 
35. See Richard A. Posner, Professionalisms, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 1 (1998) (“The terms ‘profession’ 
and ‘professionalism’ have an incredibly large and vaguely bounded range of meanings, the 
despair of sociology, the discipline that has done most to study the professions.”); see also, 
e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 13, at 247 (offering James Brundage’s definition of a profession as 
“a line of work that . . . claims to promote the interests of the whole community as well as 
the individual worker, that requires mastery of a substantial body of esoteric knowledge, 
and that is closely bounded by a body of ethical rules different from and more demanding 
than those incumbent on all respectable members of society”); Norman Bowie, The Law: 
From a Profession to a Business, 41 VAND. L. REV. 741, 743 (1988) (providing Abraham 
Flexner’s “classic definition of a profession” that “an occupation must: (1) possess and draw 
upon a store of knowledge that was more than ordinarily complex; (2) secure a theoretical 
grasp of the phenomena with which it dealt; (3) apply its theoretical and complex 
knowledge to the practical solution of human and social problems; (4) strive to add to and 
improve its stock of knowledge; (5) pass on what it knew to novice generations not in a 
haphazard fashion but deliberately and formally; (6) establish criteria of admission, 
legitimate practice, and proper conduct; and (7) be imbued with an altruistic spirit” (citing 
Abraham Flexner, Is Social Work a Profession?)); Wilensky, supra note 32, at 138 (“The job of 
the professional is technical—based on systematic knowledge or doctrine acquired only 
through long prescribed training . . . . The professional man adheres to a set of professional 
norms.”).  
For examples from the sociology literature on professions, see, for example, ANDREW 
ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR (1988); 
ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM REBORN: THEORY, PROPHECY, AND POLICY (1994); 
MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 
(1977); and KEITH M. MACDONALD, THE SOCIOLOGY OF PROFESSIONS (1995). For historical 
perspectives, see JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION: 
CANONISTS, CIVILIANS, AND COURTS (2008); and ELLIOTT A. KRAUSE, DEATH OF THE 
GUILDS: PROFESSIONS, STATES, AND THE ADVANCE OF CAPITALISM, 1930 TO THE PRESENT 
(1996). In the legal literature, see Sande L. Buhai, Profession: A Definition, 40 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 241 (2012). 
36. Cf. Bowie, supra note 35, at 743 (“Flexner’s first four criteria for a profession require the 
mastery of a complex body of knowledge.”). It might be debatable whether the possession 
of actual knowledge is in fact necessary. Discussing “professional mystique,” Richard 
Posner—citing the lack of real therapeutic knowledge in medicine “in the Middle Ages in 
Italy, where medicine was a highly prestigious profession”—suggests that “[t]he key to 
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observed, the professional-client relationship is asymmetric: the professional 
has knowledge the client does not have, which leads the client to seek out her 
advice. The reason the professional’s advice is valuable to the client is that she 
possesses knowledge that the client lacks.37 
Because the professions are knowledge-based, I contend that they should 
be thought of as knowledge communities. Individual professionals “may differ 
in their individual judgments about particular issues, [but] their role as 
professionals traditionally implies their subscription to a body of knowledge 
that is shared among their peers.”38  
What are knowledge communities?39 I use the term to describe a network 
of individuals who share common knowledge and experience as a result of 
 
socially valuable knowledge; it is the belief that some group has such knowledge . . . .” 
Posner, supra note 35, at 2. But “[t]he fact that a profession cultivates professional mystique 
does not prove that it lacks real knowledge; modern medicine is a case in point.” Posner, 
supra, at 4; see also Peter M. Haas, Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 35 (1992) (identifying the professions as a knowledge-based 
group). 
37. See Bowie, supra note 35, at 743-44 (“Walter Metzger, addressing the question ‘What Is A 
Profession?,’ argued that ‘the paramount function of professions . . . is to ease the problems 
caused by the relentless growth of knowledge.’ . . . In a complex world, people become 
increasingly ignorant of information necessary to run their lives. The job of the professional 
is to protect the client from his or her own ignorance.”); see also King v. Governor of N.J. 
(King II), 767 F.3d 216, 232 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Licensed professionals, through their education 
and training, have access to a corpus of specialized knowledge that their clients usually do 
not. Indeed, the value of the professional’s services stems largely from her ability to apply 
this specialized knowledge to a client’s individual circumstances.”); Steven Brint, 
Professionals and the “Knowledge Economy”: Rethinking the Theory of Postindustrial Society, 49 
CURRENT SOC. 101, 116 (2001) (including in the discussion of “knowledge-centered” 
industries those “industries in which the primary activity is providing service to clients and 
the knowledge necessary for providing the service is embedded in the providers themselves 
(as in the medical, education and legal services industries)”). 
38. Halberstam, supra note 1, at 772; see also Brint, supra note 37, at 130 n.9 (discussing sociology 
literature indicating that “many professionals . . . do not use much expert knowledge on 
their jobs. Studies of two leading professions, doctors and lawyers, show that rank-and-file 
practitioners frequently rely on standard reference works and accumulated experience as a 
basis for many of their decisions.” (citing DANIEL B. HOGAN, THE REGULATION OF 
PSYCHOTHERAPISTS (1979) and DONALD SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: HOW 
PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION (1983))). Brint’s observation would suggest a very close 
connection of the individual professional to the knowledge community in day-to-day 
operations. 
39. My definition of “knowledge community” builds on various definitions of that concept 
offered in the management and social science literature and draws on related concepts, such 
as “epistemic communities” or “epistemic institutions.” See, e.g., Ash Amin & Joanne 
Roberts, Knowing in Action: Beyond Communities of Practice, 37 RES. POL. 353, 359-61 (2008) 
(discussing “professional knowing”); Mai’a K. Davis Cross, Rethinking Epistemic 







training and practice.40 They are engaged in solving similar problems by 
drawing on a shared reservoir of knowledge, which, at the same time, they help 
define and to which they contribute. Their common understandings allow for 
the generation and exchange of insights within the community. Consequently, 
members of knowledge communities have shared notions of validity41 and a 
common way of knowing and reasoning (consider the old adage of “thinking 
like a lawyer”).42 Additionally, the knowledge community shares certain norms 
and values: professional norms. This is not to say that knowledge communities 
are monolithic. But their shared notions of validity limit the range of acceptable 
opinions found within them.  
The connection to a knowledge community is a distinctive feature of the 
role of professionals. In a recent case, the Fourth Circuit considered the 
question of professional speech protection for the “spiritual counselor” 
(fortune teller) known as Psychic Sophie, who assertedly engaged in providing 
predictive advice just like a lawyer.43 The Fourth Circuit, relying on Justice 
White’s concurrence in Lowe v. SEC, stated: “Professional speech analysis 
applies . . . where a speaker ‘takes the affairs of a client personally in hand and 
purports to exercise judgment on behalf of the client in the light of the client’s 
individual needs and circumstances’ . . . .”44 This definition of professional 
speech allowed the court to conclude that Psychic Sophie’s “activities fit 
comfortably within the confines of professional speech analysis.”45 Whether or 
not this assessment of her profession is accurate,46 it importantly lacks the 
connection to a knowledge community.  
 
epistemic communities and professions); Michael Earl, Knowledge Management Strategies: 
Toward a Taxonomy, 18 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS. 215, 223-25 (2001) (discussing knowledge 
communities in the oil industry); Haas, supra note 36, at 3 & n.4 (defining epistemic 
communities and their interrelatedness with professions). 
40. See Haas, supra note 36, at 18-19 (explaining that professions have shared causal beliefs and 
a consensual knowledge base). 
41. Cf. id. at 3 (including professions in his discussion of knowledge-based groups whose 
members may share criteria of validity). 
42. Cf. id. at 16 (discussing analytic methods and techniques of professions).  
43. Moore-King v. County of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 567 (4th Cir. 2013). See generally 
Volokh, supra note 5, at 1345 n.352 (discussing fortune teller cases). 
44. Moore-King, 708 F.3d at 569 (citations omitted) (quoting Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 
(1985)).  
45. Id. 
46. Cf. Posner, supra note 35, at 5 (“Sorcery and prophecy enjoy professional status in many 
primitive societies, and are overthrown when practitioners face competition from groups 
that use rational methods.”). 
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First Amendment scholars concerned with professional speech have hinted 
at the connection between the professions and institutions.47 This emerging 
institutionalist First Amendment literature is concerned with colleges and 
universities, libraries, and the press.48 But knowledge communities, while 
related to these institutions, are in a sense less “institutionalized.” 
Their most institutionalized incarnations are professional associations. The 
Fourth Circuit, for example, invoked the presence or absence of “accrediting 
institution[s] like a board of law examiners or medical practitioners” in the 
Psychic Sophie case.49 Likewise, Justice Breyer in dissent once noted that when 
speech “is subject to independent regulation by canons of the profession[s] . . . 
the government’s own interest in forbidding that speech is diminished.”50 My 
account of the role of knowledge communities in the professional speech 
context makes sense of these intuitions. But professional norms are generated 
outside of these associations as well. Conferences and the professional 
literature, for example, are sites of professional knowledge formation, even 
though they are not necessarily embodied in specific institutions or 
professional associations.51 
Of course, professional associations have held, at one point or another, 
positions they now consider erroneous or outdated. For instance, the American 
Medical Association was at the forefront of the campaign to criminalize 
abortion in the nineteenth century,52 and the American Psychological 
 
47. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 13, at 350 n.38. 
48. Schauer, Institutional First Amendment, supra note 15, at 1274-75. Frederick Schauer also 
includes “scientific research that does not have a home within a university” as an analog. Id. 
According to Schauer, “For all of these institutions, the argument would be that the virtues 
of special autonomy—special immunity from regulation—would in large part serve 
important purposes of inquiry and knowledge acquisition, and that those purposes are not 
only socially valuable, but also have their natural (or at least most comfortable) home within 
the boundaries of the First Amendment.” Id.  
Paul Horwitz also includes churches and associations in his discussion. See HORWITZ, 
supra note 13, at 107-238. 
49. Moore-King, 708 F.3d at 570 (further stating that where such accrediting institutions do not 
exist, “a legislature may reasonably determine that additional regulatory requirements are 
necessary”). 
50. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 446 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
51. While outside of the professional-client relationship, and therefore outside of the immediate 
scope of this discussion, the speech interests of professionals speaking to each other are 
similar to those underlying academic speech. See generally ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, 
EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE 
MODERN STATE 61-93 (2012) [hereinafter POST, DEMOCRACY]. 
52. See Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective 







Association (APA) did not declassify homosexuality as a mental disorder until 
1973.53 But the professions themselves can and do revise their positions on the 
basis of their ongoing intellectual development, as these examples attest.54 In 
adopting, changing, or updating these positions, the knowledge communities 
use their own professional standards, elaborated by and through their own 
community.55 
Knowledge communities have specialized expertise and are closest to those 
affected; they must have the freedom to work things out for themselves. The 
professions as knowledge communities have a fundamental interest in not 
having the state (or anyone else, for that matter) corrupt or distort what 
amounts to the state of the art in their respective fields.56 This is the key feature 
of professional discourse and the limiting principle of professional speech. The 
resulting benefit is the generation of insights within the knowledge community 
that would not otherwise occur. As knowledge communities, then, the 
professions should be granted deference.57 But where knowledge 
communities—and, by extension, individual professionals—do not possess 
such specialized knowledge or competence, such deference is not required as a 
matter of professional speech. No amount of specialized training, for instance, 
by itself makes a professional more competent to render value judgments. 
The individual professional is linked to the knowledge community in 
multiple ways. She “is understood to be acting under a commitment to the 
ethical and intellectual principles governing the profession and is not thought 
of as free to challenge the mode of discourse or the norms of the profession 
 
Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 
STAN. L. REV. 261, 280-318 (1992). 
53. HORWITZ, supra note 13, at 352 n.51. 
54. See id. (pointing out that the APA declassified homosexuality “not as a result of legal 
pressure but in response to changing professional views and broader social norms”). 
55. This mechanism is analogous to that described in epistemic communities: “In response to 
new information generated in their domain of expertise, epistemic community members 
may still engage in internal and often intense debates leading to a refinement of their ideas 
and the generation of a new consensus about the knowledge base.” Haas, supra note 36, at 
18. 
56. See Halberstam, supra note 1, at 773 (“The State may ensure professionals’ faithfulness to the 
public aspects of their calling, but it may not usurp their role or determine independently 
the bodies of knowledge that may be accessed or the individual judgments that may be 
rendered in a given case.”). 
57. Cf. Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 136 (1989) (“There is 
also wide agreement that advancement in understanding among persons capable of 
assessing scientific claims is promoted by freedom of communication within the scientific 
community, that government intervention to suppress some scientific ideas in favor of 
others would not promote scientific truth.”). 
85
 
the yale law journal 	 125 : 1238   20 16  
1254 
 
while remaining within the parameters of the professional discussion.”58 The 
individual professional thus serves as the conduit between the knowledge 
community and the client. Malpractice liability likewise assumes this 
connection in imposing the profession’s standard of care on the individual 
professional.59 
I will return to the role of professional associations and state involvement 
in regulating the professions in Part III. For now, conceptualizing the 
professions as knowledge communities allows us to focus our discussion on 
professional speech as distinct from other forms of speech.  
2. Distinguishing Private Speech 
Turning to the second and third constitutive elements of professional 
speech—(2) that it is communicated by a professional within the professional-
client relationship, (3) for the purpose of providing professional advice—it is 
fundamentally important to recognize that professional speech is not private 
speech. Daniel Halberstam and Robert Post define professional speech as 
“‘speech . . . uttered in the course of professional practice,’ as distinct from 
‘speech . . . uttered by a professional.’”60 This definition crucially distinguishes 
professional speech from private speech.61  
The line between the professional’s private speech and professional speech, 
then, can be drawn by considering the presence or absence of a professional-
 
58. Halberstam, supra note 1, at 834. 
59. See infra Section III.B.1. 
60. Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note 1, at 947 (quoting Halberstam, supra note 1, at 
843). 
61. This distinction is sometimes obscured or disregarded in the case law and literature. See, 
e.g., Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger I), 760 F.3d 1195, 1218 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(denying First Amendment protection “when the professional speaks privately, in the course 
of exercising his or her professional judgment, to a person receiving the professional’s 
services”), vacated and superseded on reh’g, 797 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2015), vacated and superseded 
on reh’g, No. 12-14009, 2015 WL 8639875 (11th Cir. Dec. 14, 2015); Pickup v. Brown (Pickup 
II), 740 F.3d 1208, 1227 (9th Cir. 2014) (placing professional speech on a continuum and 
asserting that “where a professional is engaged in a public dialogue, First Amendment 
protection is at its greatest”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2871 (2014); Jennifer M. Keighley, 
Physician Speech and Mandatory Ultrasound Laws: The First Amendment’s Limit on Compelled 
Ideological Speech, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2347, 2351-52 (2013) (discussing “physician speech” as 
a form of private speech of the physician: “[A]lthough physicians’ speech to patients during 
the course of medical practice, what I will refer to as ‘physician speech,’ may be regulated 
without offending the First Amendment, this does not mean that physicians lose their First 
Amendment rights as ordinary citizens against compelled ideological speech.” Thus, 
“compelled ideological speech . . . violates physicians’ First Amendment rights as ordinary 






client relationship. “Where the personal nexus between professional and client 
does not exist, and a speaker does not purport to be exercising judgment on 
behalf of any particular individual with whose circumstances he is directly 
acquainted,”62 the speaker is not engaged in professional speech. When the 
professional’s advice is distributed generally or to the public at large, outside of 
the professional-client relationship, it is most likely not professional speech.63 
Investment advice distributed to the general public, for example, does not 
constitute professional speech;64 nor do books on how to avoid probate,65 diet 
plans,66 or mushroom guides,67 even though inaccurate information so 
disseminated may be harmful. When professionals speak in such a manner, 
they act as ordinary citizens participating in public discourse and accordingly 
enjoy ordinary First Amendment protection. 
The third element of professional speech—that it is for the purpose of 
providing professional advice—constrains what the professional may say in the 
context of the professional-client relationship, and so helps distinguish 
professional speech from other kinds of speech a professional might engage in, 
whether in public or private. It bears emphasis that First Amendment 
protection for speech that is not professional advice is unrelated to the 
speaker’s membership in a knowledge community.68 Although the speaker’s 
 
62. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring). 
63. See Halberstam, supra note 1, at 851 (“Publication of advice for indiscriminate distribution 
generally will defeat a conclusion that the advice was rendered within the professional-client 
relationship . . . .”); see also Pickup I, 728 F.3d at 1054 (“Thus, outside the doctor-patient 
relationship, doctors are constitutionally equivalent to soapbox orators and pamphleteers, 
and their speech receives robust protection under the First Amendment.”). 
64. Lowe, 472 U.S. at 207-08.  
65. Catherine J. Lanctot, Does Legalzoom Have First Amendment Rights?: Some Thoughts About 
Freedom of Speech and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 20 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 255, 
266-69 (2011) (discussing the litigation culminating in New York County Lawyers’ Ass’n v. 
Dacey); see also N.Y. Cty. Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Dacey, 234 N.E.2d 459, 459 (N.Y. 1967) (holding 
that publication of defendant’s book, How To Avoid Probate, did not constitute unauthorized 
practice of law because it gave “general advice on common problems” rather than “personal 
advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person”). 
66. See Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (holding that a publisher was not 
liable for a death caused by following a diet book). 
67. See Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that a publisher of 
a mushroom encyclopedia was not liable for liver damage caused by eating mushrooms). 
68. See Keighley, supra note 61, at 2349 n.3 (“Of course, physicians retain the ordinary 
protections of the First Amendment when they speak in the public sphere, outside of the 
practice of medicine.”); cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal 
Profession: Constraints on Lawyers’ First Amendment Rights, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 569, 569 
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professional training may inform the content of such speech, she is not 
disseminating the knowledge community’s insights within a professional-
client relationship for the purpose of providing professional advice. In fact, in 
many instances, the speaker may be articulating disagreement with the 
knowledge community’s consensus, which the professional is not free to do 
when providing professional advice.69 
Post, for instance, recounts the “controversy over the safety of dental 
amalgams.”70 There, a dentist questioned the professional consensus that 
dental fillings containing certain substances were safe. Although the dentist no 
doubt was informed by his professional background, the expression of his 
opinion was entirely private speech.71 “Within public discourse,” Post explains, 
“traditional First Amendment doctrine systematically transmutes claims of 
expert knowledge into assertions of opinion.”72 Any non-dentist’s speech 
questioning the safety of such fillings would enjoy the same First Amendment 
protection, though the public would probably ascribe less persuasive force to a 
non-professional’s assessment of the matter.73 
The same reasoning makes political statements like “vote for Obama,” even 
if uttered within the context of a professional-client relationship, not 
professional speech but the professional’s private speech.74 It is not 
communicated for the purpose of providing professional advice, and it is likely 
not connected to the insights of the knowledge community—even if the 
 
discourse, free of state control and entitled to all the ordinary protections of speech and 
association available to other speakers”). 
69. See, e.g., Halberstam, supra note 1, at 848-49. 
70. Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note 1, at 947-49; see also HORWITZ, supra note 13, at 
249; POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 51, at 12-13. 
71. POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 51, at 43 (“If an expert chooses to participate in public 
discourse by speaking about matters within her expertise, her speech will characteristically 
be classified as fully protected opinion.”); Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note 1, at 
949 (“When a physician speaks to the public, his opinions cannot be censored and 
suppressed, even if they are at odds with preponderant opinion within the medical 
establishment.”). 
72. POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 51, at 44. 
73. And professionals’ private opinions do not necessarily have to reflect the insights of the 
knowledge community. Cf. id. (“Biologists can with impunity write editorials in the New 
York Times that are such poor science that they would constitute grounds for denying tenure 
within a university. Members of the general public can rely on expert pronouncements 
within public discourse only at their peril. Such pronouncements are ultimately subject to 
political rather than legal accountability.”(footnote omitted)). 
74. Cf. Keighley, supra note 61, at 2350-51 (suggesting that the free speech implications of 







knowledge community may have reached a consensus that one candidate for 
public office will better serve their interests than another.75  
3. Distinguishing Government Speech 
Another important distinction is between professional speech and 
government speech. Professional speech must be communicated by a 
professional, and professionals can operate in different institutional settings 
with varying degrees of government involvement. The professional may be a 
government employee, or a government program may fund the professional’s 
service. Alternatively, the government sometimes seeks to have private 
individuals disseminate its own message. Under the government speech 
doctrine, “[t]he government alone may determine its message to the exclusion 
of all others.”76 Just as the state can be anti-smoking or anti-obesity, it may 
express a preference on abortion.77 Thus, when the state tries to enlist a private 
speaker, a key concern is whether the message is attributed to the state or the 
professional.78 
As I have argued elsewhere, effective control over speech should determine 
responsibility for the message.79 This, in turn, can distinguish government 
speech from professional speech, and so mark the boundary up to which the 
state can prescribe speech. When, for example, the state demands that 
physicians communicate certain claims to their patients in materials of the 
physicians’ own design, the state effectively tries to obscure authorship even 
though it is the state that retains effective control over the message 
communicated.80 Such speech, then, should be understood as an attempt by 
 
75. If a medical professional makes the statement, it may convey an opinion regarding the 
candidate’s health policy. See id. at 2350 & n.14. 
76. Claudia E. Haupt, Mixed Public-Private Speech and the Establishment Clause, 85 TUL. L. REV. 
571, 573 (2011). 
77. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (opinion of O’Connor, 
Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (“It is conventional constitutional doctrine that where reasonable 
people disagree the government can adopt one position or the other.”); id. at 872 (“[T]he 
Constitution does not forbid a State or city, pursuant to democratic processes, from 
expressing a preference for normal childbirth.” (alteration in original) (quoting Webster v. 
Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989)); id. at 916 (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“I agree with the joint opinion that the State may ‘“‘expres[s] a 
preference for normal childbirth[.]’”’” (first alteration in original) (quoting id. at 872)). 
78. See Keighley, supra note 61, at 2361. 
79. Haupt, supra note 76, at 591-600.  
80. The concern is that “the government may make puppets out of doctors.” Tex. Med. 
Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, No. A-11-CA-486-SS, 2012 WL 373132, at *3 
(W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2012). 
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the government to co-opt or dictate professional speech. According to the 
theory developed here, such prescriptions would constitute inappropriate 
regulation of professional speech. But the situation is different where state 
regulation permits professionals to disavow the state’s message. In Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the state demanded that a 
certain message be communicated,81 but the Court’s decision suggested that 
disclaimers were permissible. The next section more closely examines the 
doctrinal status of professional speech in light of Casey and other cases that 
concern government speech. 
B. Professional Speech in First Amendment Doctrine 
Whether a “professional speech doctrine” currently exists is subject to 
debate. The Fourth Circuit recently asserted that “[t]he Supreme Court has 
recognized the regulation of occupational speech under the ‘professional 
speech’ doctrine at least since Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Thomas v. 
Collins,” a 1945 case.82 Similarly, some commentators point to Justice White’s 
concurrence in Lowe v. SEC as declaring the existence of the professional 
speech doctrine.83 Others are more skeptical.84 
Although the Supreme Court has never identified a category of 
“professional speech” for First Amendment purposes, its existence is implicit in 
a number of cases.85 The Court most directly addressed the question of First 
Amendment protection for professional speech in the joint opinion in Casey.86 
But the concept is embedded in other decisions as well.87 
 
81. See Casey, 505 U.S at 881 (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). 
82. Moore-King v. County of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 568 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Thomas v. 
Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945) (Jackson, J. concurring)). Relying on Moore-King as well as 
Wollschlaeger I, 760 F.3d 1195, and Pickup I, 728 F.3d 1042, the Third Circuit identified 
professional speech as “a recognized category of speech.” King II, 767 F.3d at 233. 
83. 472 U.S. 181, 211-36 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the judgment). For such commentators, 
see sources cited in Keighley, supra note 61, at 2368 n.82. 
84. Keighley, supra note 61, at 2367-69; Jacob M. Victor, Note, Regulating Sexual Orientation 
Change Efforts: The California Approach, Its Limitations, and Potential Alternatives, 123 YALE 
L.J. 1532, 1537, 1552-53 (2014) (calling professional speech “an ill-defined and controversial 
area of First Amendment doctrine”).  
85. Cf. Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 694 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (“Although the Supreme 
Court has never held that the physician-patient relationship, as such, receives special First 
Amendment protection, its case law assumes, without so deciding, that the relationship is a 
protected one.”). 
86. 505 U.S. at 884 (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). 
87. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 13, at 253 (asserting that “[t]he Court in Rust and Velazquez 







With Casey—arguably the most on-point treatment—as a starting point, 
the doctrinal basis of professional speech appears indeterminate at best. But a 
wide-angle view reveals that, despite the initial lack of clarity in Casey, the 
Court seems to have at least a hunch that speech communicated by 
professionals in a professional-client relationship for the purpose of providing 
professional advice is somehow distinctive.  
In Casey, the joint opinion addressed the First Amendment in a somewhat 
cryptic paragraph: 
All that is left of petitioners’ argument is an asserted First Amendment 
right of a physician not to provide information about the risks of 
abortion, and childbirth, in a manner mandated by the State. To be 
sure, the physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are 
implicated . . . but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to 
reasonable licensing and regulation by the State . . . . We see no 
constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide 
the information mandated by the State here.88 
Scholars have been struggling to make sense of this.89 Some appellate 
courts have arguably taken this obscure statement as license to espouse an 
exceedingly narrow view of professional speech.90 There is now marked and 
explicit disagreement among the circuits regarding its proper interpretation.91 
But beyond this puzzling paragraph, Casey hints at the doctrinal status of 
professional speech. The joint opinion directly addressed government speech, 
compelled speech, and the right to receive information (or not). The 
government, as the joint opinion and Justice Stevens’s opinion agreed, may 
communicate its own preference with respect to abortion.92 Regarding 
compelled speech, the joint opinion found that the government may demand, 
as part of obtaining the woman’s informed consent, that physicians distribute 
 
express it” (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) and Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 
531 U.S. 533 (2001))). But see Wells, supra note 30, at 1725 (asserting that the Court in Rust 
and Casey failed to consider abortion counseling as speech). 
88. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (citations omitted). 
89. See Halberstam, supra note 1, at 773-74, 837-38; Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note 
1, at 945-46; Volokh, supra note 5, at 1344-45. 
90. Keighley, supra note 61, at 2357 (“Both the Fifth and the Eighth Circuits have expanded 
Casey’s cursory First Amendment discussion into broad holdings that eviscerate physicians’ 
First Amendment rights within the practice of medicine.”). 
91. See, e.g., Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 248-49 (4th Cir. 2014) (rejecting the Fifth and 
Eighth Circuits’ interpretation), cert. denied sub nom. Walker-McGill v. Stuart, 135 S. Ct. 
2838 (2015). 
92. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
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state-drafted materials and make certain statements to their patients that are 
“truthful and not misleading.”93 However, the state neither required that the 
providers communicate this information as their own—which could have made 
it more difficult for patients to attribute the message to the state—nor 
prohibited the providers from expressing their disagreement with the state’s 
policy. Moreover, there was a provision for physicians to refrain from 
providing certain information if they deemed it harmful to their patients.94 
Finally, with respect to the right to receive information or not, women could 
decline to view the materials.95 
As a matter of existing First Amendment doctrine, then, Casey may be read 
as suggesting that while the government is free to express its own opinion, it 
may not enlist (potentially unwilling) professionals as mouthpieces to 
disseminate its message.96  
Also in the abortion context, and pre-dating the Casey decision by a year, 
Rust v. Sullivan further illuminates the doctrinal status of professional speech.97 
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist framed the issue as concerning “abortion-
related activities,”98 thus apparently avoiding the specific question of 
professional speech,99 that is in fact what the case concerned.100 The Court 
noted that “[it] could be argued . . . that traditional relationships such as that 
between doctor and patient should enjoy protection under the First 
Amendment from Government regulation, even when subsidized by the 
 
93. Casey, 505 U.S. at 881-82 (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (“The physician 
or a qualified nonphysician must inform the woman of the availability of printed materials 
published by the State . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
94. Id. at 883-84. 
95. Id. at 881 (“An abortion may not be performed unless the woman certifies in writing that 
she has been informed of the availability of these printed materials and has been provided 
them if she chooses to view them.” (emphasis added)). 
96. See Stuart, 774 F.3d at 253 (stating that “the viewpoint conveyed by the pamphlet is clearly 
the state’s—not the physician’s”). 
97. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
98. Rust, 500 U.S. at 178 (emphasis added); id. at 194 (“This is not a case of the Government 
‘suppressing a dangerous idea,’ but of a prohibition on a project grantee or its employees 
from engaging in activities outside of the project’s scope.” (emphasis added)). 
99. Halberstam, supra note 1, at 774. 
100. The Court did conflate professional speech and professional activities, as some 
commentators have pointed out. See Wells, supra note 30, at 1748-49. This conflation is 
exemplified by statements such as the following: “But we have here not the case of a general 
law singling out a disfavored group on the basis of speech content, but a case of the 
Government refusing to fund activities, including speech, which are specifically excluded from 






Government.”101 But it did not resolve the question, suggesting that the 
regulations in question “[did] not significantly impinge upon the doctor-
patient relationship.”102 The Chief Justice gave the following reasons: first, the 
doctor was not compelled “to represent as his own any opinion that he does 
not in fact hold;” second, the professional relationship was not “sufficiently all 
encompassing” because it “does not provide post-conception medical care” and 
consequently, “the doctor’s silence with regard to abortion cannot reasonably 
be thought to mislead a client into thinking that the doctor does not consider 
abortion an appropriate option for her.”103 Finally, “[t]he doctor [was] always 
free to make clear that advice regarding abortion is simply beyond the scope of 
the program.”104 
Justice Blackmun’s dissent rejected the “direct regulation of dialogue 
between a pregnant woman and her physician.”105 In Justice Blackmun’s view, 
“the regulations impose[d] viewpoint-based restrictions upon protected 
speech . . . .”106 Importantly for this discussion, Justice Blackmun framed the 
problem of limiting the scope of advice in terms of both the patient’s 
expectations as well as professional demands.107 Full, comprehensive advice, in 
other words, was not only what a pregnant woman expected of her physician—
government-funded or not—but also what the medical profession expected of 
its members. 
Rust anticipated the points made in Casey with respect to attribution of 
speech within government speech doctrine.108 Whether or not the Chief Justice 
appropriately characterized the extent of the doctor-patient relationship, it is 
noteworthy that the Rust Court did acknowledge the possibility of First 
Amendment protection in this professional context. Moreover, it is striking 
that the Chief Justice suggested drawing an analogy between the doctor-
patient relationship and the treatment of universities under the First 
 
101. Rust, 500 U.S. at 200.  
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. “One permissible response to such an inquiry [for referral to an abortion provider] is 
that ‘the project does not consider abortion an appropriate method of family planning and 
therefore does not counsel or refer for abortion.’” Id. at 180 (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(5) 
(1989)). 
105. Id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
106. Id. at 205. 
107. See id. at 213-14 (“Indeed, the legitimate expectations of the patient and the ethical 
responsibilities of the medical profession demand no less.”). 
108. Though the Court did not expressly analyze Rust under the government speech doctrine, 
“when interpreting the holding in later cases, . . . [the Court] explained Rust on this 
understanding.” Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 541 (2001). 
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Amendment.109 This particular institutional analogy likely supports 
conceptualizing the professions as knowledge communities. 
Several decisions concerning legal advice give further doctrinal guidance on 
professional speech. In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, the Court held 
unconstitutional a restriction on providing legal advice that “prohibit[ed] legal 
representation funded by recipients of [Legal Services Corporation (LSC)] 
moneys if the representation involve[d] an effort to amend or otherwise 
challenge existing welfare law.”110 As Justice Kennedy explained, “the LSC 
program was designed to facilitate private speech, not to promote a 
governmental message. Congress funded LSC grantees to provide attorneys to 
represent the interests of indigent clients.”111 This makes the legal advice 
different from government speech—according to Justice Kennedy, “[t]he 
lawyer is not the government’s speaker”112 and the legal advice is a form of 
private speech.113 Yet the Velazquez Court did recognize that there is a 
professional dimension to this speech. The legal system depends on the 
traditional role of the attorney,114 which includes “complete analysis of the case, 
full advice to the client, and proper presentation to the court.”115 Limiting the 
range of permissible speech “prohibits speech and expression upon which 
courts must depend for the proper exercise of the judicial power.”116 In light of 
these statements, it is evident that the Court understands professional speech 
to be distinct from government speech, even when funded by the government. 
And, although the Court did not make the point explicitly, it appeared to 
recognize the special import of professional speech—at least that of a lawyer—
as distinct from ordinary private speech. 
Finally, the two attorney speech cases from 2010, Milavetz v. United States117 
and Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,118 have implications “for those desiring 
 
109. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 200. 
110. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 536-37. 
111. Id. at 542.  
112. Id. Further, Justice Kennedy explained: “The Government has designed this program to use 
the legal profession . . . to accomplish its end . . . . The advice from the attorney to the client 
and the advocacy by the attorney to the courts cannot be classified as governmental speech 
even under a generous understanding of that concept.” Id. at 542-43. 
113. Id. at 543.  
114. Id. at 544 (“Restricting LSC attorneys in advising their clients and in presenting arguments 
and analyses to the courts distorts the legal system by altering the traditional role of the 
attorneys . . . .”). 
115. Id. at 546 (emphasis added). 
116. Id. at 545. 
117. 559 U.S. 229 (2010). 






advice about any other area of law where Congress may decide to legislate away 
the attorney’s ability to advise her client and the client’s right to receive that 
advice.”119 Milavetz concerned limitations on attorney speech imposed by the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA).120 The 
Act prohibits “debt relief agencies”—which the Court held attorneys to be—
from advising clients “to incur more debt in contemplation of such person 
filing” for bankruptcy under the applicable provisions.121 In Milavetz, the Court 
disagreed with the Eighth Circuit’s characterization of the “statute as a broad, 
content-based restriction on attorney-client communications that is not 
adequately tailored to constrain only speech the Government has a substantial 
interest in restricting.”122 As Justice Sotomayor explained, the phrase “in 
contemplation of bankruptcy” indicates abusive conduct.123 So understood, 
“advice to incur more debt because of bankruptcy . . . will generally consist of 
advice to ‘load up’ on debt with the expectation of obtaining its discharge—i.e., 
conduct that is abusive per se.”124 Importantly, Justice Sotomayor cited Rule 
1.2(d) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct in rejecting the claim 
that the BAPCPA provisions prohibit frank discussion between lawyer and 
client.125 Under the crime-fraud provision, lawyers are not prohibited from 
discussing fraudulent or criminal conduct, but they may not advise their clients 
to engage in it. In other words, the Court looked to professional standards to 
provide guidance on the scope of the Act’s prohibition as it concerned 
“attorney speech.”126 The Court here demonstrated not only an appreciation 
for the type of professional speech that occurs within the lawyer-client 
relationship, but also for the role of the professional rules of conduct in 
defining the scope of this relationship. 
The speech at issue in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,127 by contrast, 
occurred outside the boundaries of the lawyer-client relationship; the statute 
 
119. Knake, supra note 25, at 657. 
120. Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 231-32. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Issues Posed in 
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 571 
(2005). 
121. Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 233 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4) (2012)). 
122. Id. at 239. 
123. Id. at 243. 
124. Id. at 244. 
125. Id. at 246. 
126. Id. at 247 (“Against this backdrop, it is hard to see how a rule that narrowly prohibits an 
attorney from affirmatively advising a client to commit this type of abusive prefiling conduct 
could chill attorney speech or inhibit the attorney-client relationship.”). 
127.  561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
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prohibited the formation of that relationship in the first place.128 Various 
domestic groups and individuals sought to provide information and training to 
groups designated as “foreign terrorist organizations” on how to assert their 
own legal claims.129 The Court upheld the “material support” provision of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act against a First Amendment 
challenge.130 In dictum, Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that the decision 
does not suggest “that any future applications of the material-support [for 
terrorism] statute to speech or advocacy will survive First Amendment 
scrutiny.”131 Nonetheless, some commentators assert that the decision “is likely 
to have a chilling effect on attorney advice.”132 The Court in this case allegedly 
underappreciated the role of attorneys who provide “speech that constitutes 
legal ‘expert advice or assistance.’”133 
In sum, all of these decisions hint at the Court’s incipient conception of 
professional speech. While professional speech is conceptualized as somehow 
distinctive, however, the Court lacks the theoretical foundation to properly 
evaluate First Amendment protection of such speech. 
C. The Commercial Speech Analogy 
Courts134 and scholars135 have analogized professional speech to commercial 
speech. But, I argue, the analogy is tenuous; the underlying speech interests are 
fundamentally different. The content of professional speech, distinctively, is 
defined by the professional’s connection to the knowledge community. 
Most prominently perhaps, Halberstam and Post each propose and defend 
models that serve as a basis for the analogy. In doing so, however, Halberstam 
reconceptualizes commercial speech doctrine itself; Post cautions against its 
 
128. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012); see also Tarkington, supra note 25, at 24 (noting that the statute 
criminalizes the attorney-client relationship). 
129. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 14 (2010).  
130. Id. at 7. 
131. Id. at 39. 
132. Knake, supra note 25, at 656. 
133. Tarkington, supra note 25, at 67 (noting that the Court’s distinction between speech in 
coordination with a Foreign Terrorist Organization and independent speech “is distinctively 
and acutely problematic for attorney speech. The attorney’s essential role requires speaking 
in coordination with and on behalf of clients. Attorneys, when acting as attorneys, do not 
speak for themselves or independently”). 
134. See, e.g., Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 248 (4th Cir. 2014); King II, 767 F.3d at 233; 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); SEC v. Lowe, 725 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1984). 






wholesale adoption. Halberstam advances the “bounded speech institutions” 
model, and Post advances a professional speech variation of the democratic 
self-government model. Both focus on the structure of the communication. 
The doctrinal starting point for assessing commercial speech remains the 
canonical, though increasingly criticized,136 Central Hudson test.137 The Court 
has ostensibly relied on this doctrinal basis in its expansion of First 
Amendment protection for commercial speech.138 Writing at the turn of the 
twenty-first century, Halberstam observed that the classic position of minimal 
protection of commercial speech was beginning to appear in flux.139 Since then, 
there has indeed been a considerable expansion of First Amendment protection 
for commercial speech. The Court now affords what comes close to strict 
scrutiny review in commercial speech cases.140  
But the extent of protection should not be the primary reason to analogize 
the two types of speech unless doctrine is tethered to theory. This requires “a 
deeper kinship between the two forms of communication.”141 For Halberstam, 
this deeper kinship is rooted in the “paradigm of bounded speech 
institutions.”142 Both professional and commercial speech in this model can be 
seen as “relational” or “bounded speech institutions,” though Halberstam 
acknowledges that “the relationship between physician and patient and the 
duties attendant to that relationship are substantially deeper than those 
 
136. See, e.g., Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5 
(2000) [hereinafter Post, Commercial Speech] (contending that Central Hudson itself is 
indeterminate and therefore provides an insufficient constitutional basis for resolving 
questions of commercial speech protection).  
137. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (“In 
commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the outset, we must 
determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial 
speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be 
misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both 
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly 
advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is 
necessary to serve that interest.”). 
 The First Amendment was originally inapplicable to “purely commercial advertising.” 
See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). The modern category of “commercial 
speech” was first identified in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
138. See Halberstam, supra note 1, at 787-89; Post, Commercial Speech, supra note 136, at 42. 
139. Halberstam, supra note 1, at 776-77. 
140. Post, Commercial Speech, supra note 136, at 42.  
141. Halberstam, supra note 1, at 776. 
142. Id. at 778. 
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between vendor and purchaser.”143 He makes an (ostensibly descriptive) 
institutional or structural argument, suggesting that  
the Court may be seen as implementing a constitutional theory of 
bounded speech institutions, based on its perception of various socially 
defined relationships between interlocutors and, accordingly, rendering 
contextual judgments about the extent of government intervention that 
is both necessary for and compatible with the preservation of the 
particular institution.144 
With respect to both professional and commercial speech “[t]he boundaries of 
the discourse . . . may be policed, but, conversely, as long as the speaker 
remains within the boundary of the institution, the speaker would be engaged 
in protected speech.”145 In other words, state regulation serves a definitional 
purpose—mapping the boundaries of discourse. While speakers remain within 
those bounds, interference with their speech is impermissible.146 The so-
bounded communicative relationships are subject to “contextual First 
Amendment review that is specifically centered around the social relation, as 
opposed to an abstract review such as that traditionally applied to the street-
corner speaker.”147 Under this model, in both the professional and the 
commercial speech contexts, “[t]he government may neither suppress the 
speech entirely nor remodel the institution to its liking.”148 
Conceptually, it seems plausible to view both commercial and professional 
speech in this way. But, while I agree with the differentiation between speech 
within and outside of a bounded discourse and with awarding First 
Amendment protection accordingly, I do not embrace the suggested parallel 
between commercial and professional speech. The “bounded speech 
 
143. Id. at 851. “Indeed, as compared to commercial speech, we might even expect the deeper 
relationship between physician and patient to lead, at least in some cases, to protection 
beyond that afforded to commercial speech.” Id. at 838. 
144. Id. at 778. 
145. Id. at 857. 
146. Id. at 828 (“On the one hand, the Court welcomes government regulation as partially 
constitutive of the communicative interaction, that is, as assuring that communications that 
are dependent on predefined communicative goals remain within the boundaries of that 
discourse. On the other hand, the Court rejects government prescriptions as 
unconstitutional when they infringe on the integrity of an established framework for 
discourse.”). 
147. Id. at 834. This is true “whether the relationships are ones of trust, such as those between 
lawyer and client or doctor and patient, or are merely common material enterprises, such as 
those between buyers and sellers.” Id. 






institutions” model assumes the equal position of professional and commercial 
speech in contrast to political or private speech, which is traditionally 
unbounded.149 However, it does not sufficiently account for the differences 
between professional and commercial speech. In order to do so, such a 
structural view is not enough.150 The bounded discourse approach 
encompasses the individual professional-client relationship, but, in doing so, 
undervalues the role of the professional’s connection to the knowledge 
community. In terms of content, the individual professional serves as a conduit 
for the knowledge community’s insights. 
The content of the communication and its relation to the body of 
knowledge possessed by a knowledge community is distinctive in the 
professional speech context. So is the imposition of professional malpractice 
liability and its relation to the professional standard of care. This unique 
relationship with the knowledge community demands a thicker account of the 
communication. Thus, the analogy falls short if it is based solely on the 
structural “bounded speech institutions” model. It explains why the state may 
impose liability as a structural boundary, but it does not define the content of 
the boundedness. This makes Halberstam’s model conceptually useful, but 
ultimately incomplete. To establish a theoretical basis for evaluating 
professional speech, this model should be supplemented with the theory of 
knowledge communities. 
Post, in setting up the commercial speech-professional speech analogy, 
focuses on three distinctive features of commercial speech: first, the concern 
about the flow of information to the public; second, the value attached only to 
truthful, non-misleading information (and, consequently, the application of 
content- and viewpoint-based regulations); and third, the permissibility of 
disclosure requirements based on the emphasis on the public’s right to receive 
truthful and non-misleading information.151 These three features, in Post’s 
 
149. Id. at 832. 
150. Halberstam concedes as much, for at least some situations, pointing out that while “it is the 
relationship that defines the discourse within which both speakers and listeners have rights 
under the First Amendment,” id. at 851, the “deeper relationship” between, for example, a 
physician and patient may “lead, at least in some cases, to protection beyond that afforded to 
commercial speech,” id. at 838. The structural view also seems problematic on its own terms 
in defining the boundedness of commercial speech itself. See id. at 852 (“With regard to the 
regulation of commercial speech, the question of what is considered part of the bounded 
discourse is more difficult to answer, because we cannot rely on the relatively clear 
consideration of whether the speaker is reasonably understood by the interlocutors as 
applying considered judgment to the listener’s particular circumstances for the benefit of the 
listener. To the contrary, most commercial speech today occurs in the impersonal realm of 
mass communication.”). 
151. Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note 1, at 975. 
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assessment, closely track the concerns in the professional speech context. In 
contrast to speech as part of public discourse, the focus of commercial speech, 
like that of professional speech, is its informational value.152 The knowledge-
enhancing character of both types of speech provides the link to the democratic 
self-government values underlying the First Amendment.153  
However, Post offers two distinctions between commercial speech and 
professional speech, which complicates the analogy.154 The first concerns 
dissemination of commercial information to the public at large as opposed to 
the dissemination of professional information only to the client. In an age of 
sophisticated, highly personalized advertising, however, this characterization of 
the dissemination of commercial speech may no longer be descriptively 
accurate.155 The second distinction lies in the presupposed equality of the 
speaker and the listener in commercial speech and their relative inequality in 
professional speech. Of course, extensive psychological research on the part of 
advertisers makes the speaker and the listener unequal in the commercial 
speech context as well. Product placement, subconscious messaging, and the 
like give a distinct advantage to commercial speakers over their audiences. The 
Court may have originally had it right in assuming the vulnerability of 
consumers, though not because the consumer “lacks sophistication,”156 but 
because the advertiser has an overabundance of it.157 Thus, Post rightly 
cautions against pushing the analogy.158  
The commercial speech analogy, then, while initially appealing, falls short. 
It lacks descriptive accuracy and analytical force on numerous counts. A 
preferable approach, therefore, considers the theoretical justifications for 
protecting professional speech on its own merits. 
 
152. POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 51, at 41; Post, Commercial Speech, supra note 136, at 4 
(“Commercial speech . . . consists of communication about commercial matters that conveys 
information necessary for public decision making, but that does not itself form part of 
public discourse.”); Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note 1, at 974-75. 
153. See infra Section II.C. 
154. POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 51, at 46-47. 
155. See generally Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014). 
156. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 200 (1982) (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 
383 (1977)). 
157. Cf. Post, Commercial Speech, supra note 136, at 41 (speaking of the inability of the Court “to 
transcend older images of consumers as vulnerable and reliant, images that underlay the 
Court’s earlier refusal to extend any First Amendment protection to commercial speech”).  
158. Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note 1, at 980 (“The analogy to commercial speech 
should not be pressed too far. Commercial speech has its own tormented doctrinal history, 
with far too many confusions and imprecisions. It would be disheartening to see these 






i i .  theorizing professional speech 
Conceptualizing the learned professions as knowledge communities allows 
us to rethink professional speech in light of the traditional theoretical 
justifications for First Amendment protection. Professional speech as a 
distinctive form of speech is worthy of First Amendment protection. Situating 
professional speech within the standard theoretical accounts illustrates the 
unique ways in which this type of speech intersects with the underlying 
interests. While some scholars have emphasized the democratic self-
government justification for protecting professional speech,159 this Part 
suggests that other First Amendment theories, based on autonomy interests 
and the marketplace of ideas, also justify—in a way distinct from other speech 
contexts—First Amendment protection for professional speech. Without taking 
a position on which of these traditional theories best justifies First Amendment 
protection,160 and without ascribing any particular ranking to them,161 I 
suggest that professional speech interests sound in all standard theories.  
With respect to autonomy interests, the role of the professions as 
knowledge communities reframes the importance of professional autonomy. 
Although the emphasis is traditionally on the listener when the informational 
value of the communication is at issue, the speaker’s autonomy interests are 
implicated as well. Likewise, the knowledge community idea reframes the 
application of the marketplace theory. The individual professional, under this 
view, is closely connected to the marketplace of ideas that may be found within 
the discourse of the profession. Finally, with respect to democratic self-
government, the knowledge community concept influences the application of 
that theory of First Amendment protection for speech. Its effect can be seen in 
two directions. First, it explains how the individual client can benefit from 
professional advice directly and how the knowledge basis of the entire 
community can be enhanced by the individual professional’s communication of 
the knowledge community’s insights to one client. Second, by providing a 
close link between the individual professional and the knowledge community, 
 
159. Id. at 974 (suggesting that “the single most useful theory of First Amendment value is the 
concept of democratic self-governance”). Other commentators have followed Post in this 
assessment. See, e.g., Knake, supra note 25, at 674-75 (dismissing marketplace and autonomy 
justifications). 
160. Cf. Greenawalt, supra note 57, at 119-20 (suggesting that there is not one exclusive approach 
to justifying First Amendment protection). 
161. But see Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 
CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2373 (2000) [hereinafter Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine] 
(suggesting a “lexical priority” among First Amendment theories that places the 
participatory democracy theory at the top). 
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it brings together the individual focus of those who favor a participatory 
perspective of democratic self-government with those who would focus on the 
role of the collective.162  
A. Autonomy Interests 
The autonomy interests implicated by professional speech are somewhat 
distinct from other speech contexts.163 I will call “decisional autonomy 
interests” the interests of the listener who needs the information to make an 
informed decision.164 Decisional autonomy in the professional speech context is 
very different from the commercial speech context. While commercial speech 
targets the autonomy of the listener to make commercial choices—thereby 
contributing to the ability to make independent decisions—the target of 
professional speech is much more closely connected to the self, at times 
concerning the physical or psychological integrity of the listener’s own person. 
Moreover, the speaker pays for the speech in the commercial speech context 
(though, of course, the goal of commercial speech is often to persuade the 
consumer to buy a product or service) whereas it is the listener who pays for the 
speech in the professional speech context, indicating that the economic 
interests do not align. In professional speech, by contrast with commercial 
speech, payment for services is secondary to the knowledge-based nature of the 
service provided.165  
The other autonomy interests are those of the speakers, which I will call 
“professional autonomy interests.” The qualifier “professional” signals that it is 
 
162. See id. at 2368-69 (distinguishing “Meiklejohnian and participatory perspectives”). 
According to Post, “the Meiklejohnian approach interprets the First Amendment primarily 
as a shield against the ‘mutilation of the thinking process of the community,’ whereas the 
participatory approach understands the First Amendment instead as safeguarding the ability 
of individual citizens to participate in the formation of public opinion.” Id. at 2368 (citation 
omitted).  
163. See generally C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. 
REV. 964 (1978) (describing individuals’ autonomy interests as a theoretical justification for 
unrestricted speech); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 
COLUM. L. REV. 334 (1991) (arguing for the persuasion principle in freedom of expression). 
164. The Court’s failure to consider the patient’s interest in receiving information has been 
criticized in the reproductive rights context. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 16, at 219-20. 
165. Cf. Halberstam, supra note 1, at 838 (discussing the distinct interests at stake in the 
commercial and professional speech contexts); Knake, supra note 25, at 690 (recounting that 
payment may not be decisive in determining the interests at stake in professional speech 
contexts). This is true in commercial speech cases as well. See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976) (stating that “speech does not 






not so much the autonomy interest to freely express one’s personal opinions—
as is the case in free speech theory concerning public discourse—but rather to 
communicate insights of the knowledge community as a member of the 
profession. 
1. Decisional Autonomy Interests 
The professional relationship is typically characterized by an asymmetry of 
knowledge. Clients seek professionals’ advice precisely because of this 
asymmetry. “Clients are presumed to be dependent upon professional 
judgment and unable themselves independently to evaluate its quality.”166 This 
is not unique to the learned professions. As Kathleen Sullivan has pointed out, 
“Lawyers know far more about law than their clients, but information 
asymmetry creates moral hazards (such as the incentive to lie about the gravity 
of a problem) for auto mechanics as well.”167 These hazards are exacerbated 
when the client’s personal health or freedom or significant financial interests 
are at stake. Thus, “the government may properly try to shield the client from 
the professional’s incompetence or abuse of trust.”168 
The listener’s interests are only served if the professional communicates 
information that is accurate (under the knowledge community’s current 
assessment), reliable, and personally tailored to the specific situation of the 
listener. The client’s agency requires that the ultimate decision rest with her. 
The nature of the professional-client relationship gives rise to fiduciary 
duties.169 To bridge the knowledge gap, and to ensure the protection of the 
client’s decisional autonomy interests, the professional has to communicate all 
information necessary to make an informed decision to the client.  
Thus, the interest in full disclosure is linked to the autonomy interests of 
those seeking the advice of professionals. To the extent that this is facilitated by 
an informed consent requirement, as in the medical context, the potential for 
corruption of the information by outside interference is particularly 
troublesome. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his opinion in Casey, 
“Decisional autonomy must limit the State’s power to inject into a woman’s 
 
166. POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 51, at 47; see also, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (“The average patient has little or no understanding of the medical arts, 
and ordinarily has only his physician to whom he can look for enlightenment with which to 
reach an intelligent decision.”).  
167. Sullivan, supra note 68, at 580. 
168. Volokh, supra note 5, at 1344. 
169. See Halberstam, supra note 1, at 845; Keighley, supra note 61, at 2374. 
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most personal deliberations its own views of what is best.”170 But while this 
concern is perhaps most obvious in cases involving bodily integrity,171 other 
forms of professional advice should be equally uncorrupted for the same 
reason. Concerns regarding the agency of the listener obtain in all professional 
speech contexts. 
2. Professional Autonomy Interests 
To the extent autonomy interests matter in professional speech, the focus 
tends to be on the listener’s interests.172 But the speaker’s autonomy interests 
are also at stake. Some commentators fall back solely on the professional’s 
personal autonomy interests.173 Professionals as individuals of course have a 
First Amendment right to speak their own mind in public discourse, perhaps 
even challenging the knowledge community’s insights.174 But this is not a 
primary concern in the professional speech context. Quite to the contrary, there 
is an expectation within the professional-client relationship that the 
professional does not challenge the knowledge community’s insights in 
dispensing professional advice.175 
The professional not only speaks for herself, but also as a member of a 
learned profession—that is, the knowledge community. And that community 
has an interest of its own. Only if the community remains autonomous can it 
develop and refine the specialized knowledge that is its essence and the source 
of its social value. The professional speaker has a unique autonomy interest in 
communicating her message according to the standards of the profession to 
 
170. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 916 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
171. It is also arguably recognized—at least implicitly—as a matter of existing doctrine. “The 
Rust majority’s recognition, at least in principle, of the protected status of physician-patient 
communications, comports with the Court’s judgment elsewhere in the legal and medical 
contexts that professionals play a special role in assisting individuals in the exercise of 
personal autonomy in the vindication of basic rights.” Halberstam, supra note 1, at 775. 
172. See, e.g., Keighley, supra note 61, at 2405. But see Halberstam, supra note 1, at 844 (“As in the 
case of commercial speech, the focus on the listener in professional speech would again be, 
strictly speaking, misplaced, because a professional’s interest in communicating to a client 
should be constitutionally relevant.”). 
173. Keighley, supra note 61, at 2373 (“While physicians may have more limited autonomy 
interests when engaging in the practice of medicine, this does not mean that they surrender 
all of their ordinary First Amendment rights against compelled ideological speech. 
Physicians retain the core First Amendment right of ordinary citizens to refuse to be the 
mouthpiece for the state’s ideological advocacy.” (emphasis added)). 
174. See supra Section I.A.2. 






which she belongs, precisely in order to uphold the integrity of its knowledge 
community. Physicians, for instance, should not be compelled to speak in a 
way that undermines their profession’s scientific insights.  
This goes beyond the structural interest in protecting the “bounded speech 
institutions.”176 It also concerns the content of the communication. While some 
commentators assert that the professional’s autonomy interests guard against 
compelled speech “on matters of religion, politics, and values,”177 the 
professional autonomy interests reach much further. Corrupting the content of 
a communication to a client within the professional-client relationship 
fundamentally concerns the professional autonomy interests of the 
professional. This is an interest that goes to the identity of the professional as a 
member of a profession,178 rather than the professional’s individual autonomy 
interest, which is entirely unrelated to her professional role. Conceptualizing 
the professional as a member of a knowledge community brings the autonomy 
interest in articulating the uncorrupted insights of the knowledge community 
into focus. 
B. Marketplace Interests 
In the realm of professional speech, the classic Holmesian notion of a “free 
trade in ideas”179 would seem to have little purchase.180 While “the best test of 
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market,”181 the professional does not seek to subject her professional opinion to 
this test when speaking within the confines of the professional-client 
 
176. See supra notes 137-147 and accompanying text; cf. Halberstam, supra note 1, at 848 (“The 
First Amendment protects not the individual listener’s subjective desire for information, but 
the practice of the profession.”); id. at 867 (“The First Amendment protects the doctor-
patient dialogue as an important forum for the exercise of individual autonomy through the 
communication of knowledge that is generally free from government control. At the same 
time, however, the First Amendment allows for state regulation of the physician’s 
statements in order to ensure the integrity of the communicative institution.”). 
177. Keighley, supra note 61, at 2376. 
178. Cf. Knake, supra note 25, at 678 (noting that in the narrower context of attorney speech, 
“[a]n attorney’s identity as a member of the legal profession also holds First Amendment 
significance”). 
179. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
180. Cf. POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 51, at xii (“Contemporary technical expertise is created by 
practices that demand both critical freedom to inquire and affirmative disciplinary virtues of 
methodological care . . . . The maintenance of these virtues quite contradicts the egalitarian 
tolerance that defines the marketplace of ideas paradigm of the First Amendment.”). 
181. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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relationship.182 The pragmatic dimension of the market metaphor does not 
apply: experience and truth in the current assessment of the knowledge 
community are quite obviously located with the professional, making it 
inapposite “to capture the idea that truth must be experimentally determined 
from the properties of experience itself.”183 Indeed, the state may ensure that 
clients seeking professional advice are not harmed by “false” ideas by way of 
imposing professional malpractice liability.184 Thus, the classic marketplace 
paradigm is inapplicable to professional speech within the professional-client 
relationship.  
Nonetheless, there is another facet to the idea of the marketplace theory as 
applied to professional speech.185 Although scholars have observed that 
professional speech is distinct from other speech, “which generally treats the 
truth as just ‘another opinion,’”186 the details remain underexplored. As Paul 
Horwitz has put it, in the professional speech context, “expertise based on a 
body of specialized knowledge is the very basis of the value and legitimacy of 
the speech.”187 It is here that the considerations underlying professional speech 
intersect with those underlying scientific and academic speech.188  
 
182. See, e.g., Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine, supra note 161, at 2366 (“It makes no sense, 
for example, to locate a ‘truth-seeking function’ in the speech between lawyers or doctors 
and their clients . . . .”). 
183. Id. at 2360. 
184. Id. at 2364. See infra Part III. 
185. The issues addressed here are, however, discussed in the First Amendment literature 
concerned with scientific and academic speech. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 57, at 136 
(“There is also wide agreement that advancement in understanding among persons capable 
of assessing scientific claims is promoted by freedom of communication within the scientific 
community, that government intervention to suppress some scientific ideas in favor of 
others would not promote scientific truth.”); Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine, supra 
note 161, at 2365 (“The social practices necessary for a marketplace of ideas to serve a ‘truth-
seeking function’ are perhaps most explicitly embodied in the culture of scholarship 
inculcated in universities and professional academic disciplines.”). Indeed, some suggest 
that the marketplace metaphor itself originally was influenced by Justice Holmes’s readings 
on “the method of science.” See Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine, supra note 161, at 2365 
& n.43 (“It is likely that Holmes was exposed to [CHARLES S. PEIRCE, The Fixation of Belief, 
in VALUES IN A UNIVERSE OF CHANCE 91, 110-11 (Philip P. Wiener ed., 1958)] while he was a 
member of the Metaphysical Club.”). 
186. HORWITZ, supra note 13, at 248 (quoting MICHAEL WALZER, THINKING POLITICALLY: ESSAYS 
IN POLITICAL THEORY 19 (2007)); see United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (striking 
down the Stolen Valor Act). 
187. HORWITZ, supra note 13, at 248; see also POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 51, at 8 (“We rely on 
expert ‘knowledge’ precisely because it has been vetted and reviewed by those whose 
judgment we have reason to trust. All living disciplines are institutional systems for the 
production of such ‘knowledge.’”). 






There exists a marketplace of ideas internal to each profession. The issue 
here is the formation of professional knowledge (rather than, as we saw with 
the autonomy justification, its dissemination). Within the discourse of the 
profession, the acceptance of professional insights will depend on the rules 
established by the profession. Scientific insights, for example, will be subjected 
to peer review and hypotheses will be subjected to the test of falsification.189 
These internal processes serve a purpose akin to that of the Holmesian 
marketplace of ideas. But, to the extent that such a marketplace of ideas exists 
as what we might call an epistemic marketplace, and that professional 
standards are generated by testing insights on that marketplace, 
nonprofessionals do not participate in it. The current state of the art provides 
the foundation of the professional’s advice (though current debates within the 
field may influence what counts as a defensible professional position).190 As 
knowledge communities, then, the professions should be awarded deference. 
As Post notes, the marketplace theory “requires the protection only of 
speech that communicates ideas and that is embedded in the kinds of social 
practices that produce truth.”191 It is the professional’s connection to the 
knowledge community that makes the marketplace theory relevant. If the 
account offered here is an accurate portrayal of the formation of professional 
knowledge within the knowledge community, the step from the community to 
the individual professional follows straightforwardly. In reciprocal fashion, the 
individual professional’s interest lies in preserving the integrity of the 
knowledge community’s insights, just as the knowledge community’s interest 
lies in having the individual professional communicate its insights correctly. 
While this complements the professional autonomy interests, as just 
described,192 the focus of this theory is on preserving the integrity of the search 
for truth—that is, the formation of professional knowledge—within the 
discourse of the knowledge community.  
 
189. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). For similar 
observations from the legal academy, see POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 51, at 8 
(“Scholarship requires not only a commitment to vigorous debate and critical freedom, but 
also and equally a commitment to enforcing standards of judgment and critical rigor.”). 
190. Cf. POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 51, at 67 (“In contrast to the marketplace of ideas, 
therefore, academic freedom protects scholarly speech only when it complies with 
‘professional norms.’”). In the context of professional liability, the tort regime accounts for 
the range of valid opinions with “multiple schools of thought” or “respectable minority” 
rules. See infra Section III.B. 
191. Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine, supra note 161, at 2366 (contending further that 
“[e]xactly where the theory could appropriately be applied . . . would be highly debatable” 
and, in his assessment, “the scope of its application would be quite narrow”). 
192. See supra Section II.A. 
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C. Democratic Self-Government Interests 
Focusing on the informational value of professional speech, the democratic 
self-government theory would find such speech worthy of First Amendment 
protection because it “cognitively empowers public opinion” and thus “serves 
the value of democratic competence.”193 (This idea is also reflected in the 
commercial speech analogy, as discussed earlier.)194 But the democratic self-
government value of professional speech might be greater still. Professionals 
supply information to clients that not only concerns the clients’ own lives but 
may also “require collective action to change rights and responsibilities in 
society.”195 For example, courts196 and scholars197 have emphasized the role of 
lawyers in democratic self-government. Other professionals, too, may 
contribute to expanding the knowledge base upon which citizens can make 
informed decisions.  
Yet the democratic self-government theory builds on some debatable 
assumptions. It may seem questionable whether a client or patient would, in 
fact, be primarily concerned with the policy implications of the professional 
advice she receives. Is the lawyer’s client really thinking about broad questions 
of access to justice? Is the physician’s patient really thinking about health 
policy? Or are both primarily concerned with having their individual problems 
solved? While these questions are sometimes acknowledged in the literature, 
the abstract possibility of taking political action based on the individualized 
professional advice received appears sufficient to justify applying the theory to 
professional speech.198 
Within the theory of democratic self-government, two distinct strands 
arguably stand in opposition to each other: one emphasizes the “safeguarding 
of collective processes”; the other emphasizes individual rights.199 
 
193. POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 51, at 40-41 (making this observation with respect to 
commercial speech). 
194. See supra Section I.C. 
195. Halberstam, supra note 1, at 812. 
196. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 361-62 (1977) (“[L]awyers are essential to 
the primary governmental function of administering justice, and have historically been 
‘officers of the courts.’” (quoting Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975))).  
197. Halberstam, supra note 1, at 812 (“Indeed some professionals, such as attorneys, take an 
active part in assisting in the vindication of existing legal and constitutional rights in courts 
and other government fora.”). 
198. See, e.g., id. at 813; Keighley, supra note 61, at 2371-72; Knake, supra note 25, at 676. 
199. Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine, supra note 161, at 2367 (discussing the Meiklejohnian 
theory and the participatory self-government theory). Post argues that the Meiklejohnian 







Conceptualizing individual professionals as part of the larger knowledge 
community—as conduits communicating the knowledge community’s 
insights, and thus as trustees for the speech of others—reconciles the two 
democratic self-government approaches in the professional speech context. The 
close connection between the individual professional and the knowledge 
community links the individual role of the professional and the collective role 




As this Part has demonstrated, the traditional theoretical justifications for 
First Amendment protection apply to professional speech in a unique way. All 
standard theories suggest that professional speech deserves robust First 
Amendment protection. 
i i i .  l imiting professional speech 
This Part considers the appropriate limits on professional speech. The state 
may regulate the professions, but “[b]eing a member of a regulated profession 
does not . . . result in a surrender of First Amendment rights.”200 And as 
Eugene Volokh has noted, “it’s far from clear that the government should be 
completely free to regulate professionals’ speech to their clients.”201 Therefore, 
it is worth unpacking what state regulation of the professions means and 
determining when such regulation directly and impermissibly affects 
professional speech. 
Section III.A briefly considers the history of regulating the learned 
professions. Initially self-regulating, the professions developed a set of norms 
that solidified over time. State involvement in professional regulation followed. 
Turning to three typical kinds of regulations—namely concerning advertising, 
access to the profession, and unauthorized practice—I will demonstrate that 
professional speech concerns do not ordinarily arise in these contexts. These 
types of regulations do not generally concern the body of professional 
knowledge that forms the repository for individual professionals’ advice to 
clients and its subsequent communication. Thus, while these types of 
 
Id. at 2369. Nonetheless, as Post points out, there are certain contexts—such as federal 
regulation of the broadcast media—that build on the Meiklejohnian theory. There, the 
specific role of the “broadcast licensees as trustees for the speech of others” allowed an 
approach that Post deems “compatible with the participatory approach.” Id. at 2370.  
200. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 637 (9th Cir. 2002). 
201. Volokh, supra note 5, at 1344. 
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regulations may have far-reaching consequences, they do not implicate 
professional speech interests as defined here.202 This makes the importance of 
distinguishing between regulation of the profession and regulation of 
professional speech palpable.  
Section III.B then turns to the interplay between the First Amendment and 
tort liability for professional malpractice. The tort regime in this context 
functions as a form of regulation.203 The imposition of malpractice liability has 
never been found to offend the First Amendment. But the conventional answer 
as to why that is so is unsatisfactory. Stated in an oversimplified way, the 
argument is that the state may regulate the professions, and the permissibility 
of regulation is incompatible with the First Amendment.204  
There is an expansive body of literature on professional malpractice law—
its effects on professionals and clients, larger policy implications, and possible 
need for reform. All of this is well beyond the scope of this discussion. My 
point here is relatively narrow and conceptual. Professionals may be held liable 
for “unprofessional” speech—that is, speech within the professional-client 
 
202. There are other forms of regulation that may apply to the speech of professionals. Perhaps 
the most apparent, in the legal realm, are rules of procedure. See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar of 
Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991) (“It is unquestionable that in the courtroom itself, during a 
judicial proceeding, whatever right to ‘free speech’ an attorney has is extremely 
circumscribed.”); see also Frederick Schauer, The Speech of Law and the Law of Speech, 49 
ARK. L. REV. 687 (1997); Sullivan, supra note 68, at 569 (“Rules of evidence and procedure, 
bans on revealing grand jury testimony, page limits in briefs, and sanctions for frivolous 
pleadings, to name a few, are examples of speech limitations widely accepted as functional 
necessities in the administration of justice . . . .”); Wendel, supra note 25, at 348, 381-82. 
Agreeing to the many restrictions on attorney speech is simply accepted and explained as “a 
condition of being admitted into the bar.” Tarkington, supra note 25, at 31. These 
restrictions limit a wide swath of what should be protected professional speech. Perhaps a 
better explanation is that these kinds of rules seem closely related to the types of time, place, 
and manner restrictions permissible in public discourse as well. But these limits on speech 
do not give rise to professional speech concerns in the strict sense. The speech so 
constrained does not communicate the knowledge community’s insights, within the 
professional-client relationship, for the purpose of providing professional advice. Hence 
they fall outside the scope of this discussion. 
203. See Nathan B. Oman & Jason M. Solomon, The Supreme Court’s Theory of Private Law, 62 
DUKE L.J. 1109, 1118 (2013) (“[V]irtually all commentators assume that private law is a form 
of public regulation.”). See generally REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION (W. Kip Viscusi 
ed., 2002). 
204. See, e.g., King I, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 319 (“[T]here is a more fundamental problem with [the 
argument that professional counseling is speech], because taken to its logical end, it would 
mean that any regulation of professional counseling necessarily implicates fundamental First 
Amendment free speech rights, and therefore would need to withstand heightened scrutiny 
to be permissible. Such a result runs counter to the longstanding principle that a state 
generally may enact laws rationally regulating professionals, including those providing 






relationship, for the purpose of providing professional advice, that fails 
accurately to communicate the knowledge community’s insights.  
The liability scheme thus draws on the same body of professional 
knowledge that I have argued deserves First Amendment protection. If liability 
is appropriately allocated against this benchmark, the liability scheme 
normatively supports—rather than undermines—protection of professional 
speech. In order to achieve fair results under this scheme, professionals may be 
held liable only under a standard that is exclusively determined by the 
profession. It follows that the knowledge community’s insights and their 
communication to the client by the individual professional must remain 
uncorrupted.  
A. Regulation of the Professions 
State regulation of the professions is not incompatible with protecting 
professional speech. Maintaining a focus on the role of knowledge 
communities, this section outlines the extent of permissible regulation of the 
professions in light of its history. The historical perspective illuminates the 
nexus between licensing, state power, and regulation of professions and 
professionals. There is a long history of self-regulation of knowledge 
communities.205 Traditionally, certain professions themselves created barriers 
to entry into the profession, policed membership, and established a distinct 
professional “culture.” This culture then solidified into a set of professional 
norms, enforced by professional bodies overseeing the standards of entry and 
membership. The state assumed some of these functions over time, either 
taking on the role of regulator directly or through its interaction with 
professional associations.206 Licensing requirements for law and medicine in 
the United States likely date back to the founding period,207 although there was 
 
205. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶¶ 10-11 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). See generally 
BRUNDAGE, supra note 35; KRAUSE, supra note 35; William T. Gallagher, Ideologies of 
Professionalism and the Politics of Self-Regulation in the California State Bar, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 
485 (1995); Jonathan Rose, The Legal Profession in Medieval England: A History of Regulation, 
48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1 (1998).  
206. See, e.g., Mehlman, supra note 31, at 1172-75 (describing efforts of the American Medical 
Association to lobby state legislatures regarding licensing laws in the mid-nineteenth 
century and its later involvement in setting licensing standards); David B. Wilkins, Who 
Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992). 
207. Douglas A. Wallace, Occupational Licensing and Certification: Remedies for Denial, 14 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 46, 46 n.1 (1972) (“The licensing of lawyers and doctors in this country began 
in the latter part of the eighteenth century and the first years of the nineteenth.”). 
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a noticeable retreat from licensing in the Jacksonian era.208 The relationship 
between the regulated professions and the regulating state generally  
remained one of collaboration; in the case of licensing, for instance, state  
involvement was overwhelmingly welcomed—even “eagerly sought”209—by 
the professions.210  
There are now numerous ways in which the state regulates the professions. 
For example, “[t]he medical and legal professions . . . have long been subject to 
licensing and supervision by the State ‘for the protection of society,’ and the 
Court has indicated that such regulations would be upheld if they ‘have a 
rational connection with the applicant’s fitness or capacity to practice’ the 
profession.”211 I will consider briefly three prototypical areas of state regulation 
of the professions: advertising, access to the profession, and unauthorized 
practice. None of them, as the following discussion demonstrates, directly 
address the types of professional speech issues with which I am concerned. 
Therefore, they do not constitute “limits on professional speech” in the strict 
sense of the term. The takeaway is simple, but important: protecting 
professional speech does not make state regulation of the professions 
impossible. 
One prominent context in which professional regulation as a matter of free 
speech has been litigated in the past has been advertising.212 In a series of cases, 
the Supreme Court has dealt with questions of advertising and solicitation 
regulations for professional services, such as legal services,213 accounting 
 
208. Mehlman, supra note 31, at 1171-72. 
209. Gellhorn, supra note 31, at 11. 
210. Mehlman, supra note 31, at 1172-73. 
211. Halberstam, supra note 1, at 834 (first quoting Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 
(1889); then quoting Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957)); see also King 
II, 767 F.3d at 229 (“The authority of the States to regulate the practice of certain professions 
is deeply rooted in our nation’s jurisprudence. Over 100 years ago, the Supreme Court 
deemed it ‘too well settled to require discussion’ that ‘the police power of the states extends 
to the regulation of certain trades and callings, particularly those which closely concern the 
public health.’” (quoting Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910) and citing Dent v. 
West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889))). 
212. See Chemerinsky, supra note 120, at 572-76; Judith L. Maute, Scrutinizing Lawyer Advertising 
and Solicitation Rules under Commercial Speech and Antitrust Doctrine, 13 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 487 (1986); Ronald D. Rotunda, Lawyer Advertising and the Philosophical Origins of the 
Commercial Speech Doctrine, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 91 (2002); Sullivan, supra note 68, at 574-
80.  
213. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (holding that a ban on lawyer direct 
mailing to victims for thirty days after an accident or disaster was permissible); Peel v. Att’y 
Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990) (holding that a ban on advertising 
lawyer specialist certification was unconstitutional); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466 







services,214 and dental215 or medical services.216 The gist of these decisions is 
that professional advertising is largely—though not uniformly217—protected as 
a matter of commercial speech.218 Advertising for professional services is 
commercial speech, and “[c]onstitutional protection for attorney advertising, 
and for commercial speech generally, is of recent vintage.”219 
Historically, professional ethics prohibited advertising, and courts 
consistently deferred to professional ethics in upholding advertising 
restrictions. As Walter Gellhorn noted in the mid-1970s, “[t]he unethicality of 
advertising has long been an article of faith among professionals, and the 
courts have generally shared this faith.”220 This deference to professional 
 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (holding that a ban on print ads 
targeting victims was permissible); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) 
(holding that the regulation of lawyer in-person solicitation was permissible); Bates v. State 
Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding that the prohibition of newspaper ads for routine 
legal services was unconstitutional).  
214. Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 138-39 (1994) (holding that a 
censure for using the truthful designations “CPA” and “CFP” was unconstitutional); 
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 763 (1993) (holding that a ban on in-person solicitation by 
the CPA was unconstitutional). 
215. Semler v. Ore. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 294 U.S. 608, 613 (1935) (holding that a statute 
regulating certain forms of advertising by dentists was permissible). 
216. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 829 (1975) (holding that the application of a statute 
forbidding “encourag[ing] or promot[ing]” an abortion to medical advertising was 
unconstitutional). 
217. See Sullivan, supra note 68, at 580-84 (noting the disparate treatment of lawyer 
advertising—where “the Court gives greater deference to state interests” in upholding 
regulations—from that of other professionals). Sullivan criticizes this distinction between 
lawyers and other professionals, finding it “hardly clear that broad assumptions about 
public regard for the legal profession—especially if only weakly empirically demonstrated—
ought to provide the basis for limiting lawyer promotional practices that cannot be shown to 
cause clients demonstrable material harm.” Id. at 588. Instead, she concludes, “[t]he 
question . . . is whether lawyer-specific speech regulations are really needed . . . or whether 
problems of fraud, misrepresentation, and overreaching may be adequately controlled by 
generally applicable background consumer protection laws . . . .” Id.  
218. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 120, at 575. 
219. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 622 (1995). 
220. Gellhorn, supra note 31, at 21 n.53. Gellhorn further points out that not until 1976 did the 
ABA permit “a lawyer . . . to indicate ‘in dignified form’ in professional announcements and 
in the yellow pages of telephone directories his preferred areas of practice and his 
educational background.” Id. at 21. See also Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of 
Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702, 712-16 (1977) (discussing the ABA House of 
Delegates 1976 amendment permitting this type of advertising). Morgan noted in response 
to the 1976 amendment to the ABA rules on lawyer advertising that the changes “make 
information more accessible than before, but they perpetuate many barriers to 
information—barriers which are of no benefit to anyone but attorneys.” Id. at 716. 
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norms was long-standing. Chief Justice Hughes, in a 1935 case involving 
dentists’ advertising, stated: “What is generally called the ‘ethics’ of the 
profession is but the consensus of expert opinion as to the necessity of such 
standards.”221 
But, as Kathleen Sullivan observed, “[t]he decisions upholding professional 
ethics regulations against First Amendment challenges are difficult to square 
with the Court’s other advertising decisions.”222 And Chief Justice Hughes’s 
statement—that professional ethics are part of the profession’s expert 
opinion—goes too far. No specialized knowledge is needed for the question of 
whether advertising for professional services is appropriate; it is a purely 
economic question. As a matter of institutional competence, courts can rely on 
their own expertise in economic matters.223  
This helps us understand why courts have turned away from their earlier 
deference to professional norms prohibiting advertising and why, in embracing 
commercial speech protection for advertising against professionals’ wishes, 
they have nevertheless begun to regulate professional speech. On matters of 
regulation that do not directly concern the specialized knowledge of knowledge 
communities that constitutes the basis for professional advice, professional 
speech protection should not require broad deference to the profession. The 
professional advertising her services is not speaking as part of the knowledge 
community to transmit advice to a client. She speaks only as a private 
commercial actor. Professional advertising, like commercial advertising, thus is 
properly reviewed as a matter of commercial speech.224 
Beyond advertising, the state may determine educational and other fitness 
standards for the profession. Imposing limits on access to a profession by 
establishing educational standards or licensing and certification requirements 
does not affect professional speech directly. To be sure, there is a long-
recognized tension between restricting access to ensure competent advice and 
restricting access in order to limit competition.225 And there certainly is 
potential for abuse.226 “On the one side is the need to preserve the integrity of 
 
221. Semler v. Ore. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 294 U.S. 608, 612 (1935). 
222. Sullivan, supra note 68, at 578.  
223. Cf. Stein, supra note 22, at 1245 (discussing in the medical malpractice context the 
competence of courts and their impartiality as compared to the professions in decisions 
concerning economic considerations and social welfare). 
224. This is true conceptually irrespective of the Court’s doctrinal approach to commercial 
speech, which may well be flawed. See supra notes 136-140 and accompanying text.  
225. See, e.g., Gellhorn, supra note 31. 
226. See, e.g., id. at 14-15 (discussing citizenship and residency requirements); id. at 18 






professional knowledge; on the other side is the fact that professional 
knowledge sometimes reflects sociological prerogatives of class and power that 
should be disciplined by democratic political purposes.”227 Indeed, some have 
pointed out that “there is a large body of historical, economic, and sociological 
literature that suggests that the primary motivation for professional licensing 
laws is economic self-interest.”228 Without taking a position on the extent of 
self-interest in professional licensing, it seems relatively unproblematic from a 
First Amendment perspective to permit some form of access control.229 
Sometimes, First Amendment problems can arise if access to the profession 
is denied because of the content of an applicant’s speech. One prominent 
example is the case of George Anastaplo, whose bar application was denied by 
the Illinois Bar due to his refusal to answer questions regarding his views on 
the Communist party.230 (He famously argued his own case before the 
Supreme Court, lost in a 5-4 decision, and became a law professor instead.)231 
But the types of First Amendment problems arising here are different from 
those in the professional speech context. Here, it is not the knowledge 
community’s specialized knowledge that the state interferes with but rather the 
individual professional’s opinion.232 Thus, an appropriate shield against such 
restrictions may be found in the professional’s individual First Amendment 
rights. 
Finally, unauthorized practice regulations raise issues similar to regulations 
concerning access to the profession. First Amendment challenges to 
unauthorized practice rules—complicated by definitional opacity233—have 
mainly centered on the question of whether individuals may disseminate 
certain “information” (as distinct from professional “advice”). Here, unlike in 
the professional speech context, however, regulation polices the formation of a 
professional-client relationship rather than the communication of professional 
advice within such a relationship. 
 
227. Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note 1, at 987. 
228. Robert Kry, The “Watchman for Truth”: Professional Licensing and the First Amendment, 23 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 885, 888 (2000). 
229. But see id. at 889 (asserting that “the license requirement arguably acts as a prior restraint on 
speech”). 
230. In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961). 
231. See id.; Storied Law Professor George Anastaplo Dies, HYDE PARK HERALD (Feb.  
19, 2014), http://hpherald.com/2014/02/19/storied-law-professor-george-anastaplo-dies 
[http://perma.cc/X2YT-MJ8F]. 
232. See supra notes 60-75 and accompanying text (distinguishing professional speech from 
private speech of the professional). 
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The state regulations just discussed establish the boundaries of 
professional-client discourse without directly affecting its content. Structurally, 
they define the speakers’ “social roles” within the “specific communicative 
relationship.”234 In this respect, Halberstam correctly observes that 
“government regulation is not invariably destructive of communicative 
interests, but may indeed foster the communicative relationship and assist in 
institutionalizing the bounded discourse.”235 In other words, “content-based 
government regulation may enhance, rather than compromise, the speech 
practice.”236 Yet, as already discussed, this structural understanding does not 
go far enough in determining the substance of the bounded discourse—the 
knowledge community’s insights provide this dimension.  
In sum, then, state regulation may limit access to the professions or what 
professionals may do in certain circumstances. The wishes of the professions in 
these respects may be laudable or not. But as long as state regulation remains 
disconnected from the knowledge that forms the basis of the professionals’ 
advice, it does not pose the type of First Amendment professional speech 
problems I am concerned with here. State regulation of the professions is far 
from unproblematic, but the problems that arise are not of the same kind as 
those directly concerning professional speech—that is, the communication of 
the knowledge community’s insights, within the professional-client 
relationship, for the purpose of providing professional advice. The mere fact 
that the state may regulate the professions therefore has little bearing on the 
question of First Amendment protection for professional speech.  
B. Tort Liability  
The tort regime directly addresses harms caused by “unprofessional” 
speech, that is, bad professional advice. Conventionally, the relationship 
between the First Amendment and professional malpractice liability—in this 
case, medical malpractice—is framed as follows: 
Medical activity that consists primarily of speech does not automatically 
deserve First Amendment protection. There are instances when speech 
essentially amounts to the practice of medicine and could be considered 
a regulated activity. For example, physician advice regarding the 
necessity or wisdom of a particular surgical procedure could give rise to 
 
234. Halberstam, supra note 1, at 869. 
235. Id. 






malpractice liability, which many would agree has few First 
Amendment implications even though the advice is itself speech.237 
But this common framing is not entirely accurate in light of the role the 
knowledge community plays. 
Juxtaposing professional speech protection and professional malpractice 
liability leads to conceptual inaccuracy. It is an exaggeration to assert that 
professional speech is not—and ought not be—protected because the 
professional is subject to tort liability for “unprofessional” speech. The contrast 
between permissible regulation and protection is not as stark as it is commonly 
portrayed—and the two are certainly not irreconcilable.238 In fact, as already 
indicated, they are complementary. Protection and liability are best 
conceptualized as two sides of the same coin, and the substantive content of 
both is determined by the insights of the knowledge community. 
1. Professional Malpractice 
It is correctly understood that “[m]alpractice law protects the vulnerability 
of clients by requiring professionals to maintain strict standards of expert 
knowledge.”239 But the imposition of liability for professional malpractice is 
not actually the same as regulation of the profession, or even a limit on 
professional speech in the strict sense of that term. Malpractice liability ensures 
that the professional’s speech accurately communicates the knowledge 
community’s insights within the professional-client relationship. On the flip 
side, “unprofessional” speech is unprotected.240  
Post explains the connection between malpractice liability and professional 
knowledge as follows:  
 
237. Wells, supra note 30, at 1739 n.83; see also Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note 1, at 
961 (“Professional medical speech is continuously regulated without seeming to run afoul of 
First Amendment constraints. Doctors are sanctioned for engaging in certain 
communicative acts and they are compelled to engage in others.”).  
238. Halberstam, supra note 1, at 868 (noting that “government regulation and First Amendment 
protection are not mutually exclusive concepts”).  
239. POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 51, at 47. 
240. Cf. Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine, supra note 161, at 2364 (“[C]ontent-based 
regulation of speech is routinely enforced without special constitutional scrutiny, as  
for example when lawyers or doctors are held liable in professional malpractice for  
the communication of irresponsible opinions.”); Volokh, supra note 5, at 1347 (“Some 
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[M]alpractice law outside of public discourse rigorously polices the 
authority of disciplinary knowledge. It underwrites the competence of 
experts. Doctors, dentists, lawyers, or architects who offer what 
authoritative professional standards would regard as incompetent 
advice to their clients face strict legal regulation. In such contexts, law 
stands as a surety for the disciplinary truth of expert pronouncements. 
By guaranteeing that clients can plan to rely on expert professional 
judgment, law endows such communication with the status of 
knowledge.241  
Post’s presentation is compelling. But it has some unstated premises. In 
particular, for his gloss to be correct, the knowledge community must decide 
for itself what “disciplinary truth” is, and any outside interference with their 
determination ought to be met with great skepticism. 
This is already implicit in the way malpractice liability works. The standard 
of care against which a given professional is judged to determine malpractice 
liability is whether she has exercised the profession according to the degree and 
skill of a well-qualified professional. A lawyer “must exercise the competence 
and diligence normally exercised by lawyers in similar circumstances.”242 
Likewise, “a doctor commits malpractice when he treats a patient in a way that 
deviates from the norms established by the medical profession.”243 It is thus the 
knowledge community that determines the standard of care. Moreover, only 
the knowledge community’s specific insights matter. Deference is thus 
awarded to the core knowledge, not to peripheral interests.244 This mirrors 
conceptually the First Amendment interests of the knowledge community and 
its members. 
There may be variations as to who constitutes the appropriate reference 
group (i.e. whether a national standard or a local standard is applied as the 
baseline).245 But the technical approach is generally the same: a professional 
 
241. POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 51, at 44-45. 
242. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
243. Stein, supra note 22, at 1209. 
244. Id. at 1243 (“Rules that the profession is authorized to make need to utilize medical 
knowledge to diagnose and cure patients. Those rules consequently must be based on 
medical reasons. Courts scrutinize those reasons for minimal plausibility to make sure that 
the profession’s rules are not blatantly unsafe to patients. Furthermore, the profession has 
no exclusive authority to base its rules of patient treatment upon reasons extraneous to 
medicine. Correspondingly, courts fully scrutinize the profession’s non-medical reasons and 
decisions.”). 
245. See, e.g., id. at 1210 (asserting that in the medical malpractice context, “the locality 







standard is juxtaposed against the individual professional’s activities.246 The 
imposition of liability does not encompass which specific advice may be given. 
It only asks whether the advice rendered is appropriate as a matter of 
professional care.247 As one commentator points out in the medical malpractice 
context, “the medical profession single-handedly determines the entries into 
treatment-related liability for malpractice.”248  
The extent of liability under the common law should be congruent with the 
scope of protection of the knowledge community’s discourse under the First 
Amendment. Only if liability and protection are coextensive can this liability 
mechanism yield fair results. If liability is properly measured against the 
standard of care determined by the profession, the knowledge community’s 
formation of this standard should remain uncorrupted and its application 
within the professional-client relationship should receive robust First 
Amendment protection. Post hinted at this mechanism in asserting that “we 
should expect to see First Amendment coverage triggered whenever 
government seeks . . . to disrupt the communication of accurate expert 
knowledge.”249  
2. Informed Consent 
Independent of the professional malpractice claim, a separate cause of 
action exists in the medical context based on the physician’s duty to inform the 
patient of relevant information relating to the treatment.250 There is a troubling 
history of paternalism in the medical profession that limited the amount of 
information shared with patients.251 But the last century has seen the 
 
note 31, at 1180-81 (discussing the emergence of the locality rule in medical malpractice and 
tracing its origin to the case Hathorn v. Raymond, 48 Vt. 557 (1876)). 
246. Stein, supra note 22, at 1239-40 (discussing medical malpractice). 
247. Id. at 1240-41 (“Courts and legislators do not know medicine and are consequently  
not competent to devise rules for medical diagnoses and treatments. . . . [Instead, they 
delegate] the rulemaking power to an institutionally competent rulemaker—the medical 
profession. . . . All jurisdictions across the United States require care providers to treat 
patients in accordance with the rules, protocols, and practices that have been devised by the 
medical profession.”).  
248. Id. at 1235. 
249. POST, DEMOCRACY, supra note 51, at 48. 
250. See generally Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899 (1994). 
251. Kathy Seward Northern, Procreative Torts: Enhancing the Common-Law Protection for 
Reproductive Autonomy, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 489, 509-10 (1998); Sonia M. Suter, The Politics 
of Information: Informed Consent in Abortion and End-of-Life Decision Making, 39 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 7, 12 (2013) (“Historically, physicians disclosed medical information only to persuade 
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recognition of patients’ autonomy interests and, as a result, significant changes 
in the doctor-patient relationship.252 “Autonomy soon became the driving 
principle used to resolve issues within medicine,”253 and, with it, “informed 
consent doctrine . . . driven in large part by a desire to combat the paternalism 
of medicine.”254 
The doctrinal origins of informed consent are often traced to a 1914 New 
York Court of Appeals decision authored by then-Judge Cardozo in which he 
stated: “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his own body . . . .”255 The real turn toward 
information, however, occurred in decisions from the 1970s. In Canterbury v. 
Spence, emblematic of the trend, the D.C. Circuit emphasized the need for 
information in self-determination.256 Accordingly, this shift was accompanied 
by a shift in the treatment of informed consent from sounding in battery to 
negligence.257  
There is continued debate over whether the current tort paradigm 
appropriately accounts for patients’ interests, or whether it continues to be too 
physician-centric.258 Courts have adopted a negligence approach to informed 
consent with “the principle of self-determination as the bedrock of modern 
informed consent doctrine.”259 But the variations that persist tend to value 
 
comfort. Indeed, deception in certain cases was not only acceptable, but sometimes 
considered necessary, to achieve those goals.”). 
252. Suter, supra note 251, at 12-13. 
253. Id. at 13. 
254. Id. at 15. 
255. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914); see also Suter, supra note 
251, at 11-17 (providing an overview of the doctrinal development of informed consent).  
256. See 464 F.2d 772, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
257. Suter, supra note 251, at 12. 
258. See Northern, supra note 251, at 510-11. Some also argue that the law overemphasizes patient 
autonomy. See Suter, supra note 251, at 16 (summarizing Schneider and Ben-Shahar’s 
objections); see also Stein, supra note 22, at 1227 (“Consider doctors’ provision of medical 
information to their patients. When a doctor keeps her patient uninformed about the 
available treatment options and the chosen treatment, she may—and often will—achieve a 
medically outstanding result: she may actually cure the patient completely. Whether the 
doctor achieves this result depends on what she knows, not on what the patient knows. The 
doctor’s failure to properly inform the patient about the treatment consequently damages 
the patient’s autonomy, but not her anatomy.”). 
259. Northern, supra note 251, at 511; see also Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960) 
(“Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-going self determination. It 
follows that each man is considered to be master of his own body, and he may, if he be of 
sound mind, expressly prohibit the performance of life-saving surgery, or other medical 







either the physician’s role or the patient’s autonomy more heavily.260 The two 
standards are the reasonable patient standard and the reasonable physician 
standard.261  
With respect to the First Amendment, then, “[a]ny physician who has been 
held liable for failure to obtain the informed consent of his patient could argue 
that the law impairs his autonomy because it requires him to speak in ways that 
he would prefer not to.”262 But here, too, the knowledge community’s 
standards limit the extent to which a physician could reasonably assert such a 
thing. This is because “the scope of disclosure is bound only by what is 
material to medical, as opposed to non-medical, interests. Cabining the 
information that physicians must disclose to that which is material to patients’ 
medical decisions avoids holding physicians accountable for matters that go 
beyond their expertise.”263 It is again the knowledge community’s professional 
knowledge that circumscribes the relevant information.264 And it is therefore 
necessary to keep the knowledge community’s information-formation process 
free from outside interference. Thus, imposing an informed consent 
requirement does not technically restrict the professional’s First Amendment 
rights if appropriate disclosure is considered a part of medically necessary 
information flow within the doctor-patient relationship. It is “unprofessional” 
speech—or “unprofessional” silence—that is punished. 
iv .  when professions speak 
When state regulation directly targets “unprofessional” speech as a matter 
of tort liability, as discussed in the previous Part, it ensures that information 
consistent with the knowledge community’s insights is conveyed. As long as 
state regulation reinforces the knowledge community’s insights—which it does 
when the knowledge community’s standard is applied as the liability 
benchmark—no significant problems arise. State regulation delineates the 
professional-client relationship. And state regulation appropriately tracks 
concerns related to safeguarding the flow of accurate information from the 
 
necessary but the law does not permit him to substitute his own judgment for that of the 
patient by any form of artifice or deception.”). 
260. See Northern, supra note 251, at 511-13 (contrasting the “medical paternalism” and “patient 
sovereignty” models in the medical decision-making process).  
261. See Suter, supra note 251, at 14. 
262. Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note 1, at 973. 
263. Suter, supra note 251, at 15 (footnote omitted). 
264. Cf. id. at 15-16 (“[T]he law is reluctant to intrude too much into the medical decision-
making process. Courts struggle to strike a balance that promotes autonomy while 
preserving some element of professional discretion for physicians.”).  
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knowledge community through the conduit of the individual professional.265 
As is well understood in the literature, “[g]overnment regulation and licensing 
of the profession as well as the legal enforcement of professional norms thus 
may assist in establishing the trust that patients can place in their 
physicians.”266 Indeed, “content-based government regulation may enhance, 
rather than compromise, the speech practice.”267 But this is only true as long as 
the regulation mirrors, and does not contradict, professional norms.  
When the state overreaches, significant problems arise. This is the 
fundamental problem with new types of state regulation we are seeing now. 
This Part demonstrates how the knowledge community-focused theory of 
professional speech works when applied to controversial First Amendment 
questions, returning to the cases referenced at the outset.268 Some of these 
regulations directly target and attempt to alter the core of the knowledge 
community’s insights and their communication from professional to client. 
The following three sections illustrate a spectrum of regulations that defer to 
the professional standard, (partially) codify the professional standard, or 
compel professionals to speak in a manner that contradicts the professional 
standards of the knowledge community (or prohibits the professional from 
communicating the knowledge community’s insights). These forms of 
regulatory interaction between legislatures and knowledge communities 
suggest that state regulation of the professions can sometimes be supportive of 
professional speech rights and sometimes be in tension with them.  
The types of facts relevant in professional speech cases—as in a variety of 
other constitutional cases that turn on questions of fact—“are not of the 
‘whodunit’ variety of what happened between the parties. They are instead 
more generalized facts about the world: Is a partial-birth abortion ever 
medically necessary?”269 Or, in the professional speech context, is legal advice 
to load up on debt in anticipation of bankruptcy always fraudulent? Is SOCE 
therapy harmful? Does terminating a pregnancy result in an increased risk of 
suicide? The crux lies in determining whose knowledge we should rely on to 
provide answers. 
 
265. See Halberstam, supra note 1, at 844-45. 
266. Id. at 844. 
267. Id. at 868. Further, Halberstam explains, “[G]overnment regulation is not invariably 
destructive of communicative interests, but may indeed foster the communicative 
relationship and assist in institutionalizing the bounded discourse.” Id. at 869. 
268. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text (discussing SOCE therapy and suicide 
advisories). 
269. Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 1255, 1255 (2012) 






The following discussion is embedded in a larger jurisprudential context. A 
long-standing typology distinguishes between legislative and adjudicative 
facts.270 Legislative facts are not only the facts found by legislatures in enacting 
legislation but also the facts that adjudicative bodies find to apply beyond the 
confines of a particular case.271 The distinction has important implications for 
the questions of fact review that come into sharp relief when findings of fact 
deviate from the knowledge community’s insights. The following discussion 
considers how First Amendment theory plays out in litigation, a problem that 
has not traditionally received much attention from First Amendment theorists. 
In doing so, it takes into account important aspects of procedure surrounding 
the litigation of First Amendment claims.272 
A. Deference to the Professional Standard 
In Milavetz, the Court upheld the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) relying in part on the grounds that it 
aligned with the profession’s own definition of permissible communication 
within the lawyer-client relationship.273 Interpreting the restriction on attorney 
speech from the perspective of the knowledge community ensured that 
professional speech concerns did not arise.  
From the First Amendment perspective, this approach constitutionalizes 
the professional standard. This happens in other doctrinal areas as well. In 
Sixth Amendment doctrine, for instance, the right to effective counsel to a 
certain degree constitutionalizes professional standards.274 Thus, in Padilla v. 
Kentucky, the Court noted that “[t]he weight of prevailing professional norms 
supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of 
deportation.”275 Beyond applying professional standards in effective counsel 
 
270. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Official Notice, 62 HARV. L. REV. 537, 549-60 (1949). 
271. Larsen, supra note 269, at 1256-57. 
272. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment “Due Process,” 83 HARV. L. REV. 518 
(1970) (discussing procedural guarantees in free speech protection). 
273. Milavetz v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 246-47 (2010). See supra notes 110-126 and 
accompanying text. 
274. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (“[The Sixth Amendment]  
relies . . . on the legal profession’s maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law’s 
presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the Amendment 
envisions. The proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness 
under prevailing professional norms.” (citation omitted)). 
275. 559 U.S. 356, 367 (2010). 
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cases,276 this conceptual approach aligns speech regulations in a manner 
consistent with First Amendment protection of professional speech. This 
“constitutionaliz[ation] of individuals’ professional roles”277 goes beyond 
delineating the professional-client relationship. It gives the relationship 
substantive content by deferring to the knowledge community’s insights. 
It also has procedural implications.278 Here, it is important to note as  
a threshold matter that the Supreme Court “never set forth a general test  
to determine when a procedural safeguard is required by the First 
Amendment.”279 Yet “[t]he institutional characteristics of the American judicial 
system are . . . of central importance in realizing the constitutional 
guarantees.”280 Reconceptualizing the role of the professions as knowledge 
communities, and advancing a theory of professional speech as I propose, has 
significant implications for the allocation of authority in the judicial process.  
The integrity of professional advice is protected by the First Amendment, 
as well as by ordinary tort law, which subjects “unprofessional” advice to 
malpractice liability. But whereas in an ordinary tort law case the jury verdict is 
conclusive, First Amendment protection of the professional standard gives the 
professional potentially valuable legal protection. At a procedural level, 
constitutionalizing the professional standard hands important questions to the 
judge. On review, these questions are subject to independent assessment of the 
facts by the court. The resulting procedural allocation of fact review takes 
account of the interest in maintaining the integrity of professional speech.281 
Ultimately, the knowledge community-focused theory of professional speech 
results in a significant shift of decision-making and review authority to the 
judge. This gives procedural protections to the professional who speaks in 
 
276. See Knake, supra note 25, at 682-83 (discussing the role of professional standards in Sixth 
Amendment cases). 
277. Cf. Halberstam, supra note 1, at 870. 
278. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 669 (1994) (plurality opinion) (“[I]t is important to 
ensure not only that the substantive First Amendment standards are sound, but also that 
they are applied through reliable procedures. This is why we have often held some 
procedures—a particular allocation of the burden of proof, a particular quantum of proof,  
a particular type of appellate review, and so on—to be constitutionally required in 
proceedings that may penalize protected speech.”); id. at 686 (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“I do not doubt that the First Amendment contains within it some procedural 
prescriptions . . . .”).  
279. Id. at 671 (plurality opinion). 
280. Monaghan, supra note 272, at 523. 
281. See Waters, 511 U.S. at 671 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he propriety of a proposed procedure 
must turn on the particular context in which the question arises—on the cost of the 
procedure and the relative magnitude and constitutional significance of the risks it would 






accordance with the knowledge community’s insights, but does not protect the 
professional who fails to do so.  
The justification for contracting the jury’s role flows directly from the First 
Amendment interests underlying professional speech, discussed in Part II. The 
fundamental interest lies in accurately communicating the knowledge 
community’s insights to a client seeking professional advice. Whether speech is 
protected as professional speech rests on whether it accurately conveys the 
knowledge community’s insights.  
B. Codification of the Professional Standard 
California’s SOCE ban282 and similar legislation modeled after it283 
arguably “tread[] on ill-defined areas of First Amendment law.”284 Following 
the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in the California cases upholding the 
ban against First Amendment challenges, the ban will go into effect,285 and 
legislatures elsewhere may be emboldened to enact similar legislation.286  
 
282. An Act To Add Article 15 (Commencing with Section 865) to Chapter 1 of Division 2 of the 
Business and Professions Code, Relating to Healing Arts, 2012 Cal. Stat. 6569 (codified at 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 865-865.2 (West 2015)). 
283. The New Jersey SOCE ban, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-55 (West 2015), for instance, is modeled 
after the California statute. Victor, supra note 84, at 1536. 
284. Victor, supra note 84, at 1536 (arguing that therefore California’s SOCE ban “is particularly 
amenable to First Amendment challenges”). 
285. David S. Joachim, Supreme Court Declines Case Contesting Ban on Gay “Conversion Therapy,” 
N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/01/us/supreme-court 
-declines-case-contesting-ban-on-gay-conversion-therapy.html [http://perma.cc/7CJQ 
-MJTV]. 
286. The District of Columbia, Illinois, and Oregon have since banned conversion therapy  
on minors. See Aditya Agrawal, Illinois Bans Conversion Therapy for Minors, TIME  
(Aug. 21, 2015), http://time.com/4006675/illinois-bans-gay-conversion-therapy-on-minors 
[http://perma.cc/L937-7656]; Aaron C. Davis, D.C. Bans Gay Conversion Therapy of  
Minors, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/dc 
-bans-gay-conversion-therapy/2014/12/02/58e6aae4-7a67-11e4-84d4-7c896b90abdc_story.h 
tml [http://perma.cc/BLJ4-CBEF]; Katy Steinmetz, Oregon Becomes Third State To Ban 
Conversion Therapy on Minors, TIME (May 19, 2015), http://time.com/3889687/oregon 
-conversion-therapy-ban [http://perma.cc/YS8R-KCQ2]. States that actively considered 
legislative efforts to ban conversion therapy in 2015 are Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Florida, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia. See #BornPerfect: Laws & Legislation by 
State, NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS (2015), http://www.nclrights.org/bornperfect-laws 
-legislation-by-state [http://perma.cc/CTJ3-JFXM] (providing an overview of state 
legislative activity regarding conversion therapy).  
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The Ninth Circuit held the SOCE ban to regulate conduct rather than 
speech.287 Following the Ninth Circuit, a federal district court in New Jersey 
likewise concluded that that state’s SOCE ban does not regulate speech but 
conduct.288 However, “the ‘conduct-speech’ distinction is likely to be more 
misleading than helpful here. When the government restricts professionals 
from speaking to their clients, it’s restricting speech, not conduct.”289 Creating 
a circuit split on the issue, the Third Circuit disagreed with the Ninth Circuit 
in holding that conversion therapy is speech.290 I contend that the Ninth 
Circuit and the Third Circuit rightly upheld the respective SOCE bans, though 
for the wrong reasons.291 Under my account, the activity regulated by the 
SOCE legislation—“talk therapy”—is speech.292 But as professional speech, it is 
a specific kind of speech. It is the speech that communicates a knowledge 
community’s insights within a professional-client relationship for the purpose 
of providing professional advice.  
The California and New Jersey legislatures enacted their findings by 
referring to various professional organizations’ statements on SOCE.293 
Nonetheless, the codification approach is not entirely unproblematic. For one, 
 
287. Pickup I, 728 F.3d at 1048. 
288. King I, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 313-20. 
289. Volokh, supra note 5, at 1346 (“Such regulation may be valid because of the harm that 
negligent speech can cause, the potential value of the mandated speech to the patient or to 
third parties, or the risk that the speech may exploit the patient’s psychological dependency 
on the speaker—but not because the regulated speech is somehow conduct.”). 
290. King II, 767 F.3d at 228-29. 
291. For alternative approaches to SOCE regulation, see, for example, Shawn L. Fultz, 
Comment, If It Quacks Like a Duck: Reviewing Health Care Providers’ Speech Restrictions Under 
the First Prong of Central Hudson, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 567 (2013); and Victor, supra note 84, at 
1562-81. See also Clifford J. Rosky, No Promo Hetero: Children’s Right To Be Queer, 35 
CARDOZO L. REV. 425 (2013); Elizabeth Bookwalter, Comment, Getting It Straight: A First 
Amendment Analysis of California’s Ban on Sexual Orientation Change Efforts and Its Potential 
Effects on Abortion Regulations, 22 J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 451 (2014) (discussing Pickup I); 
William Travis, Case Note, Bad Medicine: The Ninth Circuit Reviews Issues of Free Speech, 
Professional Regulations, and California’s Ban on Sexual Orientation Change Efforts in Pickup v. 
Brown, 23 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 191 (2014). 
292. This discussion is not concerned with physically invasive forms of SOCE therapy. 
293. An Act To Add Article 15 (Commencing with Section 865) to Chapter 1 of Division 2 of the 
Business and Professions Code, Relating to Healing Arts, 2012 Cal. Stat. 6569 (codified at 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 865-865.2 (West 2015)); An Act Concerning the Protection of 
Minors from Attempts To Change Sexual Orientation and Supplementing Title 45 of the 







there is the problem of legislative findings.294 The bill passed by the California 
legislature entangles the factual and normative elements typical for legislative 
findings: “Being lesbian, gay, or bisexual is not a disease, disorder, illness, 
deficiency, or shortcoming. The major professional associations of mental 
health practitioners and researchers in the United States have recognized this 
fact for nearly 40 years.”295 Instead of deferring entirely to the knowledge 
community, the legislature adopts a factual assertion as the premise underlying 
the legislation. In this instance, the premise is shared by the knowledge 
community, but it is conceivable that a legislature may enact as a legislative 
finding a position that has not yet reached majority status or consensus within 
the knowledge community. In the most egregious instances, as discussed in the 
next section, the legislative findings may be diametrically opposed to the 
knowledge community’s insights.  
Some suggest that there is no consensus within the “psychological 
establishment” regarding the harms of talk-therapy SOCE.296 Thus, 
“[a]ccounting only for clinical evidence of SOCE’s harmfulness could, at least 
at this point, rationalize only a ban on physical interventions like aversion 
therapy . . . .”297 But it is difficult for both legislatures and courts to evaluate 
the scientific literature and determine whether a consensus exists. Here, the 
more workable approach is to defer to the knowledge community. Indeed, the 
APA follows a broad definition of harm caused by SOCE therapy.298 The 
legislature may rightly defer to that professional standard. As a corollary, we 
would also expect tort liability for licensed professionals who engage in 
conversion therapy.299 Yet the codification approach may prove inefficient. In 
order to accurately reflect the knowledge community’s insights, the statute has 
 
294. See generally Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-Finding, 84 
IND. L.J. 1 (2009) (discussing the judicial treatment of legislative fact-finding and proposing 
a new paradigm for judicial review of social facts); Daniel A. Crane, Enacted Legislative 
Findings and the Deference Problem, 102 GEO. L.J. 637 (2014) (discussing judicial deference to 
enacted and unenacted legislative fact-finding). 
295. § 1(a), 2012 Cal. Stat. at 6569. 
296. Victor, supra note 84, at 1546. 
297. Id. at 1545-46. 
298. Victor, supra note 84, at 1539 (“This broad definition of SOCE is generally in keeping with 
the approach of organizations like the American Psychological Association (APA), which has 
treated SOCE as a cohesive category that encompasses any attempt by a mental health 
professional to change sexual orientation.”). 
299. Others have argued in favor of a cause of action under the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. See Laura A. Gans, Inverts, Perverts, and Converts: Sexual Orientation 
Conversion Therapy and Liability, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 219, 245-46 (1999). 
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to be flexible over time, since the knowledge community’s insights might 
change.300 
Consider here also the ban’s limited scope. In addition to the legislature 
having to choose among scientific opinions that may not be entirely clear 
within the profession, the legislation’s limited scope might raise concerns. If 
the knowledge community deems conversion therapy harmful for everyone, 
limiting the ban to minors may not properly reflect the knowledge 
community’s insights.301 On the one hand, the underinclusiveness resulting 
from the law’s limited reach might be seen as First Amendment protective: less 
speech is restricted. On the other hand, under the knowledge communities-
centered theory of professional speech I offer, it raises the problem of selective 
enactment. Under my account of coextensive liability and protection, consider 
an adult patient who receives conversion therapy, which is not prohibited by 
the legislation. The adult later suffers adverse effects and sues the mental 
health provider for malpractice. Given the statute’s limited reach, the mental 
health provider might invoke the First Amendment as a defense. But if the 
First Amendment is properly understood as protecting the knowledge 
community’s insights and their subsequent communication and if malpractice 
liability properly mirrors that understanding by sanctioning “unprofessional” 
speech, the limited scope of the statute should be of no help to the mental 
health provider.  
How would the theory of professional speech offered here play out in 
practice? Consider first the example in which a licensed mental health provider 
(a) wants to engage in conversion therapy—attempting to use the First 
Amendment as a sword (as in Pickup)—or (b) engages in conversion therapy 
and, under the ban, faces revocation of her license and attempts to use the First 
Amendment as a shield. Consider then a second example in which a licensed 
psychologist engages in conversion therapy and is sued for malpractice by a 
patient.302  
In the two scenarios set out in the first example, the procedural story would 
play out as follows: In (a), the licensed mental health provider would argue 
that SOCE is protected under the First Amendment. The question of First 
 
300. Cf. Stein, supra note 22, at 1240 (discussing similar concerns in the medical malpractice 
context). 
301. See Victor, supra note 84, at 1572 (“The proponents of SB 1172 [2012 Cal. Stat. 6569] 
originally favored more comprehensive legislation, which would have mandated that 
practitioners receive a non-minor patient’s ‘informed consent’ before commencing SOCE 
treatments, but later withdrew these proposals.”). 
302. An earlier version of California’s SB 1172 “included provisions allowing former or current 
SOCE patients to sue a therapist engaging in SOCE.” Pickup v. Brown, 42 F. Supp. 3d 1347, 






Amendment coverage is one for the judge. If professional speech coverage is 
determined by deference to the knowledge community, the judge will not find 
that SOCE is protected under the First Amendment as a matter of professional 
speech. In scenario (b), the licensed mental health provider would argue that 
revocation of the license is impermissible because the SOCE ban infringes on 
her First Amendment rights, and the subsequent events would unfold as in 
scenario (a). The shift to the judge is mirrored in the malpractice example. 
Only “unprofessional” speech is subject to malpractice liability. Professional 
speech—that is, communication of the knowledge community’s insights within 
the professional-client relationship for the purpose of providing professional 
advice—however, is not.  
C. Compelled Speech Contradicting the Professional Standard 
The most problematic—and, under this theory of professional speech, most 
likely impermissible—type of regulation is one in which the state either 
demands that the professional communicate information that is incompatible 
with the knowledge community’s insights or prohibits the professional from 
communicating the knowledge community’s insights.303 In addition to 
offending the individual professional’s interest in communicating accurate and 
relevant professional information, these types of regulation also offend the 
knowledge community’s interests in having its insights disseminated 
accurately by members of the profession.304 An example of compelling the 
professional to convey inaccurate information is the informed consent 
requirement at issue in the Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South 
Dakota v. Rounds litigation, in which physicians have to inform patients of an 
“[i]ncreased risk of . . . suicide.”305 An example of the state prohibiting the 
professional from communicating accurate information to the client is on 
display in the medical marijuana cases. Similar problems arise when the state 
determines what constitutes relevant information, such as in the mandatory 
ultrasound cases, or attempts to proscribe some information as irrelevant, a 
constellation that recently arose in Florida, where doctors are prohibited from 
inquiring about gun use or ownership. I address these examples in turn. 
 
303. See Post, Informed Consent to Abortion, supra note 1, at 978-79 (“If First Amendment concerns 
arise whenever the state proscribes physician speech in ways that prevent physician-patient 
relationships from serving as a source of accurate, reliable, professional knowledge, 
constitutional questions should also arise if the state corrupts physician speech by requiring 
doctors to transmit misleading information in the context of informed consent.”). 
304. See supra Part II. 
305. See Rounds II, 686 F.3d at 892 (en banc) (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-
10.1(1)(e)(ii) (2015) (alteration in original)). 
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The suicide advisory at issue in the Rounds litigation represents a recent 
instance of direct state interference with the knowledge community’s insights. 
A South Dakota statute requires “the disclosure to patients seeking abortions of 
an increased risk of suicide ideation and suicide.”306 The district court and a 
panel of the Eighth Circuit held that the suicide advisory infringed doctors’ 
First Amendment rights.307 The South Dakota statute required doctors to 
disclose “all known medical risks of abortion.”308 The Eighth Circuit panel 
emphasized the importance of the word “known.” It crucially noted: 
“Legislatures have ‘wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is 
medical and scientific uncertainty,’ but the suicide advisory asserts certainty on 
the issue of medical and scientific knowledge where none exists.”309 What is 
“known” as a matter of professional knowledge is for the knowledge 
community to decide, not the state legislature.  
On partial rehearing en banc, limited to the issue of the suicide advisory, 
however, the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that the required disclosure of 
increased risk of suicide ideation and suicide was truthful, non-misleading, and 
relevant.310 The en banc plurality stressed the state’s ability to regulate in the 
face of “medical and scientific uncertainty,”311 relying on Gonzales v. Carhart,312 
and demand that physicians provide the suicide advisory.313 But two separate 
concurrences interpreted the plurality’s opinion to “require only a disclosure as 
to relative risk that the physician can adapt to fit his or her professional opinion of 
the conflicting medical research on this contentious subject”314 and that “the 
physician [is] free to augment that description [of the relative risks as reflected 
in the peer-reviewed literature] based on his or her professional judgment.”315 The 
concurrences thus give somewhat more weight to professional knowledge and 
deference to the individual professional. 
 
306. Id. (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23a-10.1(1)(e)(ii) (2015)) (alteration omitted). 
307. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds (Rounds I), 653 F.3d 662, 673 (8th Cir. 
2011) (“By compelling untruthful and misleading speech, the advisory also violates doctors’ 
First Amendment right to be free from compelled speech that is untruthful, misleading, or 
irrelevant.”). 
308. Id. at 670. 
309. Id. at 672 (citation omitted).  
310. Rounds II, 686 F.3d at 905.  
311. Id. at 904 (citation omitted). 
312. 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007). 
313. Rounds II, 686 F.3d at 904-05. But see Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014) 
(offering a strong critique of this use of Carhart). 
314. Rounds II, 686 F.3d at 906 (Loken, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 






One critic of Rounds II suggests that “the Eighth Circuit should have 
performed a more robust First Amendment inquiry, calibrated toward ensuring 
clinically and professionally appropriate speech within the doctor-patient 
relationship.”316 Doing so would have required the court to anchor its inquiry 
in a theory of professional speech. My theory would allow it to do so. Under 
the theory I propose, the knowledge community’s insights are the first element 
of professional speech. In deciding whether the speech is protected by the First 
Amendment, the judge would have to determine whether the knowledge 
community’s insights are being communicated. 
The suicide advisory controversy also illustrates the problem of using 
terminology in legislative fact-finding that may be inconsistent with the 
knowledge community’s usage. The South Dakota statute “used ‘risk factor’ in 
a manner inconsistent with its medical meaning, leaving doctors ‘to guess as to 
the meaning the legislature intended to give to the phrase.’”317 The district 
court noted that “the legislative drafters ‘may not have fully understood the 
meaning of this phrase as used in the medical profession.’”318 Deference to the 
profession avoids confusion as to the meaning of terms of art within the 
discourse of the knowledge community. 
The contemporaneous reproductive rights controversy over mandatory 
ultrasounds, while compelling doctors to speak in a state-mandated manner,  
is slightly different in that it does not require the disclosure of false 
information.319 Rather, it demands the communication of irrelevant 
information toward an arguably nonscientific ideological end (dissuading 
women from obtaining an otherwise legal professional service).320 As 
compelled ideological speech, it suggests proper First Amendment analysis 
 
316. Recent Case, First Amendment—Compelled Speech—Eighth Circuit Applies Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey to South Dakota “Suicide Advisory”—
Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889 (8th 
Cir. 2012) (en banc), 126 HARV. L. REV. 1438, 1438 (2013). 
317. Rounds I, 653 F.3d 662, 671 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). 
318. Id. 
319. Compare Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 
2012) (upholding mandatory sonogram requirement), with Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 
2d 585 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (holding mandatory ultrasound law violates First Amendment), 
aff’d sub nom. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Walker-
McGill v. Stuart, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015).  
320. See, e.g., Stuart, 774 F.3d at 242 (“This compelled speech . . . is ideological in intent and in 
kind.”); Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected 
Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351, 377 (2008) (“[M]andatory ultrasound is . . . meant to persuade 
women against abortion.”). 
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should be based on the principles set forth in Wooley v. Maynard321 and West 
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.322 But the Fifth Circuit upheld a 
Texas mandatory ultrasound and sonogram statute as “the epitome of truthful, 
non-misleading information” that can be required by the state in the course of 
regulating medical practice.323 The Fourth Circuit, by contrast, struck down a 
similar piece of North Carolina legislation.324 Judge Wilkinson did note that 
“[t]his compelled speech . . . is a regulation of the medical profession.”325 
Nonetheless, it “extend[s] well beyond” the measures the state has ordinarily 
employed to ensure informed consent.326 In the end, the Fourth Circuit 
rejected the regulation as compelled speech violating the First Amendment. In 
so doing, the court “borrow[ed] a heightened intermediate scrutiny standard 
used in certain commercial speech cases.”327 Yet, as discussed in Section I.C 
above, that analogy is unsatisfactory. Thus, while the Fourth Circuit reaches 
the right outcome in the case, it does so on feeble theoretical footing. The 
Texas and North Carolina mandatory ultrasound regulations represent 
precisely the new type of aggressive state regulation directly targeting 
professional-client communications. Under the knowledge community-
focused theory of professional speech, the professional is to decide what is 
relevant professional information. The knowledge community’s insights not 
only determine what accurate information is, but also what is relevant in any 
given situation according to the specific circumstances of the client.  
The flip side of compelling professionals to make statements that do not 
correspond to the knowledge community’s insights is prohibiting them from 
giving accurate advice. One prominent example involves the threat to 
“prosecute physicians, revoke their prescription licenses, and deny them 
participation in Medicare and Medicaid for recommending medical 
marijuana.”328 Prohibiting this type of professional communication raised the 
 
321. 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding mandatory display of “Live Free or Die” motto on license plate 
unconstitutional as compelled speech). 
322. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding mandatory flag salute unconstitutional as compelled speech); 
see Stuart, 774 F.3d at 255 (citing Wooley and Barnette); see also Caroline Mala Corbin, 
Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277 (2014) (discussing mandatory ultrasounds in light 
of compelled speech doctrine). 
323. Lakey, 667 F.3d at 578.  
324. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 256. 
325. Id. at 242; see also id. at 252 (“[I]t imposes a virtually unprecedented burden on the right of 
professional speech that operates to the detriment of both speaker and listener.”). 
326. Id. at 242. 
327. Id. at 248. 
328. Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 686 (N.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d sub nom. Conant v. 






question of the extent to which regulation of professional speech is permissible 
under the First Amendment.329 The district court held that “the First 
Amendment protects physician-patient communication up until the point that 
it becomes criminal . . . .”330 Therefore, “[t]he First Amendment allows 
physicians to discuss and advocate medical marijuana, even though use of 
marijuana itself is illegal.”331 The Ninth Circuit affirmed.332 
Under the theory of professional speech advanced here, communication 
about the medical benefits of marijuana use would be protected as a matter of 
professional speech. Even if insights regarding the benefits of marijuana were 
not uniformly shared within the knowledge community,333 communicating 
them within the physician-patient relationship does not offend the knowledge 
community’s insights in the way communicating erroneous statements does. 
This highlights the difference between unclear (or emerging and as yet 
untested) insights and false (tested and rejected) assertions. It is for the 
knowledge community to decide the content of its insights rather than for the 
state to determine them. The legislatively enshrined Rounds suicide advisory 
thus patently offends the professional knowledge formation and dissemination 
process. So does the classification of marijuana as a drug listed in Schedule I of 
the Controlled Substances Act, according to which it has “no currently 
accepted medical use.”334 
Just as the state may not decide for professionals what constitutes relevant 
information and compel them to communicate it (as in the mandatory 
ultrasound example), the state may not decide in their stead what constitutes 
irrelevant information and prohibit professionals from communicating it. The 
State of Florida, for instance, prohibits doctors from asking questions about 
 
329. Walters, 309 F.3d at 634. 
330. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. at 701. 
331. Id. at 695. 
332. Walters, 309 F.3d at 639. 
333. Editorial, Repeal Prohibition, Again, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com 
/interactive/2014/07/27/opinion/sunday/high-time-marijuana-legalization.html [http:// 
perma.cc/8P8D-Q8WZ] (“There is honest debate among scientists about the health effects 
of marijuana . . . .”).  
334. David Firestone, Let States Decide on Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2014), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2014/07/27/opinion/sunday/high-time-let-states-decide-on-marijuana.h 
tml [http://perma.cc/HM2F-6VQF] (“No medical use? That would come as news to the 
millions of people who have found that marijuana helped them through the pain of AIDS, 
or the nausea and vomiting of chemotherapy, or the seizures of epilepsy.”). 
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guns as a matter of course.335 The Eleventh Circuit held this restriction on a 
professional’s speech to be constitutional as “a legitimate regulation of 
professional conduct.”336 Just as the state may impose malpractice liability “for 
all manner of activity that the state deems bad medicine,”337 it may decide “that 
good medical care does not require inquiry . . . regarding firearms when 
unnecessary to a patient’s care.”338 Under the court’s view, it is thus up to the 
state to determine what constitutes appropriate care. 
But it is misleading to assert, as the Eleventh Circuit did, that the state 
imposes liability for activities that the state deems bad medicine. Rather, the 
state’s imposition of liability should track what the knowledge community deems 
bad medicine.339 Applying the knowledge community-focused theory of 
professional speech proposed here, the state legislature impermissibly deemed 
all routine inquiries concerning firearms to be irrelevant. Under this theory, it 
is for the professional to decide—based on the knowledge community’s 
insights—what constitutes relevant information within the professional-client 
relationship. 
These examples illustrate how the exchange of information between a client 
and a professional suffers in the face of regulatory overreach. A focus on the 
role of the knowledge community’s body of knowledge brings the attendant 
distortions into sharp relief. As demonstrated above, the fundamental defect in 
these types of regulation is the direct state interference with the content of the 
body of professional knowledge itself. 
conclusion 
As noted at the outset, some professionals speak a lot: “Most of what many 
lawyers, investment advisors, accountants, psychotherapists, and even doctors 
do is speech.”340 It is therefore all the more troubling that there has not yet 
been a comprehensive theory of professional speech advanced in the courts and 
 
335. Wollschlaeger I, 760 F.3d 1195; see also Paul Sherman & Robert McNamara, Editorial, 
Censorship in Your Doctor’s Office, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014 
/08/02/opinion/censorship-in-your-doctors-office.html [http://perma.cc/D3GF-LSPU].  
336. Wollschlaeger I, 760 F.3d at 1203. 
337. Id.  
338. Id.  
339. See supra notes 242-244 and accompanying text. 
340. Volokh, supra note 5, at 1343; see also Schauer, supra note 202, at 688 (“As lawyers, speech is 
our stock in trade. Speech is all we have.”); Tarkington, supra note 25, at 37 (“Attorneys 






the legal literature. Understanding the nature of the professions as knowledge 
communities allows us to reconceptualize this type of speech. 
State regulation interacts with knowledge communities’ insights in 
multiple and varied ways. Sometimes it aligns with professional insights; 
sometimes it contradicts them. If state regulation aims to interfere with  
and alter professional knowledge, the First Amendment should protect the 
client’s as well as the professional’s interest in accurate communication of the 
knowledge community’s insights when a professional speaks. 
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Professional speech should receive robust First Amendment protec-
tion. It should be shielded from state interference that seeks to prescribe 
or alter the content of professional advice. But how should we decide 
what advice falls within the scope of defensible professional knowledge? 
Where, in other words, does First Amendment protection for professional 
speech end and tort liability for professional malpractice begin? This 
Article provides a theoretical foundation to distinguish professional from 
unprofessional advice.  
The professions are best conceptualized as knowledge communities 
whose main reason for existence is the generation and dissemination of 
knowledge.  But knowledge communities are not monolithic; there is a 
range of knowledge that is acceptable as good professional advice. Ad-
vice falling within this range should receive robust First Amendment 
protection. Conversely, bad advice is subject to professional malpractice 
liability, and the First Amendment provides no defense. Protecting good 
professional advice and sanctioning bad advice requires a normative 
and doctrinal defense for excluding outliers from First Amendment pro-
tection. In providing such a defense, this Article puts the First Amend-
ment into conversation with the tort law of professional malpractice and 
the law of evidence governing the admissibility of expert testimony. Con-
ceptualizing professionals as members of knowledge communities, this 
Article provides a theory to identify the range of valid professional 
knowledge for First Amendment purposes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When you go to your doctor, lawyer, therapist, or pharmacist, you do 
so because you want to access a useful body of knowledge these profes-
sionals possess. In order to solve your individual problem, you rely on 
the professional’s competent, accurate, and comprehensive advice. But 
what if your advice-giving professional departs from, or refuses to de-
ploy, the full range of professional knowledge? Imagine she has a politi-
cal, philosophical, or religious disagreement with her profession: your 
lawyer objects to same-sex marriage and refuses to draft marriage-related 
documents for you and your same-sex spouse;1 your therapist believes 
homosexual behavior is sinful and homosexuality ought to be remedied 
by conversion therapy;2 your pharmacist considers abortion to be a grave 
moral wrong, believes some forms of birth control to be abortifacients, 
                                                     
1 Cf. Elizabeth Sepper, Doctoring Discrimination in the Same-Sex Marriage Debates, 89 IND. 
L.J. 703, 707 (2014) (lawyers could refuse to prepare prenup for same sex couple). 
2 See Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S.Ct. 2871 (2014) (up-
holding California conversion therapy law against Free Speech challenge); King v. Christie, 767 
F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied 135 S.Ct. 2048 (2015) (upholding New Jersey conversion 
therapy law against Free Speech and Free Exercise challenge); Doe v. Christie, 33 F.Supp.3d 518 
(D.N.J. 2014) aff’d Doe v. Christie, 783 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2015). 
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and refuses to advise on the availability of such drugs.3 Or your advice-
giving professional has a scientific disagreement with her profession: 
your doctor thinks marijuana is medically beneficial;4 perhaps she finds 
mammograms useless.5  
Professional speech should receive robust First Amendment protec-
tion. In particular, it should be shielded from state interference that seeks 
to prescribe or alter the content of professional advice.6 While new forms 
of aggressive state intervention into professional advice-giving have 
made the need for such protection particularly salient,7 the federal appel-
late courts are in marked disagreement on the proper treatment of these 
issues.8 A panel of the Eleventh Circuit alone has now issued three con-
secutive conflicting opinions in the same case, highlighting the profound 
difficulties courts face in analyzing the underlying theoretical and doctri-
nal questions.9 
                                                     
3 Cf. Stormans v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015) (upholding Washington requirement 
that pharmacies dispense all prescription medications) cert. denied 136 S.Ct. 2433 (2016).  
4 Cf. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002). 
5 Cf. Denise Grady, American Cancer Society, in a Shift, Recommends Fewer Mammograms, 
NEW YORK TIMES, Oct 20, 2015, http://nyti.ms/1kmsLFE (reporting on Kevin C. Oeffinger et al., 
Breast Cancer Screening for Women at Average Risk: 2015 Guideline Update From the American 
Cancer Society, 314 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1599 (2015); Evan R. Myers et al., Benefits and Harms of 
Breast Cancer Screening: A Systematic Review, 314 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1615 (2015); Nancy L. 
Keating & Lydia E. Pace, Editorial, New Guidelines for Breast Cancer Screening in US Women, 314 
J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1569 (2015)); Gina Kolata, Vast Study Casts Doubts on Value of Mammograms, 
NEW YORK TIMES, Feb 12, 2014, A1, available at: http://nyti.ms/1eSbFcm (reporting on Mette 
Kalager, Hans-Olov Adami, Michael Bretthauer, Editorial, Too Much Mammography, BRIT. MED. J. 
(2014); Anthony Miller, Claus Wall, Cornelia J. Baines, Ping Sun, Teresa To, Steven A. Narod, 
Twenty Five Year Follow-up for Breast Cancer Incidence and Mortality of the Canadian National 
Breast Screening Study: Randomised Screening Trial, BRIT. MED. J. (2014)).  
6 See generally Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238 (2016) (developing 
a theory of First Amendment protection for professional speech based on an understanding of the 
professions as knowledge communities).  
7 See, e.g., Rick Rojas, Arizona Orders Doctors to Say Abortions with Drugs May Be Reversi-
ble, NEW YORK TIMES, March 31, 2015, available at http://nyti.ms/1DpDo0Q (reporting that Arizo-
na “became the first state to pass a law requiring doctors who perform drug-induced abortions to tell 
women that the procedure may be reversible, an assertion that most doctors say is wrong.”). See also 
Planned Parenthood Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 
2012) (upholding state law requiring doctors to inform patients seeking an abortion of an increased 
risk of suicide to obtain informed consent). 
8 Compare Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2013) (upholding California conversion 
therapy law as permissible regulation of conduct) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and remanded by 
Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014)(denying rehearing en banc) cert. denied 134 S.Ct. 
2871 (2014) with  King v. Christie, 981 F.Supp.2d 296 (D. N.J. 2013) (upholding New Jersey con-
version therapy law as permissible regulation of speech) aff’d 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014) cert. 
denied 135 S.Ct. 2048 (2015). See also Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 248 (4th Cir. 2014) cert. 
denied sub nom Walker-McGill v. Stuart, 135 S.Ct. 2838 (2015) (rejecting the Fifth and Eighth 
Circuits’ interpretation of constitutionality of abortion regulations under the First Amendment). 
9 Wollschlaeger v. Florida, 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014) [hereinafter Wollschlaeger I] (up-
holding Florida law prohibiting doctors from inquiring about gun ownership as “a legitimate regula-
tion of professional conduct.” Wollschlaeger I at 1203) vacated and superseded on reh’g Woll-
schlaeger v. Florida, 797 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2015) [hereinafter Wollschlaeger II] (upholding the 
Florida law as “a permissible restriction on physician speech.” Wollschlaeger II at 869. The court 
(continued next page) 
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Existing accounts of professional speech pay insufficient attention to 
theorizing about the scope of defensible professional advice.10 If the First 
Amendment protects good professional advice, how should we decide 
what advice falls within the scope of defensible professional knowledge? 
Where, in other words, does First Amendment protection for professional 
speech end and tort liability for professional malpractice begin? Answer-
ing these questions requires a firm theoretical foundation to distinguish 
professional from unprofessional advice. The larger jurisprudential en-
deavor in this Article, then, is to chart the boundaries between the First 
Amendment and tort law. 
This Article provides a theory of the scope of First Amendment pro-
tection for professional advice, and explains and justifies corollaries in 
other areas of law. The professions, as I have argued before, are best 
conceptualized as knowledge communities whose main reason for exist-
ence is the generation and dissemination of knowledge.11 But knowledge 
communities are not monolithic: there is a range of knowledge that is 
acceptable as good professional advice. Advice falling within this range 
should receive robust First Amendment protection. Conversely, bad ad-
vice—that is, advice falling outside of the acceptable range—is subject 
to professional malpractice liability, and the First Amendment provides 
no defense.12 Conceptualizing the professions as knowledge communities 
provides a theoretical basis for this doctrinal truism.  
                                                                                                                       
reached its decision applying “a lesser level of scrutiny” commonly applied in commercial speech 
cases. Wollschlaeger II at 892-94) vacated and superseded on reh’g Wollschlaeger v. Florida, 2015 
WL 8639875 (11th Cir. Dec 14, 2015) [hereinafter Wollschlaeger III] (upholding the Florida law as 
“a permissible restriction on physician speech.” Wollschlaeger III at *1. This time, however, the 
court applied strict scrutiny. Wollschlaeger III at *19). The Eleventh Circuit will now hear the case 
en banc. Order of rehearing en banc, Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, No. 12-14009 (11th Cir. 
Feb. 2, 2016). 
10 There is renewed academic interest in the topic of professional speech, but the focus of in-
quiry tends to be primarily on the question of its constitutional protection rather than the scope of 
what constitutes good professional advice. See, e.g., Martha Swartz, Are Physician-Patient Commu-
nications Protected by the First Amendment? 2015 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 92; Harrison 
Blythe, Note, Physician-Patient Speech: An Analysis of the State of Patients’ First Amendment 
Rights to Receive Accurate Medical Advice, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795 (2015); Patrick Bannon, 
Note, Intermediate Scrutiny vs. the “Labeling Game” Approach: King v. Governor of New Jersey 
and the Benefits of Applying Heightened Scrutiny to Professional Speech, 23 J.L. & POL’Y 649 
(2015); Erika Schutzman, Note, We Need Professional Help: Advocating for a Consistent Standard 
of Review When Regulations of Professional Speech Implicate the First Amendment, 56 B.C. L. REV. 
2019 (2015); Ryan T. Weiss, Note, Removing the “Silencer”: Coverage and Protection of Physician 
Speech Under the First Amendment, 65 DUKE L.J. 801 (2016); Shannon Zabel, Note, Docs v. 
Glocks: The Need for First Amendment Protection in Preventative Care, 24 TEMPLE POL. & CIV. 
RTS L. REV. 483 (2015); Kayla M. Bennett, Comment, Professional Speech Targeted by the Florida 
Gun Privacy Law: The Impact of Wollschlaeger on Physician and Attorney Speech, 54 WASHBURN 
L.J. 725 (2015).      
11 Haupt, supra note 6, at 1241. 
12 It is well-established in the literature that the First Amendment provides no defense against 
malpractice claims. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Ille-
gal Courses of Conduct, “Situation Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. 
(continued next page) 
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Protecting good professional advice and sanctioning bad advice—or, 
interchangeably, “unprofessional advice”—requires a normative and 
doctrinal defense for excluding outliers from First Amendment protec-
tion when their professional advice diverges too much from the profes-
sion’s consensus. But how much is too much—and who decides? As a 
matter of free speech theory, excluding outliers runs headlong into an 
otherwise axiomatic First Amendment principle: the prohibition of con-
tent discrimination. Robert Post has identified a tension between expert 
knowledge and the underlying assumptions of First Amendment doc-
trine, concluding that “[e]xpert knowledge requires exactly what normal 
First Amendment doctrine prohibits.”13 Reconsidering the role of ex-
perts—in this case, professionals—and their relationship with knowledge 
communities, however, provides a new perspective. Viewed from this 
vantage point, this Article argues, First Amendment interests can be rec-
onciled with the “truth”-seeking, preserving, and communicating nature 
of professional speech. Conceptualizing professionals as members of 
knowledge communities guides the task of identifying the range of valid 
professional knowledge for First Amendment purposes.  
This Article distinguishes between two kinds of professionals who 
depart from the consensus of their knowledge community: internal outli-
ers and external outliers. I define as internal outliers professionals within 
knowledge communities whose disagreement results from alternative 
assessments based on the profession’s shared ways of knowing and rea-
soning, that is, alternative assessments based on a shared methodology. 
These professionals are part of the knowledge community. By contrast, I 
define as external outliers those professionals who premise their disa-
greement on refusing to follow the shared ways of knowing and reason-
ing due to exogenous beliefs. These professionals place themselves out-
side the knowledge community.  
I suggest that to the extent that a professional’s internal outlier status 
is based upon disagreement with the knowledge community’s insights 
based on shared notions of validity, departure from the professional 
                                                                                                                       
REV. 1277, 1342-46 (2005); Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analy-
sis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 950-51 (2007). Nonetheless, some 
courts continue to struggle with this. Stated in an oversimplified way, the argument is that the state 
may regulate the professions, and the permissibility of regulation is incompatible with the First 
Amendment. See, e.g., King v. Christie, 981 F.Supp.2d 296, 319 (D. N.J. 2013) (“[T]here is a more 
fundamental problem with [the argument that professional counseling is speech], because taken to its 
logical end, it would mean that any regulation of professional counseling necessarily implicates 
fundamental First Amendment free speech rights, and therefore would need to withstand heightened 
scrutiny to be permissible. Such a result runs counter to the longstanding principle that a state gener-
ally may enact laws rationally regulating professionals, including those providing medicine and 
mental health services.”)(emphasis in original). 
13 ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMEND-
MENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 9 (2012).  
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standard ought to be permissible. Indeed, dynamic development and re-
finement of professional insights will often depend on such divergent 
assessments.14 Internal outliers, however, can also produce bad advice by 
misusing the agreed-upon methodologies and bases for reasoning within 
the discourse of the profession.15 Yet, even these professionals ostensibly 
base their findings on the same knowledge foundation. Conversely, ex-
ternal outliers’ reliance on exogenous reasons undermines the status of 
the professional as a member of the knowledge community. An external 
outlier by definition does not place her professional advice on shared 
notions of validity and common ways of knowing and reasoning.16  
This analysis plays out against a larger jurisprudential (and political) 
backdrop. The role of external outliers is connected to questions sur-
rounding individual exemptions from generally applicable laws. In the 
wake of Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Burwell17 and the recent spate of 
state religious freedom legislation—first in anticipation of, and then in 
reaction to marriage equality nationwide18—these  issues have come to 
the forefront of legal and political debate.19 Though the focus in this area 
tends to be on commercial services,20 the provision of professional ser-
vices may be even more fraught.21 Internal outliers, likewise, may find 
                                                     
14 See infra Part IV.B. 
15 See infra Part IV.A. 
16 See infra Part II.A. 
17 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014).  
18 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). 
19 See generally Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based 
Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 100 (2015). It is entirely possible that the 
Hobby Lobby decision will have more political than legal force going forward. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, 
Moving Targets: Religious Freedom, Hobby Lobby, and the Future of LGBT Rights, 7 ALABAMA 
CIV. RTS & CIV. LIB. L. REV. 1 (2015) (arguing “that the political impact of Hobby Lobby may be 
much greater than its legal impact.”). Either way, the decision and its aftermath inform the back-
ground of this discussion. See also Stormans v. Wiesman, 136 S.Ct. 2433 *1 (2016) (Alito, J., Rob-
erts, C.J., Thomas, J. dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“This case is an ominous sign. At issue 
are Washington State regulations that are likely to make a pharmacist unemployable if he or she 
objects on religious grounds to dispensing certain prescription medications.  . . .  If this is a sign of 
how religious liberty claims will be treated in the years ahead, those who value religious freedom 
have cause for great concern.”). 
20 One of the paradigmatic cases in this area is Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 
53 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied 134 S.Ct. 1787 (2014) (upholding New Mexico Human Rights Act 
against free speech and free exercise challenge and finding that company refusing to photograph a 
same-sex commitment ceremony discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation in violation of the 
Act). See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Accommodation 
Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1233-37 (2014) (“Although the New Mexico Supreme Court rejected 
Elane Photography’s First Amendment free speech claim, that claim deserves close analysis, for 
businesses subject to public accommodations laws will surely raise similar arguments in the fu-
ture.”). See also Lupu, Moving Targets, supra note 19, at 33-35 (providing an overview of current 
litigation in this area). 
21 See, e.g., Abby Phillip, Pediatrician Refuses to Treat Baby with Lesbian Parents and There’s 
Nothing Illegal About It, WASHINGTON POST, Feb 19, 2015, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/02/19/pediatrician-refuses-to-treat-
baby-with-lesbian-parents-and-theres-nothing-illegal-about-it/ (“A Michigan pediatrician declined to 
(continued next page) 
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themselves in the minority due to shifting understandings of the underly-
ing knowledge basis. What once was accepted in the field may soon be 
outdated. Scientific, legal, and political forces may interact in a way that 
sometimes aligns with the insights of the knowledge community, but 
sometimes contradicts them.  
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I introduces the concept of 
knowledge communities, and focuses the analysis on knowledge com-
munities as providers of professional services. It considers how 
knowledge is formed within these communities, public expectations to-
ward these communities, and state regulation of them. Complicating the 
picture, it takes into account different institutional settings in which pro-
fessionals operate.  
Part II takes a normative view of professionals’ duties and justifica-
tions for departure from professional consensus. This Part assesses the 
role of outliers within and outside of professional knowledge communi-
ties and the fundamental expectations of the public served by these pro-
fessionals. It investigates what constitutes an appropriate basis for justi-
fying a professional’s outlier status. The point of departure is the concept 
of the professions as knowledge communities, and especially the notion 
of a shared knowledge basis. For all valid claims, I argue, reference to 
the shared knowledge basis and common ways of knowing and reasoning 
is necessary. Scientific disagreement within the knowledge community 
must be based on individual professionals’ divergent interpretation of the 
shared knowledge. The advice-giving function of the individual profes-
sional is thus tied back to the range of defensible opinions within the 
knowledge community. If, however, the advice is based on an assess-
ment of the knowledge rooted in exogenous reasons, the professional 
places himself outside of the knowledge community. Here, the distinc-
tion between internal and external outliers is key. Both internal and ex-
ternal outliers can produce unprofessional advice. But the difference is 
that internal outliers will base their reasoning on shared knowledge while 
external outliers will base theirs on exogenous factors. The law should 
protect the exogenous beliefs of external outliers as a matter of personal 
belief of the individual. But it should not, as a general matter, accommo-
date them as justifying departure from professional knowledge.  
Part III turns to the treatment of outliers in tort law on professional 
malpractice and the law of evidence governing the admissibility of expert 
                                                                                                                       
treat the infant daughter of a lesbian couple in yet another example of the growing tensions between 
advocates for LGBT rights and those who want greater religious expression protections.”); Emma 
Green, When Doctors Refuse to Treat LGBT Patients, THE ATLANTIC, Apr 19, 2016, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/04/medical-religious-exemptions-doctors-therapists-
mississippi-tennessee/478797/ (discussing Mississippi law extending conscience objections to treat-
ing LGBT patients). 
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testimony, bringing these areas of law into conversation with the First 
Amendment. The treatment of outliers in these areas provides the norma-
tive corollary of basing good professional advice on a shared methodolo-
gy and shared ways of knowing and reasoning. The distinction between 
good and bad advice should be drawn along these lines. It thus supports 
the division of professionals into internal and external outliers. Whether 
the substantive content of advice internal outliers give—advice that is 
based on a shared methodology and common ways of knowing and rea-
soning—clears the bar of good advice, moreover, is also for the 
knowledge community to decide. Both tort law and evidence already op-
erate on this basis; and both have resolved the overarching “who de-
cides”-questions largely in favor of the knowledge community. Thus, in 
addition to providing normative support, these areas inform the workabil-
ity of this approach in litigation practice. 
Part IV demonstrates how this theory of the scope of First Amend-
ment protection for professional advice works when applied to the con-
troversies referenced at the outset. These examples illustrate problems 
associated with identifying the range of valid professional advice. Apply-
ing the theory of distinguishing professional from unprofessional advice 
proposed in this Article provides guidance in resolving these disputes. 
I. THE PROFESSIONS AS KNOWLEDGE COMMUNITIES 
The learned professions are best conceptualized as knowledge com-
munities.22 Taking this view as the starting point has significant implica-
tions for the role of the individual professional, both in relation to the 
client and in relation to her profession. The state regulates the profes-
sions in multiple and varied ways, including through licensing require-
ments and the imposition of professional malpractice liability. When 
state regulation aligns with professional insights, it is usually unproblem-
atic. But when state regulation is incompatible with professional insights, 
significant problems arise.  
State involvement in professional licensing in particular can lead to 
considerable tensions. In licensing, the administrative function of grant-
ing access to the profession and the substantive evaluation of the 
knowledge community’s ability to impart its professional knowledge 
come together. It is appropriate for the state to enforce formal education-
al standards without implicating professional speech.23 But the substan-
tive content of the educational programs directly affects the content of 
                                                     
22 See Haupt, supra note 6. See also Timothy Zick, Professional Rights Speech, 47 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 1289, 1294 (2015) (adopting the characterization of the professions as “knowledge communi-
ties”). 
23 Haupt, supra note 6, at 1277-78. 
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professional advice. State involvement, accordingly, should be tailored 
with deference to the knowledge community. 
A. Professionals as Members of Knowledge Communities 
The definition of “profession” and the processes of professionaliza-
tion are contested. But the key defining feature—and one generally 
shared across the manifold definitions—is the professions’ knowledge-
based character.24 Thus, “[t]he connection to a knowledge community 
circumscribes the type of communication rendered as professional ad-
vice.”25 The centrality of knowledge is reflected in the asymmetrical rela-
tionship between the professional and the client. The very reason the pro-
fessional’s advice is valuable to the client is that the professional has 
knowledge that the client lacks. In order to make important life deci-
sions, the client depends on accessing the knowledge community’s 
knowledge through the individual professional.  
Knowledge communities are  
a network of individuals who share common knowledge and experience 
as a result of training and practice. They are engaged in solving similar 
problems by drawing on a shared reservoir of knowledge and, at the 
same time, they define and contribute to that shared body of 
knowledge. Their common understandings allow for the generation and 
exchange of insights within the knowledge community. Given the 
shared knowledge and understandings of this knowledge, members of 
knowledge communities have shared notions of validity, intersubjective 
understanding, and a common way of knowing and reasoning.26  
Despite possible disagreement on individual issues, professionals contin-
ue to subscribe to a shared body of knowledge.27 Yet, it is important to 
emphasize that “this does not mean that knowledge communities are 
monolithic. The shared notions of validity, however, limit the range of 
opinions that may be found valid within the profession.”28 It is the chal-
lenge of defining this range of valid professional opinions that the re-
mainder of this Article addresses.  
1. Individual Professionals  
Professional speech is speech by a professional, within a profession-
al-client relationship, communicating the insights of the knowledge 
                                                     
24 Id. at 1249. 
25 Id. at 1248. 
26 Id.at 1250-51.  
27 Id. at 1250. 
28 Id. at 1251. 
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community for the purpose of providing professional advice.29 Concep-
tualizing the individual professional in this manner as the conduit be-
tween the knowledge community and the client requires distinguishing 
the professional’s personal opinion from his professional advice. It is 
worth reiterating that distinction.30 The key to determining what is pro-
fessional advice is whether the advice is rendered within the confines of 
a professional-client relationship: “Where the personal nexus between 
professional and client does not exist, and a speaker does not purport to 
be exercising judgment on behalf of any particular individual with whose 
circumstances he is directly acquainted”31 the speaker is not engaged in 
professional speech. Thus, speech by a professional32 outside of the pro-
fessional-client relationship is not professional speech.33  
Speaking as a participant in public discourse, professionals’ private 
speech receives ordinary First Amendment protection. It is likely that the 
speaker’s professional training will influence the listeners’ perception of 
the message, in particular its accuracy.34 But as long as the speaker is not 
acting within the confines of the professional-client relationship, it is im-
portant to recognize that he is not bound by the knowledge community’s 
insights. Indeed, speaking in public discourse, the speaker is free to chal-
lenge even the most axiomatic insights of the knowledge community.35 
Consider a professional—a trained physician, for instance—hosting 
a television program in which he dispenses advice.36 Even if the physi-
cian disagrees with the profession, he cannot under the First Amendment 
be held to the standard of medical malpractice that would censor him 
within the professional-client relationship.37 In short, a professional may 
give bad advice to millions of viewers—but not to one client. At the in-
                                                     
29 Id. at 1247. 
30 See id. at 1254-57 (for more detailed discussion). 
31 Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985)(White, J., concurring). 
32 See Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional 
Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 843 (1999); Post, supra note 12, at 947 (defin-
ing professional speech as “speech uttered in the course of professional practice as distinct from 
‘speech uttered by a professional’”). 
33 See Halberstam, supra note 32, at 851 (“Publication of advice for indiscriminate distribution 
generally will defeat a conclusion that the advice was rendered within the professional-client rela-
tionship.”). See also Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042, 1054 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Thus, outside the doc-
tor-patient relationship, doctors are constitutionally equivalent to soapbox orators and pamphleteers, 
and their speech receives robust protection under the First Amendment.”). 
34 Haupt, supra note 6, at 1255-56. 
35 See, e.g., Halberstam, supra note 32, at 848. See also Post, supra note 12, at 947; POST, su-
pra note 13, at 12-13 (recounting the “controversy over the safety of dental amalgams.”). 
36 For a recent highly publicized controversy that played out along these lines, see, e.g., Bill 
Gifford, Dr. Oz is No Wizard, but No Quack, Either, NEW YORK TIMES  http://nyti.ms/1HDVCwD  
37 Post, supra note 12, at 949 (“When a physician speaks to the public, his opinions cannot be 
censored and suppressed, even if they are at odds with preponderant opinion within the medical 
establishment.”); POST, supra note 13, at 43 (“If an expert chooses to participate in public discourse 
by speaking about matters within her expertise, her speech will characteristically be classified as 
fully protected opinion.”). 
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tersection of professional speech and academic speech, the protection of 
private speech in public discourse plays out in the same way. Imagine the 
physician on television also holds a medical faculty appointment, and the 
insights propagated to viewers do not hold up to scientific standards.38 
Here, too, the First Amendment provides protection of private speech in 
public discourse where academic standards are not fulfilled. As Robert 
Post puts it, “Biologists can with impunity write editorials in the New 
York Times that are such poor science that they would constitute grounds 
for denying tenure within a university. Members of the general public 
can rely on expert pronouncements within public discourse only at their 
peril. Such pronouncements are ultimately subject to political rather than 
legal accountability.”39  
The underlying justification is that the First Amendment should treat 
speakers in public discourse as equals. Consequently, there is no such 
thing as the notion of a “false idea” in public discourse.40 By contrast, 
while there is a range of valid professional opinions that members of the 
knowledge community may disagree on, there is also a universe of ad-
vice that is plainly wrong as a matter of expert knowledge. What consti-
tutes valid professional knowledge, however, is for the profession to de-
cide. Expert knowledge thus is not treated as equal to other opinions. 
And we affirmatively do not want it to be: this notion is clearly reflected 
in the imposition of tort liability for professional malpractice. The tort 
regime directly, and appropriately, sanctions unprofessional advice. 
A critic of distinguishing the role of the professional in public dis-
course might object that the very notion of “public discourse” is indeter-
minate. But whatever the controversies at the margins concerning the 
concept of public discourse might be, the professional-client relationship 
is affirmatively not part of it. The law already attaches certain distinct 
features to this particular relationship between speaker and listener, in-
cluding evidentiary privileges and a duty of confidentiality. In doing so, 
it singles out the professional-client relationship as distinct.  
2. Institutional Settings 
Many professionals are not solo-practitioners, but rather work within 
various institutional settings; this complicates the picture significantly. 
Their obligations to their profession may clash with their obligations to 
their institutional employer. The entities in which professionals are em-
                                                     
38 Physicians Want Dr. Oz Gone from Columbia Medical Faculty, NEW YORK TIMES, April 16, 
2015, http://nyti.ms/1EQ00ID; Terrence McCoy, Half of Dr. Oz’s Medical Advice is Baseless or 
Wrong, Study Says, WASHINGTON POST, Dec 19, 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/12/19/half-of-dr-ozs-medical-advice-
is-baseless-or-wrong-study-says/  
39 POST, supra note 13, at 44. 
40 Post, supra note 12, 949. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537 (2012). 
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bedded can be governmental or private, religious or secular. Depending 
on these variables, professionals will be pulled in different directions 
regarding the content of their advice. But the First Amendment should 
protect professionals who resist those forces to guard their professional 
advice against outside interference. Professionals’ primary allegiance 
ought to be to their knowledge community on the one hand, and their 
clients on the other. If professionals are hired to provide professional 
services, the content of their advice should not be determined by who 
pays them, but rather, by the knowledge community’s understanding of 
what constitutes defensible professional advice. This is also the underly-
ing assumption of the tort regime.41 
With respect to governmental settings, the Supreme Court addressed 
government-funded professional services perhaps most prominently in 
Rust v. Sullivan,42 concerning abortion counseling, and Legal Services 
Corporation v. Velazquez,43 concerning legal advice. While the Court 
held the limits on abortion counseling in Rust to be compatible with the 
First Amendment, it held unconstitutional the restrictions imposed on 
legal advice in Velazquez.44  
In Rust, recipients of federal funding for “family-planning services” 
were prohibited from disseminating advice on abortion.45 Moreover, pro-
viders were barred from “referral for abortion as a method of family 
planning.”46 These limits on professional advice applied “even upon spe-
cific request.”47 However, providers were given a “permissible response 
to such an inquiry”: “[T]he project does not consider abortion an appro-
priate method of family planning and therefore does not counsel or refer 
for abortion.”48 The Court upheld the funding scheme against First 
Amendment challenge, pointing out that the professionals “remain free to 
say whatever they wish about abortion outside the [government-funded] 
project.”49 By framing the case as one about selectively funding some 
activities but not others, Chief Justice Rehnquist obscured the point that 
professional speech was at the heart of the matter.50 The opinion express-
ly left unanswered the question about First Amendment protection of 
                                                     
41 See infra Part III.A. 
42 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
43 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
44 See also Haupt, supra note 6, at 1259-62 (discussing the relevance of these cases for profes-
sional speech doctrine). 
45 Rust, at 178-79. 
46 Id. at 179. 
47 Id. at 180. 
48 Id.  
49 Id. at 183. 
50 See id. at 193 (asserting that the government “has merely chosen to fund one activity to the 
exclusion of another.”).  
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government-funded professional speech.51 Under the knowledge com-
munity-focused theory of professional speech, however, this question 
will likely be answered as follows: if a professional is paid to give pro-
fessional advice, the professional’s primary allegiance is to the 
knowledge community and the client. The First Amendment, therefore, 
should shield against government interference even when the govern-
ment funds the professional’s advice. Indeed, this is the result—even if 
not the reasoning—the Court reached in Velazquez. 
In Velazquez, government-funded Legal Services attorneys were 
prohibited from challenging existing welfare law on behalf of their indi-
gent clients.52 Justice Kennedy distinguished Rust as a government 
speech case; by contrast, he asserted that the speech in Velazquez is pri-
vate speech.53 This distinction introduces slippage in the concepts of 
government, private, and professional speech. As discussed in the previ-
ous section, professional speech is distinct from private speech of a pro-
fessional.54 Despite this analytical ambiguity, Justice Kennedy focused 
on the professional role of the lawyer, concluding that “[t]he advice from 
the attorney to the client and the advocacy by the attorney to the courts 
cannot be classified as governmental speech even under a generous un-
derstanding of the concept. In this vital respect this suit is distinguishable 
from Rust.”55 The government-funded lawyer, in other words, has to ful-
fill the same professional role as any lawyer who is not funded by the 
government, including “complete analysis of the case, full advice to the 
client, and proper presentation to the court.”56 
In terms of the institutional context, it is difficult to distinguish Rust 
and Velazquez, as Justice Scalia suggested in his Velazquez dissent.57 The 
government funds these professional services precisely because they are 
rendered by professionals. As Justice Blackmun pointed out in his Rust 
dissent, the physicians who are part of the federally funded program are 
expected to give clients comprehensive advice regarding family plan-
ning. The project “[seeks] to provide them with the full range of infor-
                                                     
51 Id. at 200 (“It could be argued by analogy that traditional relationships such as that between 
doctor and patient should enjoy protection under the First Amendment from Government regulation, 
even when subsidized by the Government. We need not resolve that question here . . . “). 
52 Velazquez, at 536. 
53 Id. at 540-42 (stating that “the LSC program was designed to facilitate private speech, not to 
promote a governmental message.”). 
54 See supra Part I.A.1. 
55 Id. at 542-43. 
56 Id. at 546. 
57 Velazquez, at 553-59 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority’s contention that the subsidized 
speech in these cases is not government speech because the lawyers have a professional obligation to 
represent the interests of their clients founders on the reality that the doctors in Rust had a profes-
sional obligation to serve the interests of their patients.”). 
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mation and options regarding their health and reproductive freedom.”58 
In other words, the government-funded professionals in this case, too, are 
expected to act like professionals. And, as Justice Blackmun emphasized, 
“the legitimate expectations of the patient and the ethical responsibilities 
of the medical profession demand no less.”59 The government funded, as 
Justice Scalia put it, “the normal work of doctors” and “the normal work 
of lawyers” in these cases.60  
Of course, the outcome under the knowledge community-focused 
theory of professional speech is exactly the opposite from that of the 
Scalia dissent in Velazquez: both the doctors in Rust and the lawyers in 
Velazquez ought to be able to invoke First Amendment protection of 
their professional speech against outside interference if the government 
funds them to act as “normal” professionals. 
When professionals are directly employed by the government, they 
are likewise held to the standards of the profession. Government entities 
can also contract with private parties for the provision of professional 
services to government employees. In one set of cases, professionals 
were contracted by the government to provide counseling services to 
government employees.61 A company providing counseling services to 
several police departments, including in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and 
Springfield, Illinois, for example, sued the respective municipalities over 
ending the psychological counseling contract due to anti-gay views ex-
pressed by the professionals. When their views are expressed outside the 
professional-client relationship, they are private speech. Within this rela-
tionship, they are professional speech. And if they are contrary to the 
professional consensus, they are unprofessional advice. 
Religious organizations have built a large professional services infra-
structure in which professionals are embedded. The religious tenets, 
transferred onto the institutions employing these professionals, may con-
tradict their employees’ professional insights. Elizabeth Sepper has care-
fully examined such countervailing forces in the health care context 
where hospital policies may prohibit doctors from employing the full 
range of their professional knowledge.62 As the largest nonprofit provid-
er, Catholic healthcare is perhaps the most prominent example.63 The 
                                                     
58 Rust, at 213-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
59 Id.  
60 Velazquez, at 562 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
61 See, e.g., Campion, Barrow & Associates of Illinois, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 652 
F.Supp.2d 986 (D. Minn. 2009) (providers of psychological services to police department); Campi-
on, Barrow & Associates, Inc. v. City of Springfield, Illinois, 559 F.3d 765 (2009) (same); Walden 
v. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 669 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2012) (health and wellness 
services for CDC employees).  
62 See Elizabeth Sepper, Taking Conscience Seriously, 98 VA. L. REV. 1501 (2012).  
63 Id. at 1519-20. 
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United States Conference of Catholic Bishops issues the Ethical and Re-
ligious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services.64 Several provisions 
contained in the Directives “contradict accepted professional ethical im-
peratives that require doctors and nurses to place patient welfare above 
self-interest, respect patient autonomy, guarantee continuity of care, and 
ensure patients receive adequate information.”65 Most important for pur-
poses of this discussion is the fact that “[t]he directives limit the infor-
mation doctors may provide to ‘morally legitimate alternatives,’ with 
wide-ranging repercussions for physician practice and patient care.”66 To 
name only one such limit, “Catholic clinics have refused to instruct HIV-
positive patients as to the importance of condoms.”67 The range of advice 
that may be rendered in these settings is markedly limited as compared to 
the full range of available professional knowledge. 
In the health care context, however, it is worth noting that “many 
healthcare institutions that assert an objection to legal, medically neces-
sary care are not affiliated with any religion.”68 Moreover, the problem is 
compounded by mergers in the healthcare market. On the one hand, non-
Catholic hospitals may merge with Catholic healthcare providers. On the 
other hand, formerly Catholic hospitals may be required to adhere to the 
Directives even after they have been acquired by another entity.69 The 
continued adherence to the directives by formerly Catholic hospitals that 
are not readily identifiable as such calls into question one possible reme-
dy, namely disclosure.70 Consequently, as Sepper notes, “providers will 
be caught between moral restrictions and medical ethics.”71 Professionals 
who view it as their professional obligation to render comprehensive ad-
                                                     
64 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic 
Health Care Services, Fifth Edition 2009, available at http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-
action/human-life-and-dignity/health-care/upload/Ethical-Religious-Directives-Catholic-Health-
Care-Services-fifth-edition-2009.pdf  
65 Sepper, supra note 62, at 1520. 
66 Id. at 1521. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 1581. As Sepper explains: 
Only when an institution refuses to deliver legal, necessary care does the law recognize a 
concept of “institutional conscience.” Under most provisions, an entire hospital, 
healthcare system, clinic, or practice group may refuse contested treatments. The legisla-
tion typically does not differentiate between religious and secular, public and private, and 
for-profit and not-for-profit institutions. In several jurisdictions, broad conscience clauses 
allow any corporation or entity associated with healthcare—including insurance compa-
nies—to decline to participate in, refer for, or give information about any healthcare ser-
vice for reasons of conscience. Employees and medical staff of all faiths, beliefs, and 
backgrounds must then abide by the institutional policy of refusal. 
Id. at 1514. 
69 Id. at 1523-25. See also Elizabeth Sepper, Contracting Religion, in LAW, RELIGION, AND 
HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES (Holly Fernandez Lynch, I. Glenn Cohen & Elizabeth Sepper eds. 
forthcoming 2017) draft available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2783518 . 
70 See infra Part II.A.3. 
71 Sepper, supra note 62, at 1525. 
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vice will find themselves constrained from communicating the insights 
of the knowledge community. 
*** 
The bottom line is this: professionals may operate in a variety of in-
stitutional settings. But if professionals are hired primarily to render pro-
fessional advice, no matter the institutional setting, they are members of 
the profession first. As such, they are bound together by the knowledge 
community and its shared ways of knowing and reasoning, serving as the 
conduit between the knowledge community and the client. Irrespective of 
the institutional setting, the First Amendment should therefore protect 
defensible professional advice. 
B. Knowledge Communities, Outliers, and the State 
If shared knowledge is the defining feature, shared education is one 
of the fundamental aspects that bind the members of knowledge commu-
nities together. In this context, significant tensions can arise among 
knowledge communities, outliers, and the state. Consider an example: 
Recently, the North Carolina state legislature considered a bill that would 
have put at risk the accreditation of the University of North Carolina 
(UNC) medical school.72 The measure “would prevent employees at the 
state’s two public medical schools—UNC and East Carolina University’s 
Brody School of Medicine—from performing or supervising abortion 
procedures.”73 However, “[t]he national accrediting body for medical 
schools requires OB/GYN residents to be educated in performing abor-
tion procedures.”74 State regulation in this instance would have altered 
the content of what the knowledge community has determined to be nec-
essary professional knowledge. 
Another illustrative example involves the conflict between the Amer-
ican Psychological Association’s (APA) Committee on Accreditation 
and the Department of Education over accreditation standards for psy-
chology programs. The APA delisted homosexuality as a mental disorder 
in 1973. The APA Ethics Code prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation. Yet, the accreditation standards in Footnote 4 permit-
ted preferential hiring and enrollment of coreligionists in psychology 
programs.75 This was seen as undermining the professional norms of 
                                                     
72 http://www.dailytarheel.com/article/2015/04/abortion-bill-targets-unc-medical-school  
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 For a brief history of Footnote 4, see Clark D. Campbell, Religion in Education and Train-
ing, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 
472, 478 (W. Brad Johnson & Nadine J. Kaslow eds., 2014). 
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psychologists, and the APA was poised to remove the footnote. But in 
the end, there were concerns over the APA’s status as licensing body.76 
The Department of Education, in a letter dated September 6, 2001, urged 
the APA to retain Footnote 4.77  
The affair reveals the confluence of substantive concerns over the in-
tegrity of the professional knowledge communicated in the programs, 
and subsequently by professionals who graduated from them, and the 
seemingly merely administrative question of which programs’ graduates 
are eligible to be licensed psychologists. Voices in the psychology litera-
ture have articulated this concern as follows: “The ethical codes of the 
helping professions, which are fundamental to the profession and the ed-
ucation and training of professionals, have been set against the U.S. Con-
stitution and the personal freedoms it protects (i.e., freedom of religion 
and freedom of speech).”78 Persuading (or pressuring, as some suggest79) 
the profession to maintain an exemption for religious programs thus 
amounts to state interference endorsing the outlier status of certain pro-
fessionals against the rest of the profession. The state thus enforces a 
substantive change in the knowledge community’s shared training, de-
manding the permissibility of certain outlier positions against the 
knowledge community itself.  
Similarly, accommodating student claims for exemption from certain 
training requirements against their educational institutions has the same 
effect.80 Future professionals may be trained in secular or religious 
schools, and the formation of the knowledge basis of each individual pro-
fessional is influenced accordingly. Upon endorsing the American Psy-
chiatric Association’s elimination of homosexuality from its list of men-
tal disorders, the APA set as a goal of psychology training “that psy-
                                                     
76 See D. Smith, Accreditation Committee Decides to Keep Religious Exemption, 33 MONITOR 
ON PSYCHOLOGY 16 (2002) (“Also affecting the committee’s decision was the U.S. Department of 
Education (DOE), which suggested that, if the footnote was removed, it would be forced to consider 
revoking APA’s recognition as an accrediting body. Since APA is the only organization approved by 
DOE to accredit professional psychology programs, that would have left all psychology students in a 
lurch – ineligible for some types of federal funding and, in some cases, unable to gain licensure.”).  
77 Letter from William D. Hansen to Susan Zlotlow, Director, Office of Program Consultation 
and Accreditation, American Psychological Association, available at  
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/highered/guid/secletter/010906.html  
78 Kristin A. Hancock, Student Beliefs, Multiculturalism, and Client Welfare, 1 PSYCHOLOGY 
OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER DIVERSITY 4 (2014). 
79 Maryka Biaggio, Do Some APA-Accredited Programs Undermine Training to Serve Clients 
of Diverse Sexual Orientation? 1 PSYCHOLOGY OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER DIVERSITY 
93, 94 (2014) (speaking of “significant external pressure”). 
80 See, e.g., Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865 (11th Cir. 2011); Ward v. Polite, 667 
F.3d 727 (6th Cir. 2012). In the psychology literature it has been emphasized that the programs in 
these cases are not APA accredited psychology programs. See Campbell, supra note 75, at 484. 
While this is certainly relevant for the internal discourse within the psychology profession, it does 
not affect the larger point: the state is endorsing students’ outlier status against the consensus of the 
profession regarding appropriate education standards. 
152
18 Unprofessional Advice [3/20/2017  
  
chologists work to remove the stigma that had been attached to homo-
sexuality.”81 The internal discourse of the profession concerning accredi-
tation of psychology programs focused on access of LGBT students to 
psychology programs as well as the substantive training all psychology 
students receive on LGBT issues.82  
The particular challenges of religious professional education are well 
recognized in the psychology literature: “As may be expected, any time 
minority programs deviate from accepted paradigms for professional 
preparations, there are issues with which to reckon.”83 According to es-
timates, there are less than a dozen APA accredited Christian psychology 
programs.84 One comparative study of evangelical protestant psycholo-
gists trained in secular and those trained in religiously affiliated pro-
grams—counterintuitively—found that “[r]eligious psychologists trained 
at secular programs were comparatively more conservative and more 
likely to use and value religious techniques in psychotherapy with reli-
gious or nonreligious clients than were religious psychologists trained at 
religiously affiliated programs.”85 In response, some suggest that “train-
ing provided in religious distinctive programs prepares students for more 
judicious use of such interventions.”86 Voices in the psychology litera-
ture lament the lack of data in questions surrounding the relationship be-
tween religious programs and professional expertise imparted regarding 
LGBT issues.87 In any event, it should be the profession that makes this 
determination internally. 
To be sure, the medical and mental health fields are not the only pro-
viders of professional training to face such concerns. There is a consider-
able body of scholarship on religious law schools, for instance.88 Nor are 
these issues solely domestic.89 But the two fields highlighted here con-
                                                     
81 Maryka Biaggio, Sue Orchard, Jane Larson, Kelly Petrino, and Roberta Mihara, Guidelines 
for Gay/Lesbian/Bixesual-Affirmative Educational Practices in Graduate Psychology Programs, 34 
PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 548 (2003). 
82 Id. at 549. 
83 Campbell, supra note 75, at 481. (“Specifically, religious distinctive programs have to re-
peatedly address issues of academic freedom and diversity, particularly as they relate to sexual ori-
entation and the provisions of Footnote 4 in the G&P.”). 
84 Id. at 478 (further pointing out that to date, “all religious distinctive programs are founded on 
the Christian faith tradition.”). 
85 Randall Lehmann Sorenson & Shawn Hales, Comparing Evangelical Protestant Psycholo-
gists Trained at Secular versus Religiously Affiliated Programs, 39 PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEO-
RY/RESEARCH/PRACTICE/TRAINING 163 (2002). 
86 Campbell, supra note 75, at 481. 
87 Id. at 483. 
88 See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce, Symposium Foreword: The Religious Lawyering Movement: An 
Emerging Force in Legal Ethics and Professionalism, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1075 (1998) (symposi-
um issue).  
89 See, e.g., Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers, 2001 S.C.C. 
31 (2001) (accreditation of teacher training program); Trinity Western University v. Law Society of 
Upper Canada, 2015 ONSC 4250 (July 6, 2015); Trinity Western University v. Nova Scotia Barris-
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cern today’s most politically and socially contested areas. In the end, the 
important takeaway is that professional outlier status may be created in 
different ways, including the institutional context in which the profes-
sional operates and education in which professional knowledge is im-
parted. The reference point, however, is the knowledge basis of the pro-
fession and its shared ways of knowing and reasoning.  
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PROFESSIONAL OUTLIER STATUS 
This Part investigates what constitutes an appropriate basis for justi-
fying a professional’s outlier status. It considers the interests of profes-
sionals and of knowledge communities, and client expectations toward 
them. To the extent that a professional’s outlier status is grounded in dis-
agreement based on shared notions of validity, departure from the 
knowledge community’s insights must be permissible. Indeed, dynamic 
development and refinement of professional insights will often depend 
on such divergent assessments. However, outlier status based on exoge-
nous reasons undermines the status of the professional as a member of 
the knowledge community founded in shared notions of validity and 
common ways of knowing and reasoning. This explains the initial dis-
tinction between internal and external outliers. 
It will be the reasonable expectation of the knowledge community 
that the individual professional fully and accurately communicates its 
knowledge to the client.90 Correspondingly, the client seeking profes-
sional advice reasonably may expect that she receives competent and 
comprehensive professional advice in accordance with the profession’s 
insights. In other words, the client expects that she will access the entire 
body of knowledge relevant to her problem that constitutes the state of 
the art in the field. The normative corollary can be found in the law of 
professional malpractice where the standard of care against which the 
professional’s advice is measured is determined by the profession itself: 
exercise of the profession according to the degree and skill of a well-
qualified professional. The knowledge community thus determines the 
benchmark against which the individual professional’s liability is as-
                                                                                                                       
ters’ Society, 2015 NSSC 25 (Jan 28, 2015) (recognition of law degrees from religious law school by 
provincial licensing bodies). 
90 There is another dimension that I subsume under the knowledge community’s expectations 
of the individual professional, but that others have identified separately as the expectation of the 
professional: “Reasonable belief about what a job entails is one measure of whether refusals of con-
science should be protected.” Kent Greenawalt, Refusals of Conscience: What Are They and When 
Should They Be Accommodated? 9 AVE MARIA L. REV. 47, 55 (2010). Greenawalt points out that 
nurses trained at a time when abortion was illegal would not reasonably expect to be called upon to 
assist in such a procedure. That is certainly true. Under my theory of the professions as knowledge 
communities, however, the job of the individual professional entails whatever the knowledge com-
munity defines it to be, even if its scope changes over time. 
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sessed.91 This does not only mean what the professional says must be 
correct, it also means that it must be comprehensive.  
The distinction between internal and external outliers, is a distinction 
in kind—namely, a different kind of justification for departure from pro-
fessional knowledge. While internal outliers justify their alternative as-
sessments by relying on the shared knowledge basis of the profession, 
external outliers justify their departure by reliance on exogenous factors. 
Their disagreement is premised on rejecting the shared way of knowing 
and reasoning due to exogenous beliefs. By doing so, they place them-
selves outside of the knowledge community. The remainder of this Part 
will defend the exclusion of external outliers from the knowledge com-
munity. 
The distinction between internal outliers giving good advice and in-
ternal outliers giving bad advice, by contrast, is a distinction in degree. 
Whether their advice clears the bar of “good advice” is for the 
knowledge community to decide. Internal outliers may misuse the shared 
methodology, resulting in bad advice. But it is up to the knowledge 
community to decide what the bar of good advice is, and what degree of 
departure is permissible. I will return to this issue in Parts III and IV be-
low. 
A. External Outliers 
Taking account of the expectations toward professionals, this section 
explains why external outliers should be considered to have placed them-
selves outside of the knowledge community. Through a lens of public 
reason, the knowledge community’s expectations toward the professional 
and the client’s expectations toward the professional demand that any 
departure be based upon the shared knowledge basis. But the defining 
feature of external outliers’ justifications for departure is that they are 
based on exogenous reasons. 
One recent example involves pharmacists who refuse to advise cli-
ents on the availability of drugs they consider to be abortifacients.92 Oth-
                                                     
91 See infra Part III.A. 
92 Cf. Stormans v. Wiesman, 794 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2015) (upholding Washington require-
ment that pharmacies dispense all prescription medications).  See also Dennis Rambaud, Prescrip-
tion Contraceptives and the Pharmacist’s Right to Refuse: Examining the Efficacy of Conscience 
Laws, 4 CARDOZO PUB. LAW., POL. & ETHICS J. 195 (2006); Jane W. Walker, Comment, The Bush 
Administration’s Midnight Provider Refusal Rule: Upsetting the Emerging Balance in State Phar-
macist Refusal Laws, 46 HOUSTON L. REV. 939 (2009); Heather A. Weisser, Abolishing the Phar-
macist’s Veto: An Argument in Support of a Wrongful Conception Cause of Action Against Pharma-
cists Who Refuse to Provide Emergency Contraception, 80 SO. CAL. L. REV. 865 (2007); Lora Cic-
coni, Pharmacist Refusals and Third-Party Interests: A Proposed Judicial Approach to Pharmacist 
Conscience Clauses, 54 UCLA L. REV. 709 (2007); Matthew White, Conscience Clauses for Phar-
macists: The Struggle to Balance Conscience Rights With the Rights of Patients and Institutions, 
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er examples of restricting the range of available advice may include pro-
fessional advice on assisted reproductive technology (ART) for same-sex 
couples.93 Yet another example involves crisis pregnancy centers, at least 
to the extent that they hold themselves out as providing professional ad-
vice. 
The following discussion first distinguishes between motivations and 
justifications, animated by the idea of public reason. In short, public jus-
tifications should be based on reasons that individuals of divergent back-
grounds—moral, religious, political—can accept as valid in a pluralist 
society.94 Translated to the professional realm, the shared acceptance of 
advice follows when it is based on justifications internal to the 
knowledge community. The shared ways of knowing and reasoning are 
accepted as valid among members of the knowledge community irre-
spective of their personal commitments. Likewise, clients seeking a pro-
fessional’s advice will accept professional advice justified by the 
knowledge community’s shared ways of knowing and reasoning as such, 
whether or not their priors otherwise align with the advicegiving profes-
sional’s. Acceptance of professional advice follows from its nature as 
expert knowledge, not based on individual exogenous commitments. Ap-
plied to the context of professional advice, when the justifications are 
exogenous, the dissenting professional typically does not serve the ex-
pectations of the knowledge community or individual clients.  
The two final sections interrogate whether mitigating these expecta-
tions is possible by providing disclosures of professionals’ exogenous 
commitments to their clients, or whether departure from the professional 
                                                                                                                       
2005 WISC. L. REV. 16211; Charu A. Chandrasekhar, RX for Drugstore Discrimination: Challenging 
Pharmacy Refusals to Dispense Prescription Contraceptives Under State Public Accommodations 
Laws, 70 ALB. L. REV. 55 (2006); Sarah J. Vokes, Just Fill the Prescription: Why Illinois’ Emergen-
cy Rule Appropriately Resolves the Tension Between Religion and Contraception in the Pharmacy 
Context, 24 L. & INEQ. 399 (2006); Melissa Duvall, Pharmacy Conscience Clause Statutes: Consti-
tutional Religious “Accommodations” or Unconstitutional “Substantial Burdens” on Women?, 55 
AM. U. L. REV. 1485 (2006); Amy Bergquist, Note, Pharmacist Refusals: Dispensing (With) Reli-
gious Accommodation Under Title VII, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1073 (2006); Brittany L. Grimes, Note, 
The Plan B for Plan B: The New Dual Over-the-Counter and Prescription Status of Plan B and Its 
Impact Upon Pharmacists, Consumers, and Conscience Clauses, 41 GA. L. REV. 1395 (2007). 
93 Cf. Douglas NeJaime, Griswold’s Progeny: Assisted Reproduction, Procreative Liberty, and 
Sexual Orientation Equality, 124 YALE L.J. F. 340, 340-41 (2015) (“As same-sex couples have 
gained access to marriage, some who opposed same-sex marriage have shifted their views, express-
ing support for same-sex equality while attempting to limit its impact. In particular, some now ac-
cept same-sex marriage while maintaining their commitment to biological, gender-differentiated 
parenting.”). However, it is doubtful that such restrictions specifically targeted at gay parents are 
tenable: “State laws on assisted reproductive technology may still be based on an exclusive model of 
different sex couples, but that model will not survive.” Lupu, Moving Targets, supra note 19, at 4 
n.18. But see Christian Medical & Dental Associations, Assisted Reproductive Technology Ethics 
Statement http://cmda.org/resources/publication/assisted-reproductive-technology-ethics-statement 
(emphasizing the heterosexual, married two-parent family). 
94 See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1996). 
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consensus due to exogenous—and here, primarily religious—reasons is 
generally justifiable under an exemptions regime. 
1. Motivations and Justifications 
External outliers base their divergence from professional consensus 
on exogenous reasons; often, their disagreement will be religiously moti-
vated and therefore exogenous to the ways of knowing and reasoning of 
the knowledge community. Take the pro-life pharmacist as an example. 
Here, motivation and justification for refusing to provide comprehensive 
advice align: the motivating reason the pharmacist refuses to advise on 
certain drugs is his religious, political, or philosophical opposition to 
abortion. The justification is the same. It does not matter whether scien-
tifically the drugs act in a certain way, as long as the pharmacist believes 
that they do.  
But motivation and justification do not necessarily align. Outliers 
who justify their departure from the professional consensus in terms ex-
ogenous to professional discourse—such as religious outliers—must be 
distinguished from outliers who may have a religious disagreement with 
the profession, but who nonetheless purport to share the knowledge basis 
of the profession to support their views.  
For example, the National Association for Research and Therapy of 
Homosexuality (NARTH)—one of the last remaining professional organ-
izations that supports conversion therapy95—portrays itself as an alterna-
tive to the American Psychiatric Association. A founding member of 
NARTH asserts that “NARTH came into existence in response to threats 
to take away the right of patients to choose therapy to eliminate or lessen 
same-sex attraction.”96 The group claims to “defend[] the right of thera-
pists to provide such treatment and provides a forum for the dissemina-
tion of research on homosexuality.”97 Importantly, the group explicitly 
invokes the knowledge basis and methodology of the profession:  
“Concerned that professional organizations and publications in the mental 
health field have fallen under the control of those who would use them to 
forward social constructionist theories, political agendas, and advocacy re-
search, NARTH has fought for a return to established theoretical approach-
es, solid research, therapy that puts the patient first, and freedom to discuss, 
debate, and disagree.”98  
                                                     
95 On the role of NARTH in the JONAH litigation and exclusion of conversion therapy expert 
witnesses, see infra notes 225 and 239-241 and accompanying text. 
96 Benjamin Kaufman, Why NARTH? The American Psychiatric Association’s Destructive and 
Blind Pursuit of Political Correctness, 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 423 (2002). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. (emphasis added). 
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The motivating factor for believing that homosexuality is wrong and 
must be remedied by therapy may be religious,99 but the organization 
explicitly claims to place itself within the discourse of the knowledge 
community. Thus, despite the perhaps religious motivation, the justifica-
tion is framed in terms of scientific discourse of the profession. 
So what should we make of motivations and justifications for outlier 
status? When motivation and justification align, and both are based on 
exogenous reasoning—as in the pro-life pharmacist example—the pro-
fessional is an external outlier placing himself outside of the knowledge 
community. The justification for departure at its core is a rejection of the 
knowledge community’s shared ways of knowing and reasoning. But as 
long as the justification is framed in terms of the discourse of the 
knowledge community, I am inclined to consider the outliers internal 
outliers. Their justification (at least ostensibly) respects the shared ways 
of knowing and reasoning. Does this invite dishonesty? This invokes a 
general problem in the theory of public reason.100 But as long as a profes-
sional justification is possible, I am inclined to disregard the potential 
dishonesty as to motives. On a functional level, it will be virtually im-
possible for courts to make judgments about subjectivity in this area. It 
will generally be possible, however, to presume honesty as to motive and 
judge the justification in relation to the knowledge community’s stand-
ards. Indeed, this is analogous to the tort regime where professional ad-
vice is measured against the profession’s standard.  
True external outliers will base their justifications on exogenous fac-
tors. Here, another useful illustration is provided by professional associa-
tions that explicitly frame their mission in religious terms. Individual 
professionals may understand their professional duty as part and parcel 
of their religious duty.101 The Christian Medical & Dental Associations 
(CMDA), for instance, more than 16,000 members strong, represents 
such professionals.102 CMDA’s Ethics and Scientific Statements “are 
based on scientific, moral and biblical principles.”103 The Homosexuality 
                                                     
99 Id. (“When people are discriminated against on the basis of their religious beliefs or denied 
help that they believe is in their best interests, they need an advocate to defend their rights.”) and id. 
at 440 (“If this trend persists, persons with strongly held religious beliefs may be unwilling to seek 
help from professional therapists. Religious groups may be forced to act as alternative professional 
organizations, and the demand for the entire mental health profession will be substantially re-
duced.”). 
100 See, e.g., Micah Schwartzman, The Sincerity of Public Reason, 19 J. POL. PHILOSOPHY 375 
(2011). 
101 See, e.g., Christian Medical & Dental Associations, Christian Physician’s Oath Ethics 
Statement, http://cmda.org/resources/publication/christian-physicians-oath-ethics-statement (“With 
gratitude to God, faith in Christ Jesus, and dependence on the Holy Spirit, I publicly profess my 
intent to practice medicine for the glory of God.”). 
102 Christian Medical & Dental Associations, About Our Organization, http://cmda.org/about/  
103 http://cmda.org/issues/page/cmdas-ethics-statements  
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Ethics Statement, for example, reads: “While recognizing the need to 
reach out in love to those struggling with same sex attraction, CMDA 
opposes the practice of homosexual acts on biblical, medical, and social 
grounds.”104 The medical grounds largely depart from the scientific con-
sensus.105 Notably, CMDA embraces conversion therapy and in doing so 
cites NARTH or NARTH-affiliated individuals.106  
The religious justification is more clearly articulated in the CMDA 
statement on ART, in which it sorts available reproductive technologies 
into “consistent with God’s design for reproduction,” “morally problem-
atic,” and “inconsistent with God’s design for the family.”107 The family 
is defined as a married, heterosexual couple, resting on explicitly reli-
gious terms where “marriage and the family are the basic social units 
designed by God. Marriage is a man and a woman making an exclusive 
commitment for love, companionship, intimacy, spiritual union, and, in 
most cases, procreation.”108 Providing professional advice concerning 
ART consistent with the ethics statement will necessarily limit the range 
of options otherwise available. And the justification for limiting profes-
sional advice will rest purely on exogenous considerations.  
Perhaps, then, those professionals whose justifications are based on 
exogenous factors constitute their own knowledge community, one that 
should not be held to conform to the standards of the profession. Instead, 
perhaps they should be held to the standard of the “Christian doctor” or 
“Christian lawyer,” or the standard of a coreligionist in the same profes-
sion. But here, the self-understanding of the group is relevant. The 
CMDA, for instance, addresses this issue in its Professionalism Ethics 
Statement in which they define themselves as “medical professionals.”109 
                                                     
104 http://cmda.org/resources/publication/homosexuality-ethics-statement  
105 Medical 
 The causes of same-sex attraction appear to be multi-factorial and may include de-
velopmental, psychosocial, environmental and biological factors. There is no credi-
ble evidence at this time that same-sex attraction is genetically determined. 
 Acting on homosexual attraction is voluntary. Claims of genetic or environmental 
determinism do not relieve individuals of moral responsibility for their sexual be-
havior. 
 Homosexual behavior can be changed. There is valid evidence that many individu-
als who desired to abstain from homosexual acts have been able to do so. 
 Some homosexual acts are physically harmful because they disregard normal hu-
man anatomy and function. These acts are associated with increased risks of tissue 
injury, organ malfunction, and infectious diseases. These and other factors result in 
a significantly shortened life expectancy. 
 Among those involved in homosexual acts, there is an increased incidence of drug 
and/or alcohol dependence, compulsive sexual behavior, anxiety, depression, and 
suicide. 
Id. 
106 http://cmda.org/library/doclib/homosexualityw-references.pdf  
107 http://cmda.org/resources/publication/assisted-reproductive-technology-ethics-statement  
108 Id. 
109 http://cmda.org/resources/publication/professionalism-ethics-statement  
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Moreover, the CMDA Malpractice Ethics Statement explicitly references 
the standard of care applicable in ordinary physician malpractice.110 By 
these metrics, the CMDA sees itself as part of the knowledge communi-
ty, not a particular sub-group or separate community. To the extent that 
professionals claim to be part of the knowledge community, however, 
they ought to be bound to its knowledge basis and methodology. 
As the CMDA examples illustrate, it may not always be easy to clas-
sify the justification as exogenous. Moreover, the justification may differ 
from issue to issue. With respect to immunization, for example, the 
CMDA “supports the current scientific literature that validates the gen-
eral practice of immunization as a safe, effective, and recommended pro-
cedure.”111 Generalizations, in short, are difficult in this area. But the 
conceptual line to be drawn along a shared knowledge basis and method-
ology is theoretically consistent. And typically, courts will be able to 
conduct the necessary fact-specific inquiry, as they already do so in other 
areas such as tort law and evidence. 
2. Expectations 
The expectations of the knowledge community and of clients toward 
professionals provide another reason why external outliers should gener-
ally be considered to place themselves outside of the knowledge commu-
nity. With respect to the professional’s advice-giving function, the 
knowledge community’s interest lies in having individual professionals 
render accurate, comprehensive advice. This does not occur when the 
individual professional disseminates advice based on a knowledge basis 
exogenous to that of the knowledge community. Correspondingly, the 
individual professional has an autonomy interest in communicating the 
message according to the standards of the profession to which she be-
longs.112 It is this bond that is destroyed when professionals place them-
selves outside the knowledge community for exogenous reasons. In re-
ciprocal fashion, the individual professional’s interest lies in preserving 
the integrity of the knowledge community’s insights just as the 
knowledge community’s interest lie in having the individual professional 
communicate its insights correctly.  
A critic might object that this understanding places the membership 
in a profession above other constitutive aspects of a professional’s identi-
ty. I do not mean to suggest that all other aspects of a professional’s 
                                                     
110 http://cmda.org/resources/publication/malpractice-ethics-statement (“The ‘standard of care’ 
refers to those acts which a reasonable physician of like training or skill would do in the same or 
similar situation.”). 
111 http://cmda.org/resources/publication/immunization-ethics-statement  
112 Haupt, supra note 6, at 1272-73 (arguing that this interest goes to the identity of the profes-
sional as a member of the profession). 
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identity are secondary, and this is particularly true for the professional’s 
religious beliefs. But the focus here is on the function of knowledge 
communities and the role of the advice-giving individual professional 
within the professional-client relationship. In his position as conduit be-
tween the knowledge community and the client, the defining feature in 
that particular relationship is the professional role. In the professional-
client relationship, the individual rendering professional advice is a pro-
fessional first. 
The professional-client relationship is typically characterized by an 
asymmetry of knowledge; the client seeks the professional’s advice pre-
cisely because of this asymmetry. The very reason the professional’s ad-
vice is valuable to the client is thus predicated on the knowledge the pro-
fessional possesses and the client lacks.113 The client’s interests are only 
served if the professional communicates information that is accurate (un-
der the knowledge community’s current assessment), reliable, and per-
sonally tailored to the specific situation of the listener. To bridge the 
knowledge gap, and to ensure the protection of the client’s decisional 
autonomy interests, the professional has to communicate all information 
necessary to make an informed decision to the client.114 Viewed through 
a lens of public reason from the perspective of the client, the client’s ex-
pectation is that the professional will not operate based on justifications 
that are not shared by the profession. 
If the client does not receive full information, she may not know 
what is being withheld, or even that any information is being withheld.115 
Furthermore, the client does not know what is contested professional 
knowledge and what is not. A patient, for example, may encounter a doc-
tor who for religious reasons will not provide advice on certain treatment 
options or medications. But the justification for these omissions will not 
be based on professional knowledge. In the spirit of public reason, the 
client must reasonably be able to expect that professional advice will be 
based upon reasons internal to the knowledge community rather than 
individual, exogenous justifications for departure. 
3. Disclosure 
Could this information deficit be cured by disclosure? The advice-
giving professional could tell the client that the advice she dispenses is 
                                                     
113 See, e.g., King v. Christie, 767 F.3d 216, 232 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Licensed professionals, 
through their education and training, have access to a corpus of specialized knowledge that their 
clients usually do not. Indeed, the value of the professional’s services stems largely from her ability 
to apply this specialized knowledge to a client’s individual circumstances.”). 
114 Haupt, supra note 6, at 1271. 
115 See, e.g., Jill Morrison & Micole Allekotte, Duty First: Towards Patient-Centered Care and 
Limitations on the Right to Refuse for Moral, Religious or Ethical Reasons, 9 AVE MARIA L. REV. 
141, 148-49 (2010). 
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limited. The state might even require that any professional whose advice 
departs from the knowledge community’s insights due to exogenous jus-
tifications provide such a disclosure. The previous discussion already 
addressed some potential problems of disclosure in the healthcare infra-
structure.116 A prominent current example of litigation over disclosure 
requirements involves crisis pregnancy centers.117 Often linked to a reli-
gious organization, the mission of these centers is to dissuade women 
from terminating their pregnancy.118 This mission, however, is some-
times obscured from the advice-seeking client.119 
With respect to the counseling provided at these facilities, the 
threshold question is whether crisis pregnancy centers engage in com-
mercial, professional, or some other kind of speech. Courts have been 
ambiguous at best in classifying the advice dispensed at the centers.120 
Nonetheless, some commentators have been quick to analyze the speech 
as commercial.121 But doing so may rest on a misconception.122 Other 
scholars have called this classification as commercial speech into ques-
tion. As Jessie Hill notes, “[t]he counseling transaction itself looks like 
                                                     
116 See supra Part I.A.2. 
117 See, e.g., Evergreen Ass’n Inc. v. City of New York, 801 F.Supp.2d 197 (SDNY 2011) 
[hereinafter Evergreen I] aff’d in part and vacated in part Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New 
York, 740 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014) [hereinafter Evergreen II] cert. denied 135 S.Ct. 435 (2014); 
Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery County, 779 F.Supp.2d 456 (D. Md. 2011) [hereinafter Centro 
Tepeyac I] aff’d Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty, 722 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 2013) [hereinafter 
Centro Tepeyac II]; Greater Baltimore Center for Pregnancy Concerns v. Mayor and City Council of 
Baltimore, 721 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2013). See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclo-
sures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1340-51 (2014); B. Jessie Hill, Casey Meets the Crisis Pregnancy 
Centers, 43 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 59 (2015); Kathryn E. Gilbert, Note, Commercial Speech in Crisis: 
Crisis Pregnancy Center Regulations and Definitions of Commercial Speech, 111 MICH. L. REV. 591 
(2013); Molly Duane, Note, The Disclaimer Dichotomy: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled 
Speech in Disclosure Ordinances Governing Crisis Pregnancy Centers and Laws Mandating Biased 
Physician Counseling, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 349 (2013); Megan Burrows, Note, The Cubbyhole 
Conundrum: First Amendment Doctrine in the Face of Deceptive Crisis Pregnancy Center Speech, 
45 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 896 (2014); Alice X. Chen, Crisis Pregnancy Centers: Impeding the 
Right to Informed Decision Making, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 933 (2013); Kristen Gallacher, 
Protecting Women from Deception: The Constitutionality of Disclosure Requirements in Pregnancy 
Centers, 33 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 113 (2011). 
118 Corbin, supra note 117, at 1340. 
119 Id. at 1340-41. 
120 In Evergreen II, 740 F.3d at 245, the Second Circuit left open which standard it applied 
(“[W]e need not decide the issue, because our conclusions are the same under either intermediate 
scrutiny . . . or strict scrutiny. . . .”). The District Court in Centro Tepeyac I found the speech to be 
“neither commercial nor professional” and applied strict scrutiny. Centro Tepeyac I, 779 F.Supp.2d 
at 463. The Fourth Circuit, upon review, “commend[ed] the court for its careful and restrained anal-
ysis.” Centro Tepeyac II, 722 F.3d at 192.  
121 See, e.g., Kathryn E. Gilbert, Note, Commercial Speech in Crisis: Crisis Pregnancy Center 
Regulations and Definitions of Commercial Speech, 111 MICH. L. REV. 591 (2013). But see Corbin, 
supra note 117, at 1343 (“The courts usually found that the speech was not commercial speech.”). 
122 Cf. Haupt, supra note 6, at 1264-68 (discussing and rejecting the analogy of commercial and 
professional speech). 
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the kind of one-on-one, fiduciary relationship that . . . appears to be the 
hallmark of professional speech.”123  
Given the stated mission of the centers, it seems clear that the advice 
rendered would generally not qualify as comprehensive and accurate pro-
fessional advice.124 At the same time, at least in some instances employ-
ees at these facilities may be holding themselves out as professionals, 
leading clients to expect professional advice.125 Assuming, then, that at 
least some crisis pregnancy centers should be considered to provide pro-
fessional advice, the advice rendered must measure up to professional 
standards.126 Thus, from a professional speech perspective, regulation of 
such speech is entirely unproblematic—because it is unprofessional ad-
vice to begin with.  
What about the disclosure requirements imposed by the state?127 In 
principle, such disclosure mechanisms will inform the client of the lim-
ited scope of professional advice.128 Similarly, doctor-patient matching, 
at least theoretically, might provide an attractive solution.129 In choosing 
their doctors, “patients may consider not only the physician’s expertise, 
                                                     
123 Hill, supra note 117, at 66 (“Unlike other false or unsubstantiated health claims that may be 
made in various fora, the CPC speech occurs within a counseling relationship in which the listener 
puts trust in the presumed professional and assumes that the professional will act in her best inter-
ests, thus invoking the state’s particularly strong interest in protecting the listener.”). 
124 Corbin, supra note 117, at 1342 (“Counseling varies, but most versions would violate medi-
cal ethics, as the goal is not to fully and accurately inform women of their medical options but to 
convince them to forgo abortion by any means necessary.”). See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Op Ed, In 
California, Free Speech Meets Abortion, L.A. TIMES Oct 16, 2015, 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-1016-chemerinsky-reproductive-fact-act-20151016-
story.html (“Crisis pregnancy centers have been known to spread false medical information and use 
scare tactics to dissuade their clients from seeking abortions.”); Aziza Ahmed, Informed Decision 
Making and Abortion: Crisis Pregnancy Centers, Informed Consent, and the First Amendment, 43 
J.L., MED. & ETHICS 51, 52 (2015)(noting that misinformation “includes telling women that there is 
a link between abortion and breast cancer, that they will experience psychological distress following 
abortion, and that there is the possibility for future infertility following an abortion.”).  
125 Id. at 1342 and id. at 1351 (“Women who respond to ‘Pregnant? Need Help? You have op-
tions’ advertisements and are administered pregnancy tests by people in white lab coats are led to 
believe that medical professionals will give them accurate and impartial medical advice. Instead, 
they are tricked into hearing false information and an ideological message.”). 
126 This does not mean that there may not be other forms of recourse. Certain activities could 
qualify as consumer fraud, for example, for the speech that falls into this category. 
127 See California Reproductive FACT Act, Cal Health & Saf Code §123470 et seq. (2015). 
128 Under the California Reproductive FACT Act, licensed healthcare facilities must display the 
following notice: “California has public programs that provide immediate free or low-cost access to 
comprehensive family planning services (including all FDA-approved methods of contraception), 
prenatal care, and abortion for eligible women. To determine whether you qualify, contact the coun-
ty social services office at [insert the telephone number].” Id. at §123472 (a)(1). Unlicensed facilities 
must display the following: “This facility is not licensed as a medical facility by the State of Califor-
nia and has no licensed medical provider who provides or directly supervises the provision of ser-
vices.” Id. at §123472 (b)(1).  
129 See, e.g., HOLLY FERNANDEZ LYNCH, CONFLICTS OF CONSCIENCE IN HEALTH CARE 79-97 
(2008). 
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but also whether they have shared beliefs or points of view.”130 However, 
in practice, there is a significant filtering problem that may lead to inade-
quate communication of knowledge from doctor to patient. Imagine a 
doctor informing a patient that, due to his faith, he will dispense only 
advice that is consistent with his faith. Even if the patient is of the same 
faith, it is at least questionable whether it will be obvious to her which 
advice is left out as inconsistent with the professional’s faith. Just as pro-
fessional knowledge communities are not monolithic, faith communities 
are not monolithic. What is acceptable in light of religious doctrine for 
one member of a particular religion may be unacceptable for a coreli-
gionist.131 But even if disclosure puts the client on notice, the dissenting 
professional is still not communicating the full range of professional 
knowledge. And it would reintroduce an element of paternalism—
physicians alone deciding on behalf of the patient what information the 
patient needed to know. On the tort side, this is exactly the situation to be 
remedied by the doctrine of informed consent.132 The American Medical 
Association puts it this way: “The patient’s right to self-decision can be 
effectively exercised only if the patient possesses enough information to 
enable an informed choice.”133 Thus, a disclosure regime only partially 
cures the problems outlined in the prior discussion. 
4. Exemptions 
To what extent is the departure from expectations justified by ex-
emptions? Writing more than a decade ago in the context of medical 
care, health law scholar Alta Charo posed the following set of questions:  
                                                     
130 Sonia M. Suter, The First Amendment and Physician Speech in Reproductive Decision Mak-
ing, 43 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 22, 27 (2015). 
131 And even in hierarchically organized religions, individual members may depart from offi-
cial doctrine in large numbers. See, e.g., Michael Lipks, Majority of U.S. Catholics’ opinions run 
counter to church on contraception, homosexuality, Sept 19, 2013, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2013/09/19/majority-of-u-s-catholics-opinions-run-counter-to-church-on-contraception-
homosexuality/  
132 Suter, supra note 130, at 27. 
133 Ahmed, supra note 124, at 52 (quoting American Medical Association, “Opinion 8.08 - In-
formed Consent”). But see Cameron O’Brien & Robin Fretwell Wilson, When States Regulate 
Emergency Contraceptives Like Abortion, What Should Guide Disclosure?, 43 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 
72 (2015) O’Brien and Wilson argue that “following professional norms may not yield disclosures 
consistent with what women say they want to know.” O’Brien & Wilson, supra note 133, at 78. In 
the context of informed consent, they concede that “[g]enerally, the risks of a given health care 
procedure are scientifically resolvable, and therefore patients can benefit from the measured judg-
ment of health care professionals as a group.”  O’Brien & Wilson, supra note 133, at 78. However, 
they argue that abortion is different: “But unlike ordinary medical procedures, what constitutes life 
or when life begins are subjects that are not scientifically resolvable. A physician armed with medi-
cal knowledge cannot provide an answer to women that women themselves cannot supply to these 
questions. Moreover, despite the allure of professional norms, sometimes deciding what counts as 
the professional view is not so easy . . .” O’Brien & Wilson, supra note 133, at 79-80. The solution, 
however, is more information rather than less. And disagreements within the profession should be 
worked out within the knowledge community rather than be decided via state regulation. 
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What does it mean to be a professional in the United States? Does pro-
fessionalism include the rather old-fashioned notion of putting others 
before oneself? Should professionals avoid exploiting their positions to 
pursue an agenda separate from that of their profession? And perhaps 
most crucial, to what extent do professionals have a collective duty to 
ensure that their profession provides nondiscriminatory access to all 
professional services?134  
Today, these questions remain largely unanswered—and since then, 
leading up to the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,135 
and certainly in its aftermath, new sites of contestation have emerged.136 
Contemporaneously, conscience exemptions have been at the forefront of 
legal and political debate for some time now, culminating most recently 
in the Hobby Lobby case.137 One reaction to the expansion of marriage 
equality has been to call for exemptions from generally applicable anti-
discrimination laws. These would include providers of professional ser-
vices.138 The CMDA Same-Sex “Marriage” [sic] Public Policy Statement 
for instance strongly supports such measures.139 An expansive body of 
scholarship addresses the plethora of questions surrounding exemptions. 
My point here is narrow and conceptual, and concerns only the site 
of negotiation for potential exemptions granted to professionals refusing 
to provide comprehensive professional advice. Exemptions for profes-
sionals should be negotiated within the knowledge community. Indeed, 
historically, this has been the case in the health context: “In medicine, 
until recently, legislative protection has focused on those objections 
grounded in professional ethical obligations.”140 Objections to marriage 
equality, however, are unlikely to be rooted in professional norms: 
“Whereas doctors cite their obligation to preserve life to refuse assisted 
suicide, those who decline to perform IVF for lesbian couples cannot 
anchor their refusal in professional ethics. Indeed, medical ethics prohibit 
such acts as impermissible discrimination.” The same is true outside of 
the medical context. As Elizabeth Sepper notes, “if a tax or family law 
                                                     
134 R. Alta Charo, The Celestial Fire of Conscience – Refusing to Deliver Medical Care, 352 N. 
ENGL. J. MED. 2471, 2473 (2005). 
135 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). 
136 See generally Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation: Contraception, 
Abortion, Same-Sex Marriage, and Other Clashes Between Religion and the State, 53 B.C. L. REV. 
1417 (2012). 
137 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014). 
138 Sepper, supra note 1, at 724 (“Religious organizations, small businesses, and professionals 
would be relieved of certain obligations of nondiscrimination and would avoid legal liability.”) and 
id. at 743 ([S]ome objectors could belong to professions characterized by moral complexity and 
shared ethics (including medicine.)”). 
139 http://cmda.org/resources/publication/same-sex-marriage-public-policy-statement  
140 Sepper, supra note 1, 726. 
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attorney objected to serving gay married couples, he or she would be 
hard pressed to identify the ethical norm supporting the objection.”141  
A critic might object that the professions do not necessarily have a 
track record that makes them particularly trustworthy. Consider the fol-
lowing examples: the American Medical Association supported the crim-
inalization of abortion;142 homosexuality was considered a mental illness 
by professional groups until the 1970s; members of the American Psy-
chological Association allegedly supported the C.I.A. torture program 
during the Bush administration;143 OLC lawyers provided bad advice in 
the torture memos.144 How, then, can we trust professionals to properly 
negotiate conscience exemptions? Perhaps the best answer is that among 
the finite number of potential decisionmakers, the professions are the 
least bad option. State legislatures, as the examples throughout this Arti-
cle show, are increasingly emboldened to explicitly contradict profes-
sional knowledge. Courts may lack the expertise to evaluate the full ef-
fects of granting certain exemptions on the ability of professionals to 
provide services. In other words, deference to the professions on negoti-
ating exemptions may be a second best, but still preferable option. And 
the professions are capable of correcting course.145 Moreover, by giving 
the professions the authority to self-regulate, and by decisions made in 
other areas of the law—most prominently, in the tort law governing pro-
fessional malpractice—the question has been resolved in favor of the 
professions despite such concerns beyond the narrow context of con-
science exemptions. The idea of symmetry between tort liability and 
First Amendment protection, then, normatively supports this deference. 
B. Internal Outliers 
Internal outliers share the knowledge community’s notions of validi-
ty, methodology, and intersubjective understanding. Their results deviate 
from the “mainstream;” yet, their outlier status is based on the applica-
tion of the agreed-upon methods to the same data, only to reach diver-
gent results. Ultimately, internal outlier status is thus grounded in the 
                                                     
141 Id. at 743. 
142 See Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-
Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 1000-02 (2007); Reva Siegel, Reasoning 
from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 
44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 280-318 (1992). 
143 See James Risen, American Psychological Association Bolstered C.I.A. Torture Program, 
Report Says, NEW YORK TIMES, April 30, 2015, http://nyti.ms/1P9nqK1; James Risen, Outside 
Psychologists Shielded U.S. Torture Program, Report Finds, NEW YORK TIMES, July 10, 2015,  
http://nyti.ms/1fuWwC1   
144 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/20/us/politics/20justice.html?_r=0  
145 See, e.g., James Risen, Psychologists Approve Ban on Role in National Security Interroga-
tions, NEW YORK TIMES, August 7, 2015 http://nyti.ms/1OVu4V1  
166
32 Unprofessional Advice [3/20/2017  
  
same set of professional insights. This is the key to understanding that 
knowledge communities are not monolithic. The same data may be inter-
preted in several ways. As a matter of tort liability, the resulting profes-
sional advice, consequently, is “good” professional advice falling within 
the range of defensible professional knowledge.146 Different assessments 
of shared knowledge, if valid under the agreed upon methodology, will 
produce good professional advice, even if it departs from the main-
stream.  
But internal outliers can also produce bad professional advice. If the 
assessment of the shared knowledge is faulty or based on methodological 
errors, it will not result in defensible professional advice. One example, 
discussed in more detail in Part IV, is the study linking certain childhood 
vaccines to autism.147   
The more difficult case is that in which outliers assert to be relying 
on the same knowledge basis without outright falsified or otherwise er-
roneous use of data. Again, NARTH provides a useful example. Under 
that group’s account, NARTH and the American Psychiatric Association 
operate based on different paradigms.148 The claim that the American 
Psychiatric Association and other professional organizations in the men-
tal health field have been hijacked by “gay activists” and research contra-
ry to their goals has been silenced and scientists oppressed illustrates that 
NARTH rejects the same methods of reasoning while also asserting its 
competence in the same field. Indeed, they portray the debate as one 
“within mental health professional organizations.”149 Thus, they do not 
purport to be part of a different knowledge community. The argument, 
rather, is that political pressure led to the delisting of homosexuality as a 
mental disorder from the DSM in 1973: “A review of the history reveals . 
. . that the decision was not based on science but was the response of an 
organization under siege by gay activists.”150 In other words, NARTH 
accuses the mainstream of having attained outlier status. These compet-
ing claims can only be overcome by the knowledge community itself. 
Thus, for internal outliers we must decide whose advice clears the 
bar of good professional advice and whose advice does not. The remain-
der of this Article is concerned only with internal outliers.  
                                                     
146 Haupt, supra note 6, at 1284-87. 
147 See infra Part IV.A.1. 
148 Kaufman, supra note 96, at 425 (“The paradigm of the gay activists holds that psychological 
theories and practice are social constructs and, therefore, are subject to political negotiation. The 
paradigm of NARTH holds that treatment provided by therapists should be guided by cumulative 
clinical experience and valid research carried out by responsible professionals”). 
149 Id. at 425. 
150 Id. at 433. 
167
3/20/2017] 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. ___ (forthcoming 2017) 33 
III. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF DEFENSIBLE KNOWLEDGE: OUTLIERS IN 
TORT LAW AND EVIDENCE 
In order to determine the range of acceptable advice within the 
knowledge community, it is helpful to interrogate two areas of the law 
that have dealt with similar issues: the tort law of professional malprac-
tice and the law of evidence on expert testimony. What is the scope of 
good advice for First Amendment purposes? To answer this question, 
this Part brings these two areas of law into the conversation that have 
traditionally asked similar questions, and that therefore may provide 
guidance on how to draw the line between professional and unprofes-
sional advice.  
Tort law has long acknowledged that knowledge communities are 
not monolithic; so has the law of evidence governing the admissibility of 
expert testimony.151 Both provide normative support to the position that 
the distinction between good and bad advice should be drawn by the 
knowledge community along the lines of a shared methodology and 
shared ways of knowing and reasoning. Whether advice based on a 
shared methodology and common ways of knowing and reasoning clears 
the bar of good advice on the substance, moreover, is also up to the 
knowledge community. Additionally, from an institutional competence 
and workability standpoint, both tort law and the law of evidence govern-
ing the admissibility of expert testimony illustrate that courts are able to 
accommodate the fact that a range of knowledge may constitute good 
advice. 
This Part first turns to the treatment of outliers in tort law, which has 
traditionally accounted for the fact that a range of opinions may be valid 
for purposes of defending against claims of professional malpractice lia-
bility. In particular the “respectable minority” or “two schools of 
thought” doctrines, which are available as defenses against malpractice 
claims in many jurisdictions, serve this function. Ultimately, it is up to 
the knowledge community to determine what constitutes good advice—
for malpractice liability and for First Amendment purposes alike. First 
Amendment protection of professional speech thus constitutes the flip 
side of imposing malpractice liability. Conceptually, they are two sides 
of the same coin.152  
                                                     
151 The two interact in a significant way. See, e.g., Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does 
Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 472-73 
(2005) (“In federal courts, where the decision is legally binding, Daubert has become a potent 
weapon of tort reform by causing judges to scrutinize scientific evidence more closely. Tort reform 
efforts often focus on medical malpractice, products liability, and toxic torts—all cases in which 
scientific evidence is likely to play a decisive or at least highly influential role.”). 
152 Haupt, supra note 6, at 1285. 
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This Part then turns to the law of evidence. Robert Post pointed out 
the parallels between the formation of expert knowledge and the law of 
evidence: “We rely on expert ‘knowledge’ precisely because it has been 
vetted and reviewed by those whose judgment we have reason to trust. . . 
This is explicitly the perspective adopted by federal courts when they 
determine whether to admit expert testimony . . . under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702.”153 Professionals, importantly, are experts recognized un-
der FRE 702, though the category of experts under that rule is much 
larger.154 Whether expert testimony is admissible and subject only to 
cross-examination and counter-experts, or whether it is to be excluded 
provides a micro-scale study of the functioning of expert opinions out-
side the courtroom setting. In the modern litigation setting, “the twenti-
eth-century trial judge turned into an active gatekeeper, charged with the 
responsibility of screening unreliable scientific evidence away from the 
jury.”155 The underlying interests—ascertaining the reliability of opin-
ions—are the same. Thus, both tort law and the law of evidence offer 
important insights that can guide theorizing the boundaries of First 
Amendment protection for professional speech.  
A. Tort Law  
Tort law sanctions unprofessional advice as professional malpractice 
or, in the medical context, as medical malpractice. Processes of profes-
sionalization are mirrored in the emergence of tort causes of action for 
professional malpractice. Take the mental health field as an example. 
Mental health providers find themselves increasingly exposed to mal-
practice claims as the field becomes increasingly science-based and 
standards of care become entrenched.156 The irony is not lost on com-
                                                     
153 POST, supra note 13, at 8. At the same time, Post juxtaposes this understanding of expert 
knowledge with underlying First Amendment interests: “The continuous discipline of peer judgment, 
which virtually defines expert knowledge, is quite incompatible with deep and fundamental First 
Amendment doctrines that impose a ‘requirement of viewpoint neutrality’ on regulations of speech 
and that apply ‘the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose 
differential burdens upon speech because of its content.’” Id. at 9. A First Amendment theory of 
professional speech focused on knowledge communities, however, is able to resolve this tension. 
154 Rule 702. Testimony by Expert Witnesses 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may 
testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: 
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; 
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and 
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. 
155 Tal Golan, Revisiting the History of Scientific Expert Testimony, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 879, 
880 (2008). 
156 See Thomas L. Hafemeister, Leah G. McLaughlin & Jessica Smith, Parity at a Price: The 
Emerging Professional Liability of Mental Health Providers, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29, 31 (2013). 
(continued next page) 
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mentators who point out that the very fact that treatments have improved 
creates the opportunity for recipients of such care “to pursue tort claims 
challenging the adequacy of the care they received.”157 A variety of men-
tal health care providers may be the target of such claims: physicians 
such as psychiatrists, as well as psychologists, social workers, and coun-
selors.158 Conceptually, it is important to remember that the profession 
sets the standard of care in these cases.159 While there has been a shift 
from the customary practice standard, which provided “safety in num-
bers,” to the reasonably prudent physician standard, which relies more on 
an evidence-based approach than customary practices,160 it is the profes-
sion itself that determines what constitutes reasonable care, and courts 
have long awarded deference to the professions in such cases.161 Expert 
testimony typically establishes what qualifies as the applicable standard 
of care.162 
The development of the standard of care results from contestation 
within the knowledge community. Scholars acknowledge that, given the 
“lack of consensus regarding the diagnosis of mental disorders and the 
appropriate course of treatment for a given diagnosis,” it is difficult to 
establish the standard of care.163 In the mental health field, “the defining 
question in these cases is often whether the mental health provider, prac-
ticing in a field rife with uncertainty but in which substantial empirical 
progress is being made, made an error that should incur liability.”164 The 
tort law of professional malpractice, in other words, takes into account 
the changing nature of the profession.  
                                                                                                                       
See also Steven R. Smith, Mental Health Malpractice in the 1990s, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 209 (1991). 
The same was true in medical malpractice in the nineteenth century. See, e.g., Catherine T. Struve, 
Doctors, the Adversary System, and Procedural Reform in Medical Liability Litigation, 72 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 943, 950 (2004) (noting that “progress in medical knowledge also led to malpractice 
suits.”). 
157 Hafemeister, McLaughlin & Smith, supra note 156, at 33. See also Struve, supra note 156, 
at 948 (“Improvements in medical knowledge and technology have heightened consumer expecta-
tions, and have led to lawsuits over imperfect results where previously—under less sophisticated 
treatment—no suit would have been possible.”). 
158 Hafemeister, McLaughlin & Smith, supra note 156, at 36 (“Suits targeting nonphysicians 
are typically referred to as professional liability claims, while suits aimed at physicians are catego-
rized as medical malpractice claims. Their basic nature is similar, although the terminology may 
differ somewhat.”). 
159 Id. at 38. 
160 See, e.g., Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law 
at the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 173 (2000);  
161 Hafemeister, McLaughlin & Smith, supra note 156, at 38-40 (citing Pike v. Honsinger, 49 
N.E. 760 (N.Y. 1898)). 
162 Id. at 43; Struve, supra note 156, at 945 (“In many malpractice cases, each element of the 
claim—standard of care, breach, causation, and damages—requires medical expert testimony. Party-
retained experts are the standard source of such expertise in the United States.”). 
163 Hafemeister, McLaughlin & Smith, supra note 156, at 43. 
164 Id. at 40. 
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Doctrinally, tort law manifests its acknowledgement that a range of 
opinions may exist in any given field in the “respectable minority” or 
“two schools of thought” doctrine, which is a defense against malpractice 
claims in many jurisdictions.165 It states that “[w]here two or more 
schools of thought exist among competent members of the medical pro-
fession concerning proper medical treatment for a given ailment, each of 
which is supported by responsible medical authority, it is not malpractice 
to be among the minority . . . who follow one of the accepted schools.”166 
This doctrine explicitly accommodates the range of professional opin-
ions. The benchmark for liability will be established by reference to that 
particular school of thought: “The ‘school of thought’ to which mental 
health providers belong can have considerable significance in a profes-
sional liability suit, as their actions will typically be judged against what 
a reasonable practitioner of that school of thought would have done un-
der similar circumstances.”167 
Ambiguity persists both in terms of quantity and quality as courts are 
hesitant give numerical guidance on how large the minority must be or 
what counts as recognized and respected knowledge.168 Especially with 
respect to new developments, courts have noted that a publication re-
quirement would be problematic.169 Notwithstanding these ambiguities, 
the conceptually significant point is that the doctrine accommodates the 
fact that there may not be a single correct answer when it comes to pro-
fessional knowledge. Institutionally, moreover, it does not force courts to 
function as the referee choosing among contested expert knowledge.  
Critics suggest that the doctrine permits unproven or ineffective 
treatment, which is particularly relevant in a field such as mental health 
care, “where studies of the efficacy of various treatment alternatives are 
often lacking or highly contentious.”170 Moreover, the doctrine is im-
portant “when traditional treatments are called into question by emerging 
approaches.”171 Especially in a divided field such as mental health, where 
pharmacotherapy and psychoanalysis arguably embody divergent ap-
proaches, “if [one] orientation falls out of style or is deemed inappropri-
ate to address a client’s condition, its practitioners may be subject to lia-
bility.”172 If the law were to privilege pharmacotherapy, for instance, it 
                                                     
165 Id. at 40. 
166 Id. at 41 (quoting Chumbler v. McClure, 505 F.2d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 1974)). 
167 Hafemeister, McLaughlin & Smith, supra note 156, at 72. 
168 Tim Cramm, Arthur J. Hartz & Michael D. Green, Ascertaining Customary Care in Mal-
practice Cases: Asking Those Who Know, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 699, 705 (2002)(citing Jones v. 
Chidester, 610 A.2d 964 (Pa. 1992)). 
169 See id. (citing Gala v. Hamilton, 715 A.2d 1108 (Pa. 1998)). 
170 Id. at 41. 
171 Id.  
172 Id. at 42. 
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“would enhance the risk of liability for practitioners who primarily use 
traditional, psychoanalytic methods of treatment or other nonpharmaceu-
tical approaches. However, it also suggests physicians may face liability 
for failing to refer to a nonmedical mental health practitioner a patient 
who might be better served by receiving a treatment modality that is not 
focused on pharmaceutical agents.”173 As available treatment options 
multiply and treatment outcomes improve,174 individual providers must 
therefore be aware of the alternatives.  
How substantial the disagreement within the profession is, moreover, 
may itself be contested. In the mental health care context, some see psy-
chotherapy and psychopharmacology not as antithetical but rather as 
complementary.175 The courts cannot (and should not) be the arbiters of 
such disagreement. Rather, this state of internal contestation “suggests 
that mental health practitioners, regardless of their preferred treatment 
approach, need to remain aware of and be conversant regarding the po-
tential benefits—and risks—of alternative treatment courses and refer 
their clients to other practitioners when these alternatives better meet 
their needs.”176 Ultimately, this calls for greater engagement with the 
range of professional knowledge available. Thus, “to avoid liability when 
there are several courses of treatment available and the most appropriate 
choice is not clear, mental health providers should obtain a consultation 
from someone with expertise regarding these alternatives.”177 And, on 
the liability side, “failure to obtain a needed referral or consult when 
treating a client can constitute a breach of the standard of care and result 
in liability for the provider.”178 
Here, again, conversion therapy provides a useful example, as “dif-
ferent orientations have grown and faded in popularity over the years, 
with some discredited and associated professionals found liable when 
their clients experienced harm. For example, ‘conversion therapy,’ a 
school of thought that had a significant number of adherents at one time, 
subsequently fell out of favor, and its practitioners became the target of 
numerous professional liability claims.”179 
These examples from contested areas of mental health illustrate how 
existing tort doctrines deal with the range of professional advice, and 
                                                     
173 Id. at 42. 
174 See id. at 48-52 (providing an overview of the developments in the mental health area since 
the mid-twentieth century, resulting in the rise of psychopharmacology and psychotherapy). 
175 See, e.g., Richard A. Friedman, Psychiatry’s Identity Crisis, NEW YORK TIMES, Jul 17, 
2015, SR 5, http://nyti.ms/1Vc9kNW (arguing for increased psychotherapy research alongside 
pharmacological research). 
176 Hafemeister, McLaughlin & Smith, supra note 156, at 53-54. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 52. 
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how emergent and refuted knowledge are treated with respect to profes-
sional malpractice claims. The First Amendment can learn from this area 
in its explicit acknowledgement of a range of good advice. By conceptu-
alizing First Amendment protection as the flip side of malpractice liabil-
ity, deference to the knowledge community on the substance of advice 
follows. The takeaway can be boiled down to two simple, but critical, 
insights: first, there may not be a single right answer but rather a range of 
valid opinions that constitute good professional advice; second, the 
knowledge community—rather than the courts or legislatures—
determines what clears the bar of good advice. 
B. Evidence 
Looking at the treatment of expert witnesses in the law of evidence is 
particularly instructive because the considerations underlying admissibil-
ity of expert testimony in the microcosm of the courtroom essentially 
mirror considerations underlying the role of the First Amendment. Can 
the adversary system provide tools, such as cross-examination or coun-
ter-evidence, to weed out “bad” expert opinions? These tools mirror the 
marketplace idea and the notion of speech and counter-speech. Or does 
proper administration of the system instead require the exclusion of 
“bad” experts?180 Doing so would parallel the exclusion of outliers from 
First Amendment protection. What can First Amendment theory learn 
from the treatment of experts in the law of evidence?181 
                                                     
180 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, Evidence 664 (5th ed. 
2012) (“Daubert came amidst increasing concern over ‘junk science’); Frederick Schauer & Barbara 
A. Spellman, Is Expert Evidence Really Different?, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 1-2 
(2913)(describing Daubert as “setting out a list of factors designed principally to keep so-called junk 
science out of the courtroom ”); Cheng & Yoon, supra note 151, at 474 (“Under this view, the real 
contribution of the Daubert decision was not in creating a new doctrinal test, but rather in raising the 
overall awareness of judges—in all jurisdictions—to the problem of unreliable or ‘junk’ science.”). 
On “junk science” see generally PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE 
COURTROOM (1991). 
181 This analogy is based on an oversimplification, of course. Even under Daubert, the judge as 
gatekeeper is not intended “to decide that the testimony is right or wrong or to displace the adversary 
system. That system depends on cross-examination and allowing the other side to offer its own coun-
ter-proof, and these mechanisms put before the trier of fact the necessary information to make a 
considered judgment, to decide which side should carry the day.” MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra 
note 180, at 651. However, “Daubert expects judges to decide the question whether the theories, 
techniques, and data as applied can be trusted.” Id. Therefore, the analogy still stands. First Amend-
ment protection of professional speech does not eliminate the mechanisms of speech and counter 
speech. Second opinions, in other words, remain permissible and relevant. First Amendment protec-
tion of professional speech, and corresponding lack of protection for “unprofessional” speech, only 
limits the range of acceptable advice to that based on the knowledge community’s range of accepta-
ble insights. 
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The common law largely trusted procedural tools to ensure reliability 
of expert witnesses’ testimony.182 Since judges were deemed to have in-
adequate knowledge of the substantive areas of testimony, the common 
law did not provide the judge tools to substantively evaluate expert tes-
timony. Instead, the adversary system’s tools of cross-examination and 
counter-experts were entrusted to procure reliable testimony. With re-
spect to scientific evidence, however, the standard articulated in Frye v. 
United States demanded “general acceptance in the particular field” gov-
erned.183 In an attempt to reconcile heightened concerns about reliability 
with persisting skepticism about the judge’s role to substantively evalu-
ate scientific evidence, at the most basic level, the Frye test “deferred to 
prevailing thinking and practices in the scientific field.”184  
The Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. addressed the standard set forth in the FRE, which superseded 
Frye.185 Frye still governs in a number of states though not in the federal 
courts and a majority of states where instead the Daubert test is fol-
lowed.186 Moreover, Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael extended 
Daubert beyond scientific testimony to all expert testimony.187 Under 
Daubert, “general acceptance” is still one of the factors, though unlike in 
Frye, it is not the only one.188 Other factors include testing, peer review, 
                                                     
182 See generally Golan, supra note 155; TAL GOLAN, LAWS OF MEN AND LAWS OF NATURE: 
THE HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (2004). See also 
Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 HARV. L. 
REV. 40 (1901) (providing a historical perspective). 
183 Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013, 1014 (App.D.C. 1923) (“Just when a scientific princi-
ple or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to 
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and 
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scien-
tific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently estab-
lished to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”) (emphasis 
added). 
184 PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN, MYRNA S. RADER & DAVID CRUMP, EVIDENCE IN A NUTSHELL 326 
(5th ed. 2007). 
185 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993) (“[T]he Frye test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.”). 
186 See generally Edward K. Cheng & Albert Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of 
Scientific Admissibility Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471 (2005) (finding in “a preliminary study of 
Connecticut and the EDNY as well as a national study of all available and relevant states . . . no 
evidence that Frye or Daubert makes a difference.” Id. at 511). 
187 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) (“We conclude that Daubert’s general holding—setting forth the 
trial judge’s general ‘gatekeeping’ obligation—applies not only to testimony based on ‘scientific’ 
knowledge, but also to testimony based on ‘technical’ and ‘other specialized’ knowledge.”). 
188 Daubert at 589 (“Frye made ‘general acceptance’ the exclusive test for admitting expert sci-
entific testimony. That austere standard, absent from, and incompatible with, the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials.”). See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 180, 
at 650; Mueller, supra note, at 989 (noting that “Daubert . . . asks directly the question that Frye put 
only indirectly”). See also Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. V. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (referencing 
“general acceptance” in expanding Daubert-style judicial gatekeeper function to non-scientific ex-
perts). 
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and error rates.189 Both Frye and Daubert are designed to determine the 
reliability of the science offered.190  
Daubert makes the judge the gatekeeper of scientific and other ex-
pert evidence.191 Where “the law deferred to the scientific community on 
the question whether answers that scientists provide are sufficiently 
grounded in theory and practice to be trusted and acted upon by courts” 
before, Daubert asks judges “to independently appraise what science has 
to offer, in effect screening out evidence offered as science if it is invalid 
or unreliable.”192 But the shift of decisionmaking power from the scien-
tific community to the judiciary193 may have little practical effect. In 
practice, it is likely that judges under both regimes essentially make the 
same inquiry, focusing on general acceptance. Indeed, scholars point out 
that while Daubert makes it “the job of courts to appraise science, and 
courts are not simply to defer to the scientific community on the question 
whether evidence presented as science is valid and reliable,” they still are 
charged “to judge science by the standards that scientists deploy in judg-
ing science.”194 And in doing so, Rule 706 “allows the court at its discre-
tion to procure the assistance of an expert of its own choosing.”195  
Studies suggest that “while the Daubert decision itself may have 
raised judicial scrutiny of scientific evidence across the board, courts in 
practice engage in essentially the same analysis regardless of whether 
their jurisdiction is formally Frye or Daubert.”196 Scholars thus note 
“that the power of the Supreme Court’s Daubert decision was not so 
much in its formal doctrinal test, but rather in its ability to create greater 
awareness of the problems of junk science. This suggests that courts ap-
ply some generalized level of scrutiny when considering the reliability of 
                                                     
189 Daubert at 593-94. 
190 Christopher B. Mueller, Daubert Asks the Right Questions: Now Appellate Courts Should 
Help Find the Right Answers, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 987 (2003); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, 
supra note , at 654 (“Daubert said the trial judge is to decide whether the evidence is ‘reliable’ 
enough to be considered.”). 
191 Daubert at 589 (“[U]nder the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific tes-
timony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”). See also MUELLER & KIRKPAT-
RICK, supra note 180, at 649-50. 
192 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 180, at 654 (“Daubert said the trial judge is to decide 
whether the evidence is ‘reliable’ enough to be considered. In performing this function, Daubert did 
not want the judge to take either the word of the expert or the representations of the proponent as 
definitive.”). 
193 Cheng & Yoon, supra note 151, at 472. 
194 Mueller, supra note 190, at 1007 (emphasis added). 
195 Daubert, at 595. 
196 Cheng & Yoon, supra note 151, at 478 (citing studies by LLOYD DIXON & BRIAN GILL, 
CHANGES IN THE STANDARDS FOR ADMITTING EXPERT EVIDENCE IN FEDERAL CIVIL CASES SINCE 
THE DAUBERT DECISION (2001) and Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National 
Survey of Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
433 (2001)). 
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scientific evidence, regardless of the governing standard.”197 Both ask the 
same fundamental questions regarding general acceptance in terms of 
quality and quantity: who (or how many) has to accept what?198 Over 
time, however, “the range of reasonable difference” will be deter-
mined.199 In Kumho, for instance, the expert’s testimony “fell outside the 
range where experts might reasonably differ.”200 
The focus on methodology in Daubert201 means that “sharply con-
flicting expert opinions can all pass muster” and “[a]ccepting the exper-
tise of one witness does not entail rejecting the expertise of another wit-
ness who has come to the opposite conclusion.”202 With respect to the 
range of acceptable knowledge, “Daubert means that proponents may 
sometimes present new conclusions based on old data that have led oth-
ers to contrary conclusions.”203 Yet, the underlying concept of the law of 
evidence does privilege existing knowledge and, at a very basic level, 
causes a problem for those ahead of the curve.204 Indeed, the Daubert 
court itself was cognizant of this issue.205 
Daubert places significant weight on “the scientific method.” This 
mirrors the knowledge community’s shared notions of validity and 
common ways of knowing and reasoning. The judge does not decide on 
the substantive accuracy of the expert’s testimony; likewise, the substan-
tive content of good advice is up to the knowledge community. Both 
conceptually and from an institutional perspective, then, the law of evi-
dence can inform the treatment of professional advice as a First Amend-
ment matter. 
IV. PROFESSIONAL AND UNPROFESSIONAL ADVICE IN PRACTICE 
Only good advice should be protected as professional speech. Bad 
advice is subject to professional malpractice liability, and the First 
Amendment provides no defense. Applying the theory of First Amend-
ment protection for professional speech based on an understanding of the 
professions as knowledge communities to a range of controversial cases, 
this Part illustrates how professional and unprofessional advice can be 
                                                     
197 Cheng & Yoon, supra note 151, at 503. 
198 ROTHSTEIN, RADER & CRUMP, supra note 184, at 351-52. 
199 Id. at 368. 
200 Kumho at 153. 
201 Daubert at 595 (“The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and methodology, not 
on the conclusions they generate.”). 
202 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 180, at 651. 
203 Id. at 650. 
204 ROTHSTEIN, RADER & CRUMP, supra note 184, at 352. 
205 Daubert at 597 (“We recognize that, in practice, a gatekeeping role for the judge, no matter 
how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning authentic insights and inno-
vations.”). 
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distinguished. All of the instances discussed in the Part concern internal 
outliers. Characteristically, these professionals’ advice may depart from 
the “mainstream” of the knowledge community, but it is nonetheless 
based on the same data, using shared methods of knowing and reasoning 
and a shared methodology in evaluating the data. 
A. Tested and Refuted Knowledge 
The discussion of tested and refuted knowledge provides examples 
of outright misuse of data, as in the MMR vaccine case, as well as the 
migration of once-accepted advice from the center to the periphery and 
eventually outside of the realm of shared knowing and reasoning or, in 
the language of Kumho, “outside the range where experts reasonably can 
differ.”206 Proponents of conversion therapy, as will be shown, are in the 
process of shifting from internal to external outliers. The treatment of 
expert witnesses in recent conversion therapy litigation reflects this shift. 
One way in which formerly good professional advice can become 
unprofessional advice is through advances in the field. Hypotheses are 
subject to falsification, and when insights are tested and refuted, the re-
sult is that knowledge based on this data is rejected by the field. One 
court summed up this situation as follows: “[T]he theory that homosexu-
ality is a disorder is not novel but – like the notion that the earth is flat 
and the sun revolves around it – instead is outdated and refuted.”207 Put-
ting aside whether this characterization is exactly on point, the notion 
underlying this statement is what matters: something that once was be-
lieved to be axiomatic has been rejected by the knowledge community.208 
1. MMR Vaccine 
In early 2015, reports of a measles outbreak originating at Disney-
land in California brought renewed focus to communities refusing to 
vaccinate children.209 Aside from medical reasons that make vaccination 
impossible,210 parents cited either religious or “lifestyle” objections. In 
some instances, those parents relied on a discredited, and subsequently 
retracted, study that linked childhood mumps, measles and rubella 
                                                     
206 Kumho at 153. See also supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
207 Ferguson v. JONAH, Opinion relating to Plaintiffs’ motion to bar JONAH’s experts (“Evi-
dentiary Opinion”) at *25 (Sup.Ct. of N.J. – Hudson County, Feb 5, 2015). 
208 See also Marie-Amélie George, Expressive Ends: The Substance and Strategy of Conver-
sion Therapy Bans, 68 ALA. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript on file with author) (trac-
ing the history of the move of conversion therapy out of the medical mainstream). 
209 See, e.g., Editorial, Reckless Rejection of the Measles Vaccine, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb 3, 
2015,  http://nyti.ms/1zBS2jJ  
210 Tamar Lewin, Sick Child’s Father Seeks Vaccination Requirement in California, NEW 
YORK TIMES, Jan 29, 2015, http://nyti.ms/1wBRwMc   
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(MMR) vaccinations to autism.211 As Erwin Chemerinsky and Michele 
Goodwin discuss, there was a noticeable increase in parents refusing to 
vaccinate their children that was based on a “medically unsupported the-
ory that inoculation could lead to autism among children.”212 
While the question of objections to vaccinations primarily concerns 
claims of parental rights and religious exemptions,213 not professional 
advice, the discredited autism link illustrates an instance of “tested and 
refuted” knowledge. The autism link ostensibly was established by inter-
preting the knowledge community’s shared body of knowledge, using 
scientific methodology. But the study was flawed,214 and the knowledge 
community refuted its assertions.215 In short, the study failed to survive 
the knowledge community’s test of falsification. In addition, the author 
of the study was stripped of his medical license.216 This, in a sense, rep-
resents the easy case of tested and refuted knowledge.  
2. Conversion Therapy 
One particularly rich and currently unfolding example of how previ-
ously accepted advice becomes bad advice involves the now-discredited 
practice of conversion therapy or “sexual orientation change efforts” 
(SOCE). Over the past two years, California,217 New Jersey,218 Ore-
gon,219 Illinois,220 and the District of Columbia,221 have passed legislation 
prohibiting licensed mental health providers from offering conversion 
therapy for minors. Similar legislation is pending in a number of other 
                                                     
211 Michael Specter, A Death from Measles, THE NEW YORKER, July 3, 2015, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-death-from-measles; Clyde Haberman, A Discrecited 
Vaccine Study’s Continuing Impact on Public Health, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb 1, 2015, available at 
http://nyti.ms/1z3vHen (both discussing AJ Wakefield et al., RETRACTED: Ileal-lymphoid-nodular 
hyperplasia, non-specific colitis, and pervasive developmental disorder in children, 351 THE LAN-
CET 637 (1998) available at http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-
6736%2897%2911096-0/fulltext). See also The Editors of the Lancet, Retraction—Ileal-lymphoid-
nodular hyperplasia, non-specific colitis, and pervasive developmental disorder in children, 375 
THE LANCET 445 (2010). 
212 Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Compulsory Vaccination Laws Are Constitution-
al, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 589, 591-92 (2016) (discussing the effects of the discredited Wakefield 
study). 
213 See id. at 604-11 (explaining “why neither the claimed right of religious freedom nor the as-
serted right of parents to control the upbringing of their children justifies a constitutional exemption 
from compulsory vaccination requirements.” Id. at 604). 
214 Id. at 591.  
215 Id. at 592 (noting that “subsequent research disproved Wakefield’s findings”). 
216 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/opinion/sunday/nicholas-kristof-the-dangers-of-
vaccine-denial.html  
217 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code D. 2, Ch. 1, Art. 15 (2015). 
218 N.J. Rev. Stat. Title 45 § 45:1-54 (2014). 
219 Or. Rev. Stat. § 675.070 et seq. (2015). 
220 Youth Mental Health Protection Act, Public Act 099-0411 (2016).  
221 D.C. Official Code § 7-1231.01 et seq. (2015). 
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states,222 and federal legislation was introduced in the House in May 
2015.223 The Governor of New York implemented measures aimed at 
ending conversion therapy by executive action.224 The Obama admin-
istration225—including, most importantly for present purposes, the Sur-
geon General226—have come out against conversion therapy. Federal 
appellate courts upheld the California and New Jersey legislation, respec-
tively, but took diametrically opposed approaches in doing so.227 In addi-
tion to constitutional challenges under the free speech clause of the First 
Amendment, the legislation has been upheld against a free exercise and 
establishment clause challenge.228  
From the perspective of mental health professionals, advising minors 
to subject themselves to conversion therapy has become unprofessional 
advice.229 In response to an Oklahoma bill to protect conversion therapy, 
                                                     
222 See National Center for Lesbian Rights, #BornPerfect: Laws & Legislation by State, 
http://www.nclrights.org/bornperfect-laws-legislation-by-state/  
223 H.R.2450 (introduced 5/19/2015). Moreover, pending resolutions H.Con.Res.36 “Express-
ing the sense of Congress that conversion therapy, including efforts by mental health practitioners to 
change an individual’s sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender expression, is dangerous and 
harmful and should be prohibited from being practiced on minors” (introduced 4/14/2015) and 
S.Res.184 “A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that conversion therapy, including efforts 
by mental health practitioners to change the sexual orientation, gender identity or gender expression 
of an individual, is dangerous and harmful and should be prohibited from being practiced on minors” 
(introduced 5/21/2015) address the issue.  
224 Jesse McKinley, Cuomo Moves Against Therapy That Claims to Make Gay Children 
Straight, N.Y. TIMES Feb 6, 2016, http://nyti.ms/20gA5jM  
225 Valerie Jarrett, Official White House Response to Enact Leelah's Law to Ban All LGBTQ+ 
Conversion Therapy Response to Your Petition on Conversion Therapy, 
https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/response/response-your-petition-conversion-therapy  
226 Sunnivie Brydum, U.S. Surgeon General Opposes Conversion Therapy, THE ADVOCATE, 
April 10, 2015, http://www.advocate.com/ex-gay-therapy/2015/04/10/watch-us-surgeon-general-
opposes-conversion-therapy  
227 Compare Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2013) (upholding California conversion 
therapy law as permissible regulation of conduct) with King v. Christie, 767 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(upholding New Jersey conversion therapy law as permissible regulation of speech). Despite the 
circuit split on this issue, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in King v. Christie, 135 S.Ct. 2048 
(2015). 
228 See Welch v. Brown, 58 F.Supp.3d 1079 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (upholding California conversion 
therapy law against Free Exercise and Establishment Clause challenge). 
229 See, e.g., King v. Christie, Brief of Amici Curiae American Association for Marriage and 
Family Therapy-New Jersey Division, New Jersey Psychological Association, National Association 
of Social Workers, National Association of Social Workers, New Jersey Chapter, and New Jersey 
Psychiatric Association Supporting Defendants-Appellees Urging Affirmance, 2014 WL 991477 
(2014) at 4 (stating that the New Jersey conversion therapy law “reflects a broad consensus of re-
sponsible medical and mental health experts that efforts to change a child’s sexual orientation may 
cause harm to the child, and that the use of Sexual Orientation Change Efforts (‘SOCE’) provides no 
benefits that derive from SOCE itself and that could not be achieved through competent professional 
counseling that does not attempt to change sexual orientation. . . . [T]he statute is based on the cur-
rent scientific understanding that homosexuality is not a mental disorder that can or should be 
‘cured.’”). The amicus brief concludes: 
As the medical and mental health communities have made clear for the last forty years, homo-
sexuality is not a mental disorder in need of a “cure.” The medical and mental health communi-
ties have advised against practices that attempt to change an individual’s sexual orientation be-
cause such attempts can cause long-term harm, particularly in the case of minors. 
(continued next page) 
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members of the profession articulated their opposition based on profes-
sional insights.230 
In Ferguson et al. v. JONAH (Jews Offering New Alternatives for 
Healing f/k/a Jews Offering New Alternatives to Homosexuality), a New 
Jersey court after jury trial found conversion therapy providers to be en-
gaged in consumer fraud.231 This case is particularly instructive precisely 
for its treatment of expert testimony and the limits set to the scope of 
valid professional knowledge. In the course of that litigation, experts 
called to testify on the benefits of conversion therapy were excluded, 
illustrating how a once accepted practice has been eliminated from the 
canon of professional knowledge—from being offered by internal outli-
ers to being offered by external outliers. While the pretrial ruling has no 
formal precedential effect, it did make the national news as a noteworthy 
development in conversion therapy litigation.232 
Plaintiffs in the case argued that the expert testimony should be ex-
cluded because, first, “it is a scientific fact that homosexuality is not a 
disorder, but rather a normal variation of human sexuality, and thus any 
expert opinion concluding that homosexuality is a disorder is inadmissi-
ble.”233 They based this assertion on the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion’s 1973 removal of homosexuality as a mental disorder from the Di-
agnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), which was 
followed by professional organizations domestically and worldwide.234 
Second, plaintiffs argued, “because the belief that homosexuality is a 
mental disorder is false and lacks any basis in science, any expert opin-
ion that is derived from that false initial premise is unreliable and should 
be excluded.”235 Moreover, they note that “because their belief that ho-
mosexuality is a disorder conflicts with the understanding held by every 
legitimate professional association, these experts have banded together 
under NARTH’s umbrella.”236 JONAH, by contrast, claimed that “reli-
                                                                                                                       
Id. at 23. 
230 William S. Meyer, Duke psychiatry professor: Sally Kern’s conversion therapy bill would 
do irreparable harm to Oklahoma children, TULSA WORLD, March 8, 2015. 
231 Erik Eckholm, In a First, New Jersey Jury Says Group Selling Gay Cure Committed Fraud, 
NEW YORK TIMES, June 25, 2015, A18, available at http://nyti.ms/1JmFMJv  
232 See, e.g., Jason Grant, Selling Cure for Being Gay Found Illegal in New Jersey, NEW YORK 
TIMES, Feb 13, 2015, http://nyti.ms/1MkMaR0; Olga Khazan, Can Sexuality Be Changed? THE 
ATLANTIC, Jun 3, 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/06/can-sexuality-be-
changed/394490/; Olga Khazan, When the Therapist Is A Quack, THE ATLANTIC, Jun 4, 2015,  
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/06/when-your-therapist-is-a-quack/394886/;Olga 
Khazan, The End of Gay Conversion Therapy, THE ATLANTIC, Jun 26, 2015, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/06/the-end-of-gay-conversion-therapy/396953/  
233 Ferguson v. JONAH, Evidentiary Opinion at *12 (Sup.Ct. of N.J. – Hudson County, Feb 5, 
2015). 
234 Id. 
235 Id. at *12-13 
236 Id. at 13. See also supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text (discussing the formation of 
NARTH in opposition to the American Psychiatric Association’s stance on homosexuality). 
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ance on the DSM is misplaced because the removal of homosexuality 
was a political, rather than scientific, decision.”237 Moreover, defendants 
insisted on “their experts’ clinical experience in SOCE” and the sound-
ness of their methods.238  
In excluding the expert witnesses, the judge stated: “The overwhelm-
ing weight of scientific authority concludes that homosexuality is not a 
disorder or abnormal. The universal acceptance of that scientific conclu-
sion – save for outliers such as JONAH – requires that any expert opin-
ions to the contrary must be barred.”239 Turning to the question of relia-
bility, since the litigation occurred in New Jersey state court, the Frye 
standard governed.240 Applying the general acceptance standard, the 
court noted that “the DSM is unquestionably authoritative in the mental 
health field,” citing several instances in which other courts have found 
so.241 With respect to the allegation that the decision to remove homo-
sexuality from the DSM was political rather than scientific, the court 
stated that “a trial court should not substitute its judgment for that of the 
relevant scientific community.”242 Nonetheless, the court did note in a 
footnote that “the APA does, in fact, provide a scientific reason for its 
decision to remove homosexuality as a disorder.”243 Whether the APA’s 
decision to “generally accept that homosexuality is not a disorder” was 
correct, however, “is not a proper inquiry for a court.”244 
Expanding on the meaning of “general acceptance,” the court noted 
that it “is not an end in itself. Nevertheless, general acceptance consti-
tutes strong – some might say conclusive – indicia of whether a sufficient 
level of reliability has been achieved.”245 Indeed, “[c]ountless organiza-
tions have followed the APA’s lead in removing homosexuality from its 
listings of mental disorders.”246 Although JONAH argued that a more 
flexible standard governing “a new technique or theory” should apply,247 
the court noted that this case presented the exact opposite situation: while 
                                                     
237 Ferguson v. JONAH, Evidentiary Opinion at *15 (Sup.Ct. of N.J. – Hudson County, Feb 5, 
2015). 
238 Id. 
239 Id. at *19. 
240 Id. at *21 (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)) and id. at *25 (“The 
correct legal standard here is Frye’s general acceptance standard) . 
241 Id.  
242 Id. at *22 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
243 Id. at *22 n.3.  
244 Id. at *22 (“It is not a proper inquiry for a court to determine the correctness of the APA’s 
decision to generally accept that homosexuality is not a disorder, and no proper basis has been ad-
vanced on which a court may reassess the scientific accuracy of the psychiatric categorization of 
homosexuality.”). 
245 Id. at *23 (internal citations omitted). 
246 Id. (further noting that “JONAH hardly can argue that all of these organizations – including 
a federal appellate court – were the victims of manipulation by ‘gay lobbying’ groups. Regardless, it 
is not up to this court to decide that question.”). 
247 Id. at *24. 
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homosexuality was listed in the DSM in the past, it has been removed.248 
And “JONAH has not identified any case that provides a standard for the 
admission of obsolete and discredited scientific theories. By definition, 
such theories are unreliable and can offer no assistance to the jury, but 
rather present only confusion and prejudice.”249 
Moreover, the court addressed the question of unanimity with respect 
to the general acceptance standard, concluding that “JONAH also cannot 
point to the existence of NARTH to counter the general acceptance 
standard. This argument, which assumes that general acceptance requires 
unanimity, is incorrect.”250 Thus, “general acceptance does not depend on 
unanimous or universal agreement within the scientific community.”251 
“The existence of a minority of conversion therapy proponents does not 
and cannot negate the fact that the DSM and its exclusion of homosexu-
ality are generally accepted in the mental health field. Furthermore, a 
group of a few closely associated experts cannot incestuously validate 
one another as a means of establishing the reliability of their shared theo-
ries.”252 
Finally, the court did take up the methodology question: “Although 
not necessary to this decision, one cannot fail but notice that several of 
the JONAH experts’ reports are riddled with methodological errors that 
also render their opinions inadmissible; these include the refusal to con-
sider studies that do not support their views, and the plagiarism of anoth-
er JONAH expert’s prior work without independent research or analy-
sis.”253 In the end, the court rightly deferred to the knowledge communi-
ty’s insights. In excluding the expert witnesses, it mirrored the current 
state of the profession’s standard of good professional advice. 
B. Emergent Knowledge 
The discussion of emergent knowledge that follows illustrates a shift 
in the opposite direction: using medical marijuana as an example, outli-
ers’ advice can become more widely accepted in the field. The “guy 
ahead of the curve”-problem poses one of the most vexing puzzles. The 
medical marijuana cases illustrate the shift from the fringe of the 
knowledge community toward the center—when the mainstream of the 
profession subsequently catches up with the “guy ahead of the curve.” As 
already mentioned, as a matter of evidence law, the Daubert court recog-
                                                     
248 Id. at *25. 
249 Id. 
250 Id. 
251 Id. at *26. 
252 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
253 JONAH at 26 n. 4. 
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nized that an approach that privileges existing knowledge harbors the 
risk of stifling innovation. Here, the perfect congruence of First Amend-
ment protection and tort liability is challenged.  
State regulation of off-label drug use provides an example of innova-
tive or generally accepted advice within the knowledge community that 
conflicts with a state-imposed regulatory scheme restricting professional 
advice. The off-label drug use example illustrates how state regulation 
and professional insights collide when the state seeks to restrict profes-
sional advice. Here, the need for a dynamic system of deference to the 
knowledge community becomes clear. 
1. Medical Marijuana  
In contrast to tested and refuted knowledge, emergent knowledge by 
definition is generally untested. The medical marijuana cases provide an 
example of how emergent and untested knowledge can gain traction 
within the knowledge community and advance to an accepted position. 
One key question in this context is whether marijuana has medical use, 
and who determines whether it does or does not.254 The federal govern-
ment continues to adhere to the view “that marijuana has no currently 
accepted medical use in treatment in the United States.”255 The D.C. Cir-
cuit affirmed the government’s determination.256 But the medical com-
munity’s views on medical marijuana have shifted over time.257 The First 
Amendment question, then, is whether doctors’ advice regarding the 
benefits of medical marijuana is protected professional speech, or wheth-
er the government’s determination makes it unprofessional advice.  
A California initiative, the Compassionate Use Act, took effect in 
1996, providing a “right to obtain and use marijuana for medical purpos-
es.” The recommendation for use had to be made “by a physician who 
has determined that the person’s health would benefit from the use of 
                                                     
254 The Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 801 et seq. classifies drugs in five Schedules. 
Schedule I controlled substances have “no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United 
States.” See, e.g., Conant v. McCaffrey, 2000 WL 1281174 at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (discussing the 
classification of drugs in the medical marijuana context). 
255 Editorial, A Sensible Bill on Medical Marijuana, NEW YORK TIMES, March 11, 2015, A24 
http://nyti.ms/19bdH8p See also Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681, 686 (N.D. Cal. 
1997)(issuing preliminary injunction limiting government’s ability to prosecute physicians who 
recommend use of medical marijuana). 
256 See Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 15 F.3d 1131 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994). 
257 Philip M. Boffey, What Science Says About Marijuana, NEW YORK TIMES, July 30, 2014, 
http://nyti.ms/1o5yvBE; Aaron E. Carroll, How ‘Medical’ Is Marijuana? NEW YORK TIMES, July 
20, 2015, http://nyti.ms/1KfYwbv (discussing Penny F. Whiting, Robert F. Wolff, Sohan Desh-
pande, Marcello Di Nisio, Steven Duffy, et al., Cannabinoids for Medical Use: A Systematic Review 
and Meta-Analysis, 313 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2456 (2015)). See also Deepak Cyr-
il D'Souza, Mohini Ranganathan, Editorial, Medical Marijuana: Is the Cart Before the Horse? 313 J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N 2431 (2015). 
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marijuana.”258 In the California cases, the district court and the Ninth 
Circuit alike noted that what is at stake is doctors’ ability “on an individ-
ualized basis, to give advice and recommendations.”259 Pursuant to fed-
eral policy, “the government confirmed that it would prosecute physi-
cians, revoke their prescription licenses, and deny them participation in 
Medicare and Medicaid for recommending medical marijuana.”260 With 
respect to the doctors’ First Amendment claim, plaintiffs asserted that the 
policy prevents them from “offer[ing] patients their best medical judg-
ment regarding the use of marijuana to treat disease.”261 The government 
clarified its position, stating that it “does not prohibit physicians from 
discussing the risks and benefits of marijuana” and that it did not seek to 
“prevent physicians from communicating their professional judgments 
regarding the risks and benefits of any course of treatment.”262 Nonethe-
less, physicians are not allowed to “provide their patients with oral or 
written statements in order to enable them to obtain controlled substances 
in violation of federal law.”263 
Granting a preliminary injunction, the district court noted that “phy-
sicians contend they have censored their medical advice to patients,” and 
“patients allege that as a result of the government’s policy, they no long-
er trust in their physicians’ advice.”264 Finding the speech to be protected 
by the First Amendment, the court concluded that the government may 
only prosecute California physicians if “it has probable cause to charge 
under the federal aiding and abetting and/or conspiracy statutes.”265 The 
court thus protected the scope of professional advice consistent with the 
knowledge community’s emergent knowledge, despite ongoing scientific 
debate. The Ninth Circuit subsequently agreed with the district court’s 
assessment on the First Amendment issue, noting that “[t]he government 
policy does . . . strike at core First Amendment interests of doctors and 
patients.”266   
                                                     
258 Conant v. McCaffrey, at 685. 
259 Id. at 686. See also Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 631 (9th Cir. 2002). 
260 Conant v. McCaffrey, at 686. The federal policy was upheld in Pearson v. McCaffrey, 139 
F.Supp.2d 113 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
261 Conant v. McCaffrey, at 686. 
262 Id. at 688.  
263 Id. 
264 Id. at 690 (further noting as one of the results that “physicians . . . are unable to advise pa-
tients about safe use of marijuana or guide proper use of marijuana for treatment” id. at 691). 
265 Id. at 701; Conant v. McCaffrey, 2000 WL 1281174 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (granting in part and 
denying in part cross-motions for summary judgment; dissolving preliminary injunction; entering 
permanent injunction). See also Haupt, supra note 6, at 1300-01 (discussing the question of First 
Amendment protection of doctors’ speech in these cases). 
266 Conant v. Walters, at 636 (“An integral component of the practice of medicine is the com-
munication between a doctor and a patient. Physicians must be able to speak frankly and openly to 
patients.”). 
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In these cases, the characterization of medical knowledge on the 
benefits of marijuana reveals the changing nature of the profession’s in-
sights. In 1997, the district court stated that “a majority of Californians, 
and many physicians, apparently believe that medical marijuana may be 
a safe and effective treatment.”267 By the time the controversy reached 
the Ninth Circuit, Judge Alex Kozinski characteristically made the point 
very clear: 
To those unfamiliar with the issue, it may seem faddish or foolish for a doc-
tor to recommend a drug that the federal government finds has “no currently 
accepted medical use in treatment in the United States” . . . But the record 
in this case, as well as the public record, reflect a legitimate and growing 
division of informed opinion on this issue. A surprising number of health 
care professionals and organizations have concluded that the use of mariju-
ana may be appropriate for a small class of patients who do not respond 
well to, or do not tolerate, available prescription drugs.268 
Summarizing professional findings on the matter,269 he concluded 
that “there is a genuine difference of expert opinion on the subject, with 
significant scientific and anecdotal evidence supporting both points of 
view.”270 For patients, “obtaining candid and reliable information about a 
possible avenue of relief is of vital importance.”271 On a matter of emer-
gent knowledge, then, the First Amendment rightly protects differing 
opinions as good professional advice.  
Beyond the First Amendment context, the shift from the periphery to 
the core of professional knowledge is also reflected to a certain extent in 
the treatment of expert testimony in United States v. Oakland Cannabis 
Buyers’ Cooperative272 and Gonzales v. Raich.273 OCBC argued that “a 
drug may not yet have achieved general acceptance as a medical treat-
ment but may nonetheless have medical benefits to a particular patient or 
class of patients.”274 Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, however, 
“decline[d] to parse the statute in this manner.”275 As Jessie Hill noted, 
“despite the fact that the patients in OCBC presented evidence, unrefuted 
by the Government, that marijuana may have legitimate medical uses and 
may be the only appropriate treatment for some patients, the Court re-
                                                     
267 Conant v. McCaffrey, at 686. 
268 Conant v. Walters, 640-41 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
269 Id. at 641-42. 
270 Id. at 642. 
271 Id.  
272 532 U.S. 483 (2001) (holding that no implied medical necessity exception exists for the 
Controlled Substances Act). 
273 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that application of the Controlled Substances Act to intrastate 
growers and users of medical marijuana does not violate the Commerce Clause). 
274 523 U.S. 493. 
275 Id. 
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fused to consider that evidence, finding itself to be powerless to override 
a conclusory and controversial congressional finding.”276  
Four years later, in Gonzales v. Raich, a commerce clause case, Jus-
tice Stevens noted that “[t]he case is made difficult by respondents’ 
strong arguments that they will suffer irreparable harm, because despite a 
congressional finding to the contrary, marijuana does have valid thera-
peutic purposes.”277 Justice Thomas in dissent further points out that “the 
Medical Board of California has issued guidelines for physicians’ canna-
bis recommendations, and it sanctions physicians who do not comply 
with the guidelines.”278 These cases did not hinge on the knowledge 
community’s professional knowledge, but they demonstrate how courts 
do or do not deal with changing professional insights when emergent 
knowledge is at issue. 
2. Off-Label Use 
In order to gain approval by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), prescription drugs must pass rigorous clinical trials. Upon ap-
proval of the medication, the FDA approves labeling that includes the 
chemical composition, the mechanism of action, and the regimen upon 
which approval is based. But once the FDA has approved the drug, phy-
sicians are free to prescribe it to treat illnesses and patients beyond those 
in the trials.279 This is known as “off-label” or “evidence-based” use; as 
of 2008, over one-fifth of prescriptions in the United States fell into this 
category.280 
Off-label use raises numerous First Amendment questions. In addi-
tion to free speech questions related to the marketing of drugs,281 there is 
a First Amendment issue directly at the heart of professional advice. 
Scholars have noted that “if FDA were to proscribe off-label uses of 
                                                     
276 B. Jessie Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment Decisions: A Tale of 
Two Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277, 294 (2007). 
277 545 U.S. 11. 
278 Id. At 62 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
279 See 21 U.S.C. § 396 (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit or interfere with 
the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally marketed device to a 
patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health care practitioner-patient relation-
ship.”). 
280 Jacob Rogers, Freedom of Speech and the FDA’s Regulation of Off-Label Drug Uses, 76 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1429 (2008). 
281 Generally, off-label uses may not be used for promotion of prescription drugs which raises 
First Amendment questions. See, e.g., Christopher Robertson, When Truth Cannot Be Presumed: 
The Regulation of Drug Promotion Under and Expanding First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 545 
(2014); Steven R. Salbu, Off-Label Use, Prescription and Marketing of FDA-Approved Drugs: An 
Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory Policy, 51 FLA. L. REV. 181 (1999); Dina McKenney, 
Note, Off-Label Drug Promotion and the Use of Disclaimers, 92 TEX. L. REV. 231 (2013); Gina 
Shaw, Is Off-Label Marketing a First Amendment Right?, 9 NEUROLOGY TODAY 20 (2009); Rodney 
A. Smolla, Off-Label Drug Advertising and the First Amendment, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 81 
(2015).  
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drugs, it would interfere with physicians’ judgments about how to treat 
their patients, which is forbidden by the [Food, Drug, and Cosmetics 
Act].”282 But doctors’ freedom to prescribe drugs off-label came into di-
rect conflict with state regulation to limit this ability in the abortion con-
text. Several states, including Texas,283 Ohio284 and Oklahoma,285 passed 
legislation requiring doctors to follow FDA protocol for medication 
abortions. Yet, the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted that off-label use is 
“common, permissible, and can be required by good medical practice.”286 
This type of legislation represents an instance of the legislature determin-
ing against the insights of the profession what should be considered good 
professional advice. In effect, the legislature in these cases codifies pre-
viously good advice that has attained internal outlier status by subsequent 
innovation and advances in the field. Professional advice based on this 
emergent knowledge has become good advice.   
The FDA approved mifepristone (RU-486) in 2000. In doing so, it 
“approved a specific regimen for administering mifepristone, but soon 
thereafter abortion providers began to change the protocol.” 287After the 
drug was approved, “additional clinical trials led to the development of 
new protocols for administering” it.288 Under the new regimen, the dos-
age of mifepristone was reduced to one-third of the original dosage. 
Moreover, women could self-administer a second drug at home. The 
length of time during which the drugs could be administered was extend-
ed under the new regimen.289 The second drug, “Misoprostol has not 
been approved by the FDA for use in abortions but has been approved by 
the FDA to treat ulcers.”290 An alternative evidence-based regimen “in-
volve[s] the use of methotrexate,” a drug whose “FDA-approved label . . 
. is silent on abortion-related uses.”291 The Oklahoma and Ohio legisla-
                                                     
282 Robertson, supra note 281, at 548. 
283 See Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583, 600-605 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(upholding Texas law requiring physicians to follow FDA protocol). 
284 See Planned Parenthood Southwestern Ohio Region v. DeWine, 696 F.3d 490 (6th Cir. 
2012) (upholding Ohio law requiring adherence to the FDA protocol). 
285 See Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive Justice v. Cline, 292 P.3d 27 (S.Ct. Okla. 2012) 
(holding Oklahoma statute facially unconstitutional) cert. granted 133 S.Ct. 2887 (2013) certified 
Cline v. Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive Justice, 313 P.3d 253 (S.Ct. Okla. 2013) cert. dis-
missed as improvidently granted 134 S.Ct. 550 (2013). 
286 Cline v. Oklahoma Coalition for Reproductive Justice, 313 P.3d 253, 258 (S.Ct. Okla. 
2013). 
287 Caitlin E. Borgman, Abortion Exceptionalism and Undue Burden Preemption, 71 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1047, 1056 (2014). 
288 Cline at 257. 
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tures passed legislation requiring that doctors follow the FDA proto-
col.292 
In requiring doctors to prescribe drugs contrary to professional prac-
tice, the legislation seeks to bind doctors to the uses indicated on the la-
bel. In short, the legislature determines against the knowledge communi-
ty’s insights what constitutes good professional advice. Stated another 
way, the state requires doctors to dispense unprofessional advice. In 
these cases, the courts did not consider the First Amendment implica-
tions of limiting professional advice. Given the newly fractured land-
scape among federal appellate courts regarding the proper interpretation 
of the First Amendment implications of Planned Parenthood v. Casey,293 
however, this area of the law appears to be in flux.294 The Fourth Circuit 
fundamentally challenged the Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ positions on pro-
fessional speech in the abortion context. Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson noted 
that “[t]he single paragraph in Casey does not assert that physicians for-
feit their First Amendment rights in the procedures surrounding abor-
tions.”295 With respect to the relationship between the undue burden 
standard and the First Amendment, he further pointed out: “The fact that 
a regulation does not impose an undue burden on a woman under the due 
process clause does not answer the question of whether it imposes an 
impermissible burden on the physician under the First Amendment.”296 
In short, First Amendment protection of professional speech in the abor-
tion context is unresolved by Casey and newly disputed among the cir-
cuits. 
The theory of professional speech focused on the professions as 
knowledge communities resolves the issue in favor of First Amendment 
                                                     
292 The FDA changed the mifepristone guidelines in spring 2016. See 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/uc
m111323.htm. See also Sabrina Travernise, New F.D.A. Guidelines Ease Access to Abortion Pill, 
NEW YORK TIMES, March 30, 2016, A1,  http://nyti.ms/22OWdIM  
293 505 U.S. 833 (1992). The somewhat cryptic passage in Casey dealing with the First 
Amendment states: 
All that is left of petitioners’ argument is an asserted First Amendment right of a physi-
cian not to provide information about the risks of abortion, and childbirth, in a manner 
mandated by the State. To be sure, the physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak 
are implicated, see Wooley v. Maynard . . . , but only as part of the practice of medicine, 
subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State, cf. Whalen v. Roe . . . We see 
no constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physician provide the information 
mandated by the State here. 
Id. at 884. 
294 See Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 248 (4th Cir. 2014) (rejecting the Fifth and Eighth Cir-
cuits’ interpretation of constitutionality of abortion regulations under the First Amendment) cert. 
denied sub nom Walker-McGill v. Stuart, 135 S.Ct. 2838 (2015). See also Scott W. Gaylord, Fourth 
Circuit Survey, Comment, Casey and the First Amendment: Revisiting an Old Case to Resolve a 
New Compelled Speech Controversy, 66 S.C. L. REV. 951 (2015). 
295 Stuart v. Camnitz at 249. 
296 Id.  
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protection of professionals’ advice from state interference. The FDA as 
licensing body, moreover, should not determine the limits of professional 
advice.297 In fact, this is what the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act explicit-
ly states: “Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit or interfere 
with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer 
any legally marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease 
within a legitimate health care practitioner-patient relationship.”298 
Citing this provision, the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted the depar-
ture in the abortion context from the usual deference awarded to physi-
cians’ professional judgment.299 Permitting off-label use acknowledges 
the fact that professional knowledge is not static: “Researchers continue 
to perform clinical trials, doctors continue to gain experience, and wide-
spread use of a particular treatment allows the medical community to 
collect data about side effects, alternative doses, and potential new uses 
for treatments.”300 Leading professional organizations have endorsed the 
type of off-label used prohibited by the Oklahoma legislation.301 The 
court cites the FDA’s statement that “[g]ood medical practice and the 
best interests of the patient require that physicians use legally available 
drugs, biologics and devices according to their best knowledge and 
judgment.”302 This is true in all other areas of the law, and it is, in fact, 
“unprofessional conduct” to prescribe, dispense, or administer “drugs in 
excess of the amount considered good medical practice.”303 In conclu-
sion, the Oklahoma Supreme Court emphasized the role of the physi-
cian’s “knowledge and experience.”304 It agreed with the district court 
that the legislature’s restrictions are “completely at odds with the stand-
ard that governs the practice of medicine.”305 The First Amendment, con-
sequently, should provide a shield against the state’s requirement that 
professionals dispense unprofessional advice. Ultimately, the theory of 
professional speech and advice-giving offered here supports the Okla-
                                                     
297 The divergence was eliminated in the 2016 updated guidelines. Travermise, supra note 292 
(“The American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists said in a statement that it was ‘pleased 
that the updated F.D.A.-approved regimen for mifepristone reflects the current available scientific 
evidence and best practices.’”). 
298 21 U.S.C. § 396. 
299 Cline, 260-61 (noting that this is “[i]n contrast to the deference physicians receive regarding 
treatment decisions in almost all other areas of medicine”). 
300 Id. at 260. 
301 Id. at 261 (“Both the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the World 
Health Organization have endorsed these alternate regimens as safer and more effective than the 
now-outdated regimen provided for in mifepristone’s FDA-approved label.”). 
302 Id. 
303 Id.  
304 Id. (“The role of the physician is to heal the sick and the injured, and physicians are required 
to undergo rigorous training to develop the required knowledge and experience to perform that role 
well.”). 
305 Id.  
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homa Supreme Court’s position on off-label drug use and rejects the op-
posite outcome in the decisions of the Fifth and Sixth Circuit. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The First Amendment should provide robust protection for profes-
sional speech. The scope of protection has to take into account that a 
range of professional knowledge may count as good advice. Individual 
professionals may differ in their individual judgments, but being a pro-
fessional still implies that they subscribe to a shared body of knowledge. 
And the shared notions of validity limit the range of professional opin-
ions that may be found valid within the profession. 
To the extent that the knowledge community decides that outlier sta-
tus is encompassed by the range of defensible professional knowledge, 
state regulation should mirror this. Advice that is given in accordance 
with this range is good professional advice; what falls outside the scope 
is unprofessional advice. The client seeks good professional advice, that 
is, defensible professional knowledge. The First Amendment should pro-
vide robust protection for this type of advice, but it does not protect un-
professional advice. 
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